Profile of coh2player

Both-although there were substantial differences.

Of interest though is the differences in counterattacks generally involved. Along the broad front, the Germans tend to use small forces of proven men- (their best company or battalion reinforced with some heavy weapons or a regimental battlegroup) and halt immediately if it didn't go through. In their big counterattacks, these were generally infrequent and planned, using a force several times larger. The counteroffensives in the West were generally quite small and anemic compared to those in the East (which often involved up to 1-2 armies plus up to a thousand aircraft)

The soviets on the other hand tended to use a much larger portion of their force in reactive counterattacks, and their attacks were often quite ambitious and used mass to push their way through to consolidate. Their big ones were even larger than the german- even at Army Group (Group of Fronts) scale. They used a lot of fixing counterattacks, designed to draw reserves away from points of main effort.

To be clear, are we referring to Counterattacks on the scale of Unternehmen Lüttich or smaller, tactical counterattacks, such as quickly counterattacking a hill that has been lost?

The nerf of the once quite OP Tiger (1 year + ago) made the expensive panthers viable. Chalk it up to game design IMHO.

No, I follow. The problem is the alternative to counterattack policy (which is actually a form of defense) was generally much worse in both east and west fronts. This wasn't WW1 anymore- the attacker had wings, and usually the defender did not.

The losses are immaterial- the idea is to derail the offensive operation, and prevent catastrophe by robbing the enemy of their finite forward momentum. It is a longer term view. Even a soft frontal attack that involves exchange of small arms fire and mortar fire only (fixing attack) accomplishes something.

You still seem to be missing my point. I'm not making a generalised, principled criticism of the counter-attack; I'm saying that if your doctrine is predictable to this degree, then the defender does in fact know just where to defend, because that's always the place it most recently attacked: it knows exactly where to place its spikes. Nor is this a "rigid" defence; it's a very flexible one, in which you establish a defensive position on top of every advance, but then strip it down and move it to the next position you take.

This is however, idealistic- elastic defense requires much in the way of mobility and troop strength which neither the germans or the soviets possessed in abundance on their typical frontage. Armored and mot. Infantry divisions can do this well, the typical 1/3 or 1/2 strength infantry (effectively static) divisions in 1944, missing most of their horses and vehicles..? not so much. Soviet Rifle units were similarly immobile for most of the war. The Germans had to base most of their defense around strongpoints and counterattacks while elastic defense were practiced sparingly, and mostly by the mobile divisions.

Neither the RKKA/Heer counterattacked frontally all the time-flank attacks were preferred if possible. You seem to be taking a worst case scenario and spreading it out. Also, the counterattacks were often pre-planned and practiced beforehand by the defenders. In the West Front, the allied air supremacy severely fragmented the mobility of the Germans and their ability to not only move, but perform concentrated attacks of substance.

The point of a rapid counter-attack (the RKKA did this as well) was to hit the attacking force on their weak points before they consolidated 100% and force them on the defensive in order to buy time in order to consolidate one's own defense on the new lines.

By not attacking, one courts with allowing the enemy to have free room to maneuver and chose their place of the next follow-up attack. The very act of counterattacks forces the enemy to defend.

It is not always a bad thing even if the counterattack losses may be higher than the defender's. The best case scenario is a total rout of the newly arrived enemy force.

Something I don't see mentioned above is that the Germans seem to have a deep commitment to the counter-attack, to the point that it was ridiculously predictable. And seeing as the British had certainly learned this from the experiences in North Africa, they always tried to prepare for the counter-attack that they knew was coming.

So even if it's true that an aggressive attacking strategy does not automatically mean higher losses, a claim I agree with, being overly predictable in launching counter-attacks with scratch forces against a position that is expecting you to do exactly that, might.

+1 ivan. Not perfect in the drama/character department- the 5 x bimbos were a minor annoyance. But the rest of the movie is one of kind IMHO.