Profile of coh2player

The German way was to rely on the abilities of their mobile forces (20% of their army) to help them win the war. If this 'elite component' possessed a superiority, it could 'offset' their material inferiority and their infantry divisions, which were much more pedestrian.

The German panzer forces did major re-organization and re-equipping work after 1939, 1940, and before Barbarossa. This was basically a learning and correction period. They started the war being very different, being very high armor like the soviets but few infantry and recon assets, and having brigade structures. The whole structure was re-worked. They learned how to coordinate combined arms, air power, and logistics even better in battle.

A big reason why the performance of the panzer divisions was so good in 1941 and consistently good until 43 had to do with this outstanding preparatory effort in which they discovered the correct synergistic mix and the correct training doctrine. This added even more to their pre-war lead in executing mobile war. After 1941, the general organizational form did not change drastically throughout the war, as it was flexible doctrine that worked well.

This was compounded by the high quality of panzer leaders at the division and corps level- Men like Model was originally commander of 3.Pz. Manstein was a Korps (mot.) commander. Hube was commander of 16.Pz. Rommel, Cruwell and Nehrling, of Afrika Korps fame, originally lead the 7.Pz, 11.Pz and 18.Pz also with great success.

This is how, Hoth and Guderian's Panzergruppes in 1941 destroyed and captured 2,000 soviet tanks for the loss of ~150 write-offs in one week. Most of these enemy tanks were overrun, but whenever the panzer divisions fought the mech. corps, they usually slaughtered them and outclassed them completely tactically. The same happened in North Africa, although to a lessor extent.

The W. allies took two-three years to rework their system to a competitive standard and according their own needs. By 44', the Germans didn't have a particular edge anymore in mobile forces against the west.

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Even the horse-drawn infantry divisions had various standards of mobility. The original 1941, 9-battalion divisions had thousands of horses and hundreds of vehicles. They were more mobile than the Soviet rifle units, and could outmaneuver them. By early 1942, mobility assets (horses, vehicles) were reduced by 50% outside of those earmarked for Case Blue, which had 9-battalions, 80% mobility.

By 1944 the typical infantry division increased in numbers but was less than 6 effective battalions- often just 1-4 with even less mobility than before.

Bagration was not really a tank dominated operation but was in fact mostly fought by horse-drawn Soviet rifle corps that marched from railheads in overwhelming numbers. The terrain was often poor for armor. The rifle corps, with their attached armor, were powerfully supported by artillery and air supremacy and steamrolled AGC or encircled them without stopping. The L'vov operation was more of an armored operation.

That feeling when I understand it at a glance because Swedish is also germanic. Kinda how Panzerkampfwagen has always made immediate sense even though some friends who only speak english struggle with it.

How about Russian words? I have no idea how to pronounce them much of the time, let alone spell them!

Bagration was also very short (with most of the fighting done in 2 weeks, and then the front stabilized) and one-sided (extreme disaster for the Germans). The Soviets advanced faster and farther than the Germans in Poland.

Bagration (against AGC) and L'vov (against AG-North Ukraine) were interconnected offensives. There is not enough on Bagration, and as far as I have found, only one book on L'vov in english, which is a soviet general staff study from that period.

Bagration is probably the largest operation that receives little to no attention in the west simply because it happened at the same time as Normandy.

Siege of Leningrad is the other biggy

That's why they develop decision trees, and plan for alternatives.

Overall, once sufficient experience was developed, they pretty much knew what the enemy units were capable of and how they generally behaved in various situations.

You are right about 'creativity' but a serious upset was generally a rarity. One example I can think of is Chikov/Shuimov's command of 62nd/64th Army in Stalingrad while being outclassed. Another is Mantueffuel's command of the elite 7.Pz and elite PzG 'GD'. Katukov's Tank Brigade in the battle of Moscow. Most commanders don't have the unit quality or the talent to move the formation that creatively and achieve unusual results.