Operation Barbarossa

All these thing are good general answers to questions what can go wrong with an invasion as the Operation Barbarossa. But this doesn't answer that specific question about why the Germans according to your opinion could not have reached little further if the conditions would have been better.

I am not a specialist on military logistics, therefore I want to know these things. If you claim that I have wrong because of I don't have knowledge of logistics, then it is good if you can prove your arguments for me. As I said earlier, I don't understand why the Germans could not reached further in case of good weather, if they tried so hard in bad weather and conditions and wasted resourses on that.

Another factor was losses due to frostbite - in the last couple of weeks before the soviet counterattack German losses to frostbite soared greatly exceeding those from combat. Different weather might have eased supply for some periods but bear in mind that the frosts also made the ground hard enough to drive on after the mud in autumn.

One thing not mentioned (I think) so far in this thread was the impact of the Siberian divisions that entered the battle at this point. A spy in Tokyo reported that the Japanese had no intention of attacking Russia in the East and so the Soviet command were able to shift a large number of fresh veteran units, experienced in fighting in cold conditions to Moscow where they joined in the December counter attack.

Like the earlier poster stated- Moscow probably had to be encircled to be conquered.

The city is HUGE. Even 70 years ago it was huge. a Major capital city with a population that size is around 100Kms from end to end. Encircling a hostile population like that has it's own logistical nightmares. Even worse when you are more than a 1000Kms from home base.

Can you imagine trying to entrench 400Kms of front line that could be attacked from either side in one of the coldest winters ever....

Like the earlier poster stated- Moscow probably had to be encircled to be conquered.

The city is HUGE. Even 70 years ago it was huge. a Major capital city with a population that size is around 100Kms from end to end. Encircling a hostile population like that has it's own logistical nightmares. Even worse when you are more than a 1000Kms from home base.

Can you imagine trying to entrench 400Kms of front line that could be attacked from either side in one of the coldest winters ever....

I don't really think that the Germans need to surround the city completely in that way. Instead they could just destroy the most important roads and the railroad to the city. The city with its inhabitants need food and medicine, and the soldiers there need also food, but also weapons and ammunition. The city is so big, that the Germans could easily have forced a humanitarian catastrophe in that place. It is the Germans who would have an advantage if they had reached the city in time.

This doesn't sit very well with the doctrine of siege warfare and also doesn't consider the Russians ingenuity or will to live.

The Siege of St Petersberg/Leningrad illustrates their tenacity but also the tragedy to the civilian populace. The Russians would have found a way to supply their combatants (at least).

In addition to this the area they needed to encircle Leningrad was much smaller than that around Moscow- they still didn't even get the gaps closed up and a trickle of supplies was able to get through.

Moscow- possible to take if the red Army sallied forth & was utterly destroyed (bloody well not likely). A protracted siege would have been basically impossible.

This doesn't sit very well with the doctrine of siege warfare and also doesn't consider the Russians ingenuity or will to live.

The Siege of St Petersberg/Leningrad illustrates their tenacity but also the tragedy to the civilian populace. The Russians would have found a way to supply their combatants (at least).

In addition to this the area they needed to encircle Leningrad was much smaller than that around Moscow- they still didn't even get the gaps closed up and a trickle of supplies was able to get through.

Moscow- possible to take if the red Army sallied forth & was utterly destroyed (bloody well not likely). A protracted siege would have been basically impossible.

Leningrad was not completely surrounded all the time, but it suffered hard during the years 1941-1944. Also the Finns could have done more, for example advancing further against the city or cut the communications completely between Murmansk and the rest of Russia. Mannerheim chose not to do it.

But, I say it once again, the Germans did not need to surround the city of Moscow completely to have an impact on the transports to Moscow. The inhabitants and soldiers need food and materials to survive.

This doesn't sit very well with the doctrine of siege warfare and also doesn't consider the Russians ingenuity or will to live.

Which doctrine do you refer to?
The Germans do not need to make a complete circumvallatio as the Romans did in ancient times to have an impact. Times has changed.

The big problem for the Germans that you are ignoring robertmikael is the resistance. (It often forgotten in these threads.)

The Germans couldn't advance further than they did even with good weather. They never managed to advance in the south, since their units had been fighting fierce battles with incredibly stubborn Soviet resistance and now came upon a strongly defended city.
They managed to advance in the north, taking a bridgehead across the Moskva-Volga canal, they weren't driven back by cold but by fierce counterattacks.
Attacks directed from the immediate west was again pushed back by Soviet counteroffensives after the attacking Germans had been seriously weakened by heavy soviet defenses. Not to mention the very fierce fighting that had been going on already since September.

The logistics that AvNY points out makes sure the Germans never was able to replace the losses they took. The Rasputitsia slowed the German advances and made logistics harder but in the end they never were able to end Soviet resistance and recover the losses they took fighting towards Moscow.

For the Germans to be able to advance more quickly you need to solve the problem of being able to replace losses much quicker, especially in terms of armored vehicles, ammunition and fuel.
And in order to fix that problem you have to fix the problem of logistics. Even before the rasputitsia set in the logistical situation was very dire. The distances are simply too great and the losses are too heavy. And most importantly the resistance is constant and it is heavy, some suggest it just got worse the closer they got to Moscow.


Then of course we could discuss the notion that the Stalinist regime would ever sign any kind of peace treaty anyhow. I find it highly implausible. Such an agreement would just mean a complete destruction of the Communist experiment and the top brass not having much options but suicide. I doubt they would do that in Yaroslav, perhaps in Kamchatka.

Then of course we could discuss the notion that the Stalinist regime would ever sign any kind of peace treaty anyhow. I find it highly implausible. Such an agreement would just mean a complete destruction of the Communist experiment and the top brass not having much options but suicide. I doubt they would do that in Yaroslav, perhaps in Kamchatka.

Well Lenin signed one but your probably right and I suspect Hitler wouldn't have settled for anything but total annihilation either. It think it would depend on whether not signing would result in the end of Stalin perhaps from a coup or break-up of the remainder of the union when they saw the central power diminished (i.e. Crimea, Ukraine, Caucasus split and Siberia turn into Fiefdoms like before the Reds conquered them all). Probably happy to sacrifice millions for the cause but the leadership themselves not so much

The big problem for the Germans that you are ignoring robertmikael is the resistance. (It often forgotten in these threads.)

The Germans couldn't advance further than they did even with good weather. They never managed to advance in the south, since their units had been fighting fierce battles with incredibly stubborn Soviet resistance and now came upon a strongly defended city.
They managed to advance in the north, taking a bridgehead across the Moskva-Volga canal, they weren't driven back by cold but by fierce counterattacks.
Attacks directed from the immediate west was again pushed back by Soviet counteroffensives after the attacking Germans had been seriously weakened by heavy soviet defenses. Not to mention the very fierce fighting that had been going on already since September.

The logistics that AvNY points out makes sure the Germans never was able to replace the losses they took. The Rasputitsia slowed the German advances and made logistics harder but in the end they never were able to end Soviet resistance and recover the losses they took fighting towards Moscow.

For the Germans to be able to advance more quickly you need to solve the problem of being able to replace losses much quicker, especially in terms of armored vehicles, ammunition and fuel.
And in order to fix that problem you have to fix the problem of logistics. Even before the rasputitsia set in the logistical situation was very dire. The distances are simply too great and the losses are too heavy. And most importantly the resistance is constant and it is heavy, some suggest it just got worse the closer they got to Moscow.


Then of course we could discuss the notion that the Stalinist regime would ever sign any kind of peace treaty anyhow. I find it highly implausible. Such an agreement would just mean a complete destruction of the Communist experiment and the top brass not having much options but suicide. I doubt they would do that in Yaroslav, perhaps in Kamchatka.

I am not sure he gets the ideas of TO&Es, supply or the how the rates of consumption of fuel and ammunition differ so greatly during defense, maneuver (and advance) and the beginnings of an offensive.

Just because units labeled "Corps" "Army" or "Army Group" are in a certain position doesn't mean that the strength or potential of those labels are the same at any given time. While the AGC facing Moscow was not exactly Force Steiner of the Battle of Berlin, it was still a shadow of what it was on June 22nd and greatly diminished from its strength when Typhoon started. And that is after a several week period of resupply once the rasputitsia ended with the coming of winter. Remember, initially the coming of winter was WELCOMED by the Germans. It froze the mud that both held up their advance and their resupply.

If you start Typhoon a month earlier because Barbarossa started a month earlier, Russian reinforcements continue at the same pace but you are now facing the forces around Moscow in the beginning of October, with the Rasputitsa about to cut off a supply chain that is also 400 km longer than it was at Smolensk while the Russians you are facing are sitting int he midst of the best infrastructure in the Soviet Union.

The usual argument is that the Germans could have won had they started earlier, but I am beginning to think that an earlier start to Barbarossa would have meant a faster defeat of the Germans in the war.

Well Lenin signed one but your probably right and I suspect Hitler wouldn't have settled for anything but total annihilation either. It think it would depend on whether not signing would result in the end of Stalin perhaps from a coup or break-up of the remainder of the union when they saw the central power diminished (i.e. Crimea, Ukraine, Caucasus split and Siberia turn into Fiefdoms like before the Reds conquered them all). Probably happy to sacrifice millions for the cause but the leadership themselves not so much

Lenin's signature was fulfilling his promise to the Germans who pretty much made the overthrow of the Tsar possible. He signed a peace that basically gave him Russia.

Does anybody know when Hitler took direct control of the military forces in the East? I recall watching a documentary about a full-strength panzer division being shuffled between southern Ukraine and Army Group Centre towards Moscow at his orders because there was tough resistance in Ukraine and, according to the producers/historians of whatever program I was watching, they believed that this panzer division could have helped cripple Moscow.


The biggest issue with the invasion of the USSR was Hitler's and the Nazi's policy regarding slavs. Many people of ethnic minorities (or local majorities) in the western portions of the USSR greeted the Germans as liberators. Unfortunately, they were treated like the subhumans the Nazis perceived them to be. Treating them better would've reduced the amount of partisans in harassing German supply lines and potentially increased manpower available to the Germans.

It's important to understand that this type of war on such a large scale was never fought in Europe before. Napoleon wasn't declaring his desire to annihilate a certain race of people. Nationalism is a terrible thing, really.

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The biggest issue with the invasion of the USSR was Hitler's and the Nazi's policy regarding slavs. Many people of ethnic minorities (or local majorities) in the western portions of the USSR greeted the Germans as liberators. Unfortunately, they were treated like the subhumans the Nazis perceived them to be. Treating them better would've reduced the amount of partisans in harassing German supply lines and potentially increased manpower available to the Germans.

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my thoughts exactly. they should've at least try to lie and manipulate the conquered to help them against russia.

arrogance.

Which doctrine do you refer to?
The Germans do not need to make a complete circumvallatio as the Romans did in ancient times to have an impact. Times has changed.

Siege warfare is a doctrine- it's the belief that surrounding your enemy & cutting them off from all support (starving them out) is better than attacking a heavily fortified position.

Piecemeal attempts at surrounding Moscow would have been disastrous- the city would have attacked from within & without. They might have had an impact but it would have been like kicking Andre the giant in the nuts. You can't kill him- but after he gets off the floor you better run.

Siege warfare is a doctrine- it's the belief that surrounding your enemy & cutting them off from all support (starving them out) is better than attacking a heavily fortified position.

Piecemeal attempts at surrounding Moscow would have been disastrous- the city would have attacked from within & without. They might have had an impact but it would have been like kicking Andre the giant in the nuts. You can't kill him- but after he gets off the floor you better run.

Now that you mentioned the word 'siege' in your post, I was reminded by the last and largest city to be under siege. The city of Leningrad. That city may be a reason as to why the operation the Germans had didn't go well in Moscow, because they were focusing a good expenditure on starving out Leningrad. With this possible split in resources, it would be difficult to even get one city.

My five word explanation why the Germans lost in the east.

"Russia is too damn big."

...A spy in Tokyo reported that the Japanese had no intention of attacking Russia in the East and so the Soviet command were able to shift a large number of fresh veteran units...

In 1941 USSR keep the border with Japan more solders then UK, USA, French, Italy, and Reich taken together have in North Africa.
In 1942-1943 USSR keep the border with Japan as much or more solders then UK, USA and Reich taken together have in Normandy 1944.
So that "A spy in Tokyo report" sounds pretty funny.

Like the earlier poster stated- Moscow probably had to be encircled to be conquered..

The Germans just destroyed it as they did with Stalingrad and Warsaw.

Does anybody know when Hitler took direct control of the military forces in the East?

Hitler could do whatever he wanted after he received the powers of a dictator, but he did take complete control of the military in 1938, when he became the Commander-in-Chief. After that point he actually was the Warlord of the Germans. The only time he did not intervene in the decisions was when he fled from his hiding place during the Sovjet offensive 1944, and the German generals could take their own decisions. The comical thing is that during that time when Hitler was not involved in decisions, the German generals succeeded to stop the Sovjet assault in many places.

The biggest issue with the invasion of the USSR was Hitler's and the Nazi's policy regarding slavs. Many people of ethnic minorities (or local majorities) in the western portions of the USSR greeted the Germans as liberators. Unfortunately, they were treated like the subhumans the Nazis perceived them to be. Treating them better would've reduced the amount of partisans in harassing German supply lines and potentially increased manpower available to the Germans.

It's important to understand that this type of war on such a large scale was never fought in Europe before. Napoleon wasn't declaring his desire to annihilate a certain race of people. Nationalism is a terrible thing, really.

This is not nationalism, but nazism. The Prussians (1525-) and the Germans in WW1 were nationalists, but they could have jews and other minorities to serve them, but the Nazis did not. That was utterly stupid, because for example more Ukrainians could have fight on the German side against Stalin. The Germans could have millions of Ukrainians to fight for them instead of against them.

Siege warfare is a doctrine- it's the belief that surrounding your enemy & cutting them off from all support (starving them out) is better than attacking a heavily fortified position.

Piecemeal attempts at surrounding Moscow would have been disastrous- the city would have attacked from within & without. They might have had an impact but it would have been like kicking Andre the giant in the nuts. You can't kill him- but after he gets off the floor you better run.

The siege of Leningrad was in a way very effective, because during that time a lot of Russians died and Germans could hold their losses at a minimum, which was not the case in Stalingrad where the Germans tried to capture the city. Just look at the statistics of the casualties during the siege of Leningrad.

If the Germans had succeeded in the same in Moscow and Stalingrad, that could have had an impact on the war.

In 1941 USSR keep the border with Japan more solders then UK, USA, French, Italy, and Reich taken together have in North Africa.
In 1942-1943 USSR keep the border with Japan as much or more solders then UK, USA and Reich taken together have in Normandy 1944.
So that "A spy in Tokyo report" sounds pretty funny.

The Germans just destroyed it as they did with Stalingrad and Warsaw.

Well the soviet states did have a lot of troops. The spy was called Richard Sorge and I have read several sources that describe this intelligence as the most significant on the entire war.

The spy was called Richard Sorge and I have read several sources that describe this intelligence as the most significant on the entire war.

I heard about it. Yet, every third Soviet soldier guard border with Japan.

That was utterly stupid, because for example more Ukrainians could have fight on the German side against Stalin.

Stalin once wrote an article "Dizziness with success". It looks like it's just it was in the Reich.

The siege of Leningrad was in a way very effective, because during that time a lot of Russians died and Germans could hold their losses at a minimum...

Most of them were civilians. The Nazis were good at it. Still, I do not understand why they could not just turn the town into ruins.