Profile of coh2player

What was not normal up to 39':

1. German General Staff/prussian military traditions & almost myopic focus on tactics, troop training and operations
2. focus on mobile warfare, the creation of the panzer and light divisions. This is along with the tendency to concentrate development in the top 20% (mobile units).
3. No strategic air force or surface navy of note; a larger share resources instead shifted to developing ground force and tactical airpower in service of ground forces.
4. German military was a 'one shot'/ "shop window" force that was structured around short wars of movement rather than long attrition battles (like the Red Army). They invested a time and resources in divisional training which meant that most of their capability was in intangibles/capabilities rather than durable systems and production. They had to win fast or not at all.

But this is normal for a peacetime army; keep the officer cadre intact and recruit/conscript as need arises, rather than keep a whole army sitting around doing nothing. The Red Army certainly did this in the 80's at least, and the US is similarly top-heavy now, despite its degree of activity.

I find the German Army to be the best in 39-41- as it fought in wars that it was designed for. The greatest operational weapon they fielded was Fliegerkorps 8 and Panzergruppe 1 to 4. FK-8 may have set the standard for aerial-ground support in WW2. Their infantry divisions were also pretty solid. By 42', their capabilities were much deteriorated but they had some left for the summer offensive and surgical set-piece operations. By 43' they were in irreversible decline and basically fell apart in the summer of 43' with the infantry arm collapsing before and during the battle for the Dnepr.

44-45 there is not much of note left in the German military except the 'GD' division, which was an elite that was kept up to older standards. Without high capability units, they can't do much.

Carius was a member of 502nd Heavy. 2./502 with its 9 tigers was the first to get there, and Carius was one of them. The whole battalion later arrived. They fought in AGN sector for a long time, and I can kind of see why so many of the 502nd Tiger crews racked up a lot of kills. The Germans performed few offensive actions of note. For the defender, the terrain was restrained to narrow mobility corridors for approaching armor. The front was somewhat static, and a slugfest until early 1944 without major strategic collapses.

This meant that the tiger crews were able to get a lot of relevant experience and skill in that particular region without getting killed like in other sectors. Similarly, in the air there was Walter Nowotny of LF-I who shot down a ridiculous number of aircraft overhead.

Of course, this should not be distracted from the fact that he and his comrades helped maintain the siege of Leningrad, and helped kill over half a million civilians in the city.

Divisions in mid- late 44' that retained higher standards (IMO) were:

-Panzer Lehr
-2.Pz, 9.Pz, 11.Pz
-116.Pz 'Windhund'- It was originally 16.PzG in the East.
-2.SS 'Das Reich'

The new 'volksgrenadier' divisions were usually merged remnants or renamed 'old' divisions. The 62nd VG division in the battle of the bulge was actually a poorly equipped veteran division, and outperformed its peers due its men.

it would be interesting to know how many german veterans units and formations were on the west front upon the arrival of the D-Day troops in Normandy and with all the newly german armies that were created by that time is even hard to know .

In reading some of your posts, you come across as not meticulous enough with sources; for instance, the book "Michael Wittmann and Waffen SS Tigers of the Leibstandarte" is written by a neo-nazi, Pat Agte. It is hero worship and falsification, not history.

Carius' book, "Tigers in the Mud" is also unconfirmed by Soviet (TsAMO) and Allied sources so his claims should be taken with spoonfuls of salt.

On Axishistory.com, there are meticulous researchers that largely conclude that the "Tank Ace" phenomenon was a nazi propaganda invention via archival digs. As far as Wittmann goes, his Villers-Bocage Kill claim is not confirmed by Allied sources, in fact the allied records are closer to 1/3rd of his SS document. This incident was used to boost Nazi, particularly SS propaganda efforts and morale on the home front, and its significance was overblown.

In Carius' interview, he also says that Knispel's score was goosed up like his was.

All three were good tank soldiers, but hero-worship is not necessary.

One of the finest tank commanders in WW2(Not better than Wittmann though) and gave the Americans and Russians one hell of a fight, so he has my respect. I wonder if the modern German Army will attend his funeral or pay respects? In a way, men like Otto Cariius, Wittmann and Kurt Knispel paved the way for modern tank combat, and if there's any tank aces that emerge from future conflicts, they'll have these German tank commanders to thank.

Of interest is how Carius, in his life, was much more active in most in helping create the "Tiger Legend" with his participation in the whole tank hobby realm, his acceptance of fans, and his book. There is some good and bad to this.

Also, in an interview at his pharmacy, he basically admitted that his kill score was exaggerated by the propaganda ministry and was closer 100. If I have time later, I may try to track down the source again. Given the propensity for the Germans (not singular to them, other armed forces also exaggerate) to overclaim by 2:1 or 3:1 in tank kills, his real score was probably around 50 kills.

But Carius (with his men) rescued an entire encircled German army, with Navy support, whereas Wittmann was facing troops with lesser tanks and simply carried out a surprise attack.

You mean General Strachwitz's special operations panzergruppe, in which Carius' unit was apart of. or another incident?