I think you are seeing it as a football game a bit. The whole German war was a giant gamble against a superior coalition that fell apart in 1941', and the rest was just them trying to figure out how to avoid total defeat. (which was pretty damn interesting in its own right)
True, the German military weakness was a tendency to be hyperaggressive and execute operations on a razor edge. You can see this from the small unit up to the grand strategic level. It's madness. But it was also a double edged sword.
Case Blue actually had many encirclements- just nothing compared to Barbarossa or Typhoon phase I. The biggest one was the encirclement at Kalach (up to 75,000)and the early ones in the caucasus. The real effect was the rapid gain of territory with the panzer drives, which caused the soviet armies to retreat and lose much of their stores and equipment making them much less effective in future ops. The irony is that the pre-Case Blue encirclements (up to 230,000) and surgical ops were more successful at reducing the soviet oob.
American/British complaints of logistics problems and the British manpower crisis actually pale compared to German problems in 41' and 42'. As early late august 1941, the German mobile forces could only get their strength up to 50-75% maximum in all categories provided a two week refitting period. Their actual strength was around 50% in armor and vehicles operable. By mid-Oct 1941, for instance, the Germans had only 13% of their vehicle fleet still running and were typically getting only 40-60% of the minimum supplies they needed to sustain the offensive. And they were just starting Operation Typhoon!! Then in two weeks, the Vyzama/Bryansk pockets are closed with over a million into the prisoner hauls or dead.
Wars are won at the Strategic level. The allies and the soviets were on the ball on this one. However, other things points out to operational art at the tactical and operational levels- basically the W.Allied armies aren't aggressive, effective, or ambitious enough. Basically the West Front armies and airpower may have needed a different configuration and doctrine other than variations of 'methodical' battle. It would be an attempt to replicate blitzkrieg, although in West. Allied terms. In 1940 you have Rommel's 7.Pz taking 94,000 British and French prisoners before the armistice using german methods. The others did nearly as good in France and in Russia 41'.
It is possible you are quite right... But if I am an infantryman and have the choice of fighting under a Prussian who studies fine use of minimal necessary materials in an artistic duel or the American logistician who believes in massing a huge punch that you land after blowing up everything on the other side.... And then winding up for another big punch, I would rather be on the side of the US and let the historians disparage the way I won.
So again, if you are an allied commander you hit hard, and if you end up having to stop there isn't a reason to risk a strategic overreach if you can just wait a bit and wind up the next punch.
(If I hear you correctly this is part of the argument that the Germans were not at their best in the West yet they still managed to hold off the Allies because... they were so good? And to an American, to say "you only won because you hit us with much more than you needed to" will often probably only get the response "yeah.... so what's your point?")
Case Blue is in part the counter argument to the whole "encirclement" argument. By Case Blue there just weren't the kind of successful massed encirclements of Soviets. The Soviets had a few more months of experience under them and were much more successful at avoiding that kind of devastation. Likewise the Germans were aware of the dangers, having done it so many times to others. They fought tooth and nail to unplug the Poles who were threatening to close the Falaise pocket and hold it open long enough to allow at least the troops if not the material to escape.
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