With research on both sides, the double sided POV is that the war was lost at Smolensk in July-Sept. 1941 and they didn't have a chance on consolidating gains even if they managed to take Moscow. In truth, they were intimidated by the Moscow grouping and turned right to take an easier victory, the Kiev pocket.
My point was that Germany nearly captured Moscow in much less time, through continuous outmaneuvering of Russian garrison forces and entire armies.
The key here is the strategic capabilities of the RKKA, and its ability to field substandard forces in emergency situations and replace losses, which they did. They fielded 600 divisions in 1941, much of these built were built in little over a month or two. The Wehrmacht was already depleted of combat power by the time they launched Typhoon.
By the March of 1942 the Soviet Union had already recovered economically, accumulated offensive reserves, and was outproducing the Axis in key weapons categories. The Soviet military system, as established by pre-war planning, was based around a future long war of attrition.