Yea, sure, link? Nope, but I can use a translator if it is on a link.
Balck, "Order in Chaos" (his memoir), Mellanthin, "Panzer Battles"
The SSLAH was training most of 1942' and Peiper was only SPW co for a couple of weeks which makes the claim of him being a super-SPW commander suspect. I am familiar with the soviet wintercounteroffensive 42-43. Nothing I have read of Peiper or 1.SSLAH did was out of the ordinary- it did fine but wasn't a crazily effective unit like some of the army units during the same era. I also don't have an opinion if he is correct or he is spinning regarding Ukraine 43/44. 1.SSLAH did not seem like a failure in Ukraine 43/44 tactically; it was part of a FUBAR operation- retake Kiev with a panzer strong but infantry weak force. The results were heavy equipment losses inflicted on 1.UKF but weak manpower damage and weak territorial gains.
I agree, the SSLAH took many beatings and was weak by the Korsun pocket- where it fought yet again, and was burnt down to a cinder shortly afterwards. It was never trained properly for the rest of the war, with many poorly trained personnel being lost. The irony was that Hitler relied more and more on it and GD (which won more of his love during the July plot), his two guards units even though the SSLAH was a fought out outfit. In late 44', he authorized the PzK GD, which watered down GD and turned it for a larger, but pound for pound lower quality korps.
Do you speak German? There was a recent lengthy exchange between Westemeier and Roman Töppel of MGFA fame on just that matter, plus the proceedings of the symposion the W-SS have recently been touched upon where the question of its military efficiency during the Kursk operation was discussed at some length, and might be of interest to you. In my opinion, it appears that LSSAH and indeed the entire II. SS-Panzerkorps were at the peak of their efficiency through 1943 and spring 1944 until their losses in the Ukraine became too severe, and that in this timeframe, they were at least the equal of comparable Heer formations including GD. Afterwards, their showings appear much more indifferent.
Personally, I think that Westemeiers personal dislike for Peiper, however understandable, sometimes indeed gets the better of his judgement when it comes to the latters strictly military performance, however, I find his case for Peipers ineptitude in handling tank formations quite convincing, as he brings up quite a number of primary sources showing Peiper in a rather unfavourable light.
I haven't read Balcks account or at least I can't recall, could you post a source?