Profile of coh2player

men of war sucks

I like the concept of men of war (mid-way between RTS and simulation, attention to microscopic detail, huge array of units, COH-like interface) better than COH2 but it suffers from a much lower development base than COh2. COh2 is a pure RTS that has better support.

So when people complain of unit diversity and buy DLCs (like I did- maybe $20 worth), I would point toward MoW:AS to satisfy one's needs. The tanks and infantry are also modeled much more realistically and most of the equipment from WW2 are already there.

I have bought a lot of commanders and at this point I don't think I'll ever buy more.

Buy men of war with that money people...

It is subjective, because the statistics have to be integrated with their context, cardboard. You and some of the others are myopically focused on one thing and believe in numbers alone without breaking down the drivers of the numbers.

Stugs were organized in batteries and brigades and usually held in Corps (Rifle) or army reserve. They spent most of their time on the Eastern front as defensive tank hunters. This usually entailed traveling through familiar territory and getting in ambush positions. Their kill claims were in excess of the Panzer battalions in the East.

This has little to do with the quality of the vehicles (stug III G obviously were inferior to panzer IV G, H, J, etc.) and more due to the nature of their combat mission.

Let me put it this way: For purposes of the game, the Soviet equipment was overall better except for fire rate, visibility and optics.

I have commented on the official forums that they could give the germans the edge in accuracy, rate of fire, and visibility range.

I think some here are using 'German/Nazi mentality' of tanks rather than the 'Soviet Mentality'. The Germans were obsessed with destroying tanks because they had less of them. Their tanks and even SPGs like Stugs were all very expensive compared to soviet AFV. They however, had a lot more motorized infantry regiments and mechanized infantry battalions than the Soviets. The two militaries were very different in design, function, and strategy.

The Soviets were obsessed with maximizing the number of tanks. They preferred having more tanks instead of more motorized and mechanized infantry. That's why there were so few halftracks in the Red Army and the ones that were there were typically Lend-Lease.

The primary function a Soviet tank in the war was not to fight other tanks, but to destroy German infantry and infantry defenses (including Anti-tank guns with HE). And to advance and help take territory. It was actually the job of the AG companies and regiments (SU-85, SU-100,etc.) of a tank army to hunt down tanks.

Tanks (T-34, T-60, etc.) were like disposable artillery shells of victory for the Soviets. The T-34 had weak soft features but solid 'hard' features (later versions: better repair-ability/ reliability, very long operational range, speed, armor, turret, gun). But it was very cheap, and the opportunity cost of building and fielding one was much lower than a Panzer III.

The Soviets didn't give a damn about tank kill ratios since they have replacement vehicles. Kill ratios is the myopic belief and is what a tank destroyer regiment should concern themselves about. The Soviets care about winning the battle and penetrating the German operational depths, which they were successful at.

In July 1943, the 5th Guards Tank army lost most of their tanks (around 500). Two weeks later, they received several hundred replacement tanks and went on to push the Germans out of the Ukraine.

Beancounting logic: During the conquest of Denmark, the Danish military suffered 16 casualties and inflicted 200+ on the Germans.

Ergo, the Danish military is 'superior' to the German. Silly, right?

So the Danish military is 'qualitatively' superior; that they had no ability to conduct offensive operations and got totally defeated is not even considered.

Most of the Soviet high losses after the military restructuring and reform (1943-1945) were caused from their offensive operations and not the defense. When in the defense they usually marginalized German counteroffensives & counterattacks rather quickly. The Germans were only capable of shallow penetrations at this point.

The German panzer divisions lost their offensive edge at this point even if they conducted offensive operations with local superiority; they were incapable of penetrating soviet units and local reserves into the operational rear even if they outnumbered and outgunned the soviets in the local sector.

Their counterattacks were really just a thousand papercuts; they could only inflict losses and run away before Soviet reserves responded in full but not force a situation at the operational level. This is why one can get the sense that the German commanders were so obsessed with tank kill ratios and the like rather than winning. In comparison, the Red Army's attacks at this point were like stabbing a man in the stomach.

The mark of a good army in WW2 was being able to conduct long range offensive operations (extending over months) with operational and strategic level results. This covers everything an effective war machine can do (troop, logistics, command, operations, etc.) That's pretty much the story of the (most particularly) first 11 panzer divisions & the Ostheer armies in 1939-1942 (before their cadres were decimated).

By 1943 the situation switched it was the Soviet tank army that was doing this and not the Panzer Army. And the US/British/CW Armies as well. The Soviets had a way of winning the war with heavy use of tanks/SPGs and lightly equipped infantry. The Allied armies advanced on a broad front and relied most on heavy firepower and heavily equipped troops.

The Germans (pre-1943) used superior maneuver operations, communications, tactics, military doctrine, and combat operations to win. Post 1942 the German armies had no game plan as their tricks were getting countered and eventually in full. Same thing with the Panzer divisions. Even though their equipment got heavier and sexier their comparative advantages declined continuously against their opponents.

Take FM Rommel from the 'Rommel Papers' during the summer of 1944: [paraphrase] We [OB West] are inferior to the enemy in all areas except for a few equipment items.