Profile of coh2player

The stugs were deployed in small units, only capable of short-range thrusts (low offensive capability) and were fundamentally defensive units or units used to support short ranged counterattacks. So naturally it would get plenty of opportunities to snipe attacking and infiltrating enemy armor.

It was not intended to perform the complex and offensive oriented roles of a Pz Division.

The value of an armored unit is not really measured by how many tank to tank kills it gets.

And an excerpt from that book showed the Stug III got the most kills of all tanks in the war lol. So it really was a Stug Life!

Arracourt has become a trope of such. I used to believe in this trope but the claim of "East Front not like West Front so fail" and other rationale, seemingly invented after the fact has given me cause for doubts- most of the sourcing is from Cole's Lorraine campaign and it has been repeated in other texts & even tv shows.

I think it is actually BS, as the west front historians that cover this come across as not grasping the east front, and thus playing up the jingoism rather than making a quality appraisal. The claim seems to aim at condescending the RKKA when in fact the Red armored units were halting PzK sized attacks regularly in mid-44'- and these were higher quality than what the US faced.

Pz General Balck addresses Patton & his command of Army Group G in his memoirs- basically he says that the US command was too slow paced and his survival until the Ardennes offensive was to him, "a miracle". His command was totally outclassed in numbers, material and formations. He also cites "1,250 sorties a day against AG-G, typical" vs LW @ zero in France as being very restrictive. To put this into reference, this level of airpower was 300-400 sorties more what 6.AOK used on an average day in Stalingrad.

Anyone serious (outside of "history" channel documentaries) ever said the entire US AT arsenal was ineffectual?
That being said, Arracourt etc. which you'll often find quoted as a vindication of US armour doctrine/employment is a problematic example at best, as the newly c

When the game first came out, the Tiger was OP and the IS-2 was UP & had problems dealing with panthers. I think they had the IRL role of the IS-2 in mind, but they made the mistake of making it far too expensive along with having it in a faction with weak AT options.

Now dozens of patches later, the Tiger and the IS-2 are somewhat similar vehicles in the game.

For the first year of the game's life, the Tiger was literally an I-win button. It was common to get 1 tiger, and then attempt to get a second to seal the deal..

thanks for the link. I know about Dupuy; they sell an information product. They largely use empirical techniques and approach the issue like statisticians. This is however, only a piece of the whole, the whole of which is highly subjective.

As far the blog article goes it is interesting but there are a few missing facets- such as logistical history - that would be needed to fill a thorough appraisal. Long-lived units tend to have a "life cycle" of sorts that rises and falls. The really effective units stick out among their peers and tend to have the operational impact of 2 or 3, rather than 1 unit. Like in many fields in life, 5,000 lions will outperform 15,000 donkeys.

P.S. I haven't read any of the quoted books, I'm not that into WW2 history to devote any serious time to it. My studies keep me busy with the more recent literature and also the classics.

Ten years ago, I told myself the same. Eventually the interest creeps back in and I specialized like many people tend to do. I frankly believe that the interest in WW2 is lifelong for many, if not most