What if soviets attacked Western Europe right after WWII?

Soviet military doctrine in WWII is not 'blitzkrieg'...

In Russia, it is believed that in 44-45 years, the Red Army began to successfully use elements of the blitzkrieg tactics. The most typical example lead the rout of one milion Japanese Army in Manchuria for 1 month.

Allies were also capable of manoeuvre warfare, as was aptly shown in Northwest Europe 44-45 and Italy in early 1945.

I do not see how it has helped them in the Ardennes. Without air support Allied forces not able to stand the impact caused by the Nazis, even at half strength, like in the Ardennes.

Soo, can anyone of you counter-factual thinkers come up with a feasible Causus-Belli, that would make the Soviet people willing to fight a war of aggression against the west in 1945?

The allies attacked first. More no options. Stalin got what he wanted at Yalta. The Soviet people was exhausted.

Otherwise the entire premise kinda falls on its head, and all talk of carriers, B-29s, tactics, industrial output, logistics would be moot no?

Industrial power on the Allied side. Military power (in land) on the USSR side.

Experience is important but remember that the US and British beat the "battle hardened" Germans as well.

http://ww2history.com/videos/Eastern/Defeat_of_the_Nazis

That is not relevant since German planes - all designed for low-mid range altitude got absolutely wrecked from above by USAAF planes. The key problem with making a low altitude fighter is that high altitude fighters can dive on them and climb again.

You do not understand the differences in the air battles on the Western Front from the Eastern Front. In the West, it is the bombing of cities, so everything revolves around escort and intercept heavy bombers.
In the East, everything revolves around the support for ground troops. Stukas and IL-2 can not throw bombs from the stratosphere. They need to be reduced. Therefore, fighting in small (up to 5, rarely 7 kilometers) altitude.
Therefore, Thunderbolt was popular in the West and in the East (was obtained by lend-lease), he was considered as unwieldy log. And was sent to the Soviet trash settler Air Forces - Air Defense.
Another example of Aerocobra and Kingkobra. Absolutely not popular in the West. Absolutely popular in the East.
Same for Fw-190. Soviet pilots always put the Me-109 above.

Not that any of that mattered, when we look at statistics in the Korean war it becomes clear that the battle hardened sovi.. I mean "North Korean" pilots were not of the same calibre as USAF pilots and were shot down 2 to 1 conservatively or 10 to one based on pilot reports.

Of course,"North Korean" pilots were not of the same calibre as USAF pilot. Just remember BLACK TUESDAY, lol.
As for pilot reports... Nowhere do not lie after the fishing, hunting or war (c)Russian proverb.

What was left to bomb? In 1945 most of Russia was rubble...

Based on USAAF target priorities and Operation Unthinkable we know which cities the US would of bombed if Stalin got uppity...The plan was to devastate Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Kuybyshev, Sverdlovsk, Kazan, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Leningrad and either Saratov or Stalingrad depending on the reconstruction of the latter.

It looks as if you are talking to yourself

The Germans used that sort of propaganda to try to keep going. It worked about as well as pinning medals to 12 year old "Storm Troopers" in Berlin '45.

Because grenadiers '41 at that time were imprisoned or dead. Quess where.

The US unlike the Soviet Union maintained it's alliances through trust unlike the Soviets who ruled through invasion.

How does this relate to a hypothetical "What if soviets attacked Western Europe right after..."

How would American planes/ doctrine fare vs soviet equivalents?
How would Pershing, fireflies,M18 hellcat, deal with ISU and IS2 supported by T34 spam etc?

You forgot IS-3. T-44 ... unlikely. That is, of course it would have been more than Pershing, but ... you know

Thoughts?? Was it logistically possible?

They did. It was called The Great Patriotic war, except they stayed stopped in Eastern Germany at Berlin and Austria in 1945 because Truman flexed the Atomic bomb muscle 3 months later.

Anyone who has read other than the usual poularist trash will already realise it a intelligence reported on the record fact that Stalin and his Soviet Union planned to attack Germany before 1942. Hitler just preempted that, and possibly would have been successful had it not been for Mussolini's ego getting arsekicking in Greece delaying the start of Barbarossa for those crucial weeks of good weather.

Although he was on the nose, Patton was still an influential General in 1945 despite his pearl handled revolvers and gaffes. It has long been postulated that Patton's accident was an assination because of his well known highly vocal "Why stop here?! Let's keep pushing east now" stance.

As for the Soviets even considering an attack on Western Euope after WWII? My personal view is, I don't think so.

After four years of indescribably bitter fighting a war of opposing Weltanshauungen, and let's face it bearing the brunt of attrition in the destruction of the Wehrmacht at insurmountable cost in human and material sacrifice, a feat truly deserving of much respect, the U.S.S.R. was in no position economically or logistically to continue let alone escalate a war of attrition with a nation of the undeniable industrial capacity and might of the USA even had it not had the ace card of the atomic bomb. To suggest the Soviets had no inkling of the US having an atomic weapon available prior to its first public deployment at Hiroshima would be naive. They had their own program happening from 1943 and a great deal of intelligence on the German program. In 1945, they also gained the input of all those captured German scientists and engineers, which like German inventions, all the Allies were in contest to appropriate. e.g. The famous and fantastic MiG-15 was an example of a direct result of German research and technology applied by the MiG design bureau.

America might have been a long way away, and whilst well understanding that tyranny of distance that was a two edged sword, that geographic distance and a mighty ocean barrier also kept the safe from attack of the weapons of the day remembering that the Soviets didn't have a nuclear capability until 1949, and then it was some time before the delivery mechanism was an ICBM. I was born during the Cold War at its zenith of the 1950s and remember it all only too well when MAD was a very real prospect. However, I still hold that any perceived threat of a soviet invasion of western europe at that time was propaganda. The last thing that or any european country wanted or needed was another war of a scale or magnitude of the one it had fought only years earlier and from which it had not yet recovered. What must be remembered is that war or the threat of war was good for one particular western economy's military industrial complex. France, Italy and the former low countries were all a mess, Britain had surrendered her colonies, part of the deal for the US to come to her aid, as well as completely crippled by an austerity policy and socialist government with little imported in the way of luxury or consumer goods and pretty much everything produced exported to pay off both her WWI and WWII war debts. The American Congress wasn't particularly generous to Mr Keynes when he went cap in hand to Britain's former ally, so Britain was in no position to fight another war even if put under that political pressure from international bankers.

No. Albeit they were now a world power with a formidable military and largely expanded conquered territories, the Soviet real posture after WWII was defensive, and the Iron Curtain a figure of Churchill's usual partisan oratory blustering. To show you what the British people really thought of him, they unceremoniously tossed him out of office in an overwhelming landslide at the first opportunity they were given in 1945!

FWIW my own extended immediate family was caught behind that "Iron Curtain" after the Soviets swept through Hungary into Austria and subsequently closed the borders when relations with the west turned sour a few years later. My Aunt spent two years in a Soviet prison for plotting to escape across the border back to the village in Austria where she had been born and lived much of her life. Her children, my cousins then aged 5 and 9 were taken from her and their father and sent to a Soviet orphanage in the Ukraine so that any future escape attempts would mean they would have to leave them behind. They did escape, in 1956, and it took the international Red Cross until 1963 to get them repatriated to Switzerland where their parents had been settled with refugee status. My father never saw his mother again. She died, behind that curtain.

Personally knowing many of them including many postwar British emmigrants, I know that the general feeling within all the nationalities of the countries who had suffered the devestation of two world wars within just 30 years was one of "Nie Wieder Krieg!". So risk of a Soviet attack was a western propaganda tool rather than bearing any resemblance to a probable reality.

Would they have fought if attacked? Absolutely, but kick off the match? I really really don't think so, nor was it logistically feasable even if arguably possible?

The famous and fantastic MiG-15 was an example of a direct result of German research and technology applied by the MiG design bureau.

A small note. Thanks UK for the Rolls-Royce Nene.

A small note. Thanks UK for the Rolls-Royce Nene.

I was referring more to the swept wing aerodynamics, but yes that's undeniably true. The Klimov powering the MiG-15 was a Soviet built Nene.

And it powered many others including Grumman's aesthetically beautiful Panther as a licence built P&W achieving a heightened public profile in the film "The Bridges of Toko-Ri" and the equally aesthetically beautiful Brit AS Seahawk, which like the Meteor was another straightwing. As the decade passed, the Nene and centrifugal engines lost popularity in mil and RPT jets as the Brits and Rolls Royce moved toward axials in pretty much everything in the quest for more power. e.g Avon in the Swift. I'm a ex-mil pilot and now retired airline pilot, so that kind of stuff is my bread and butter interest. Rolls Royce still design and make very fine engines.

i have read the book 'Tigers in the mud' from the infamous tanker Otto von Carius who served as a tank commander in eastern front.

He states that at the last months of the war and as germans were at constant retreat they hoped that the americans whould help them to push back the communists.

And thats history.

In Russia, it is believed that in 44-45 years, the Red Army began to successfully use elements of the blitzkrieg tactics. The most typical example lead the rout of one milion Japanese Army in Manchuria for 1 month.

The term 'blitzkrieg' is not a term used in a serious operational discussion either in Germany or in the West since it was a term made up by British journalists and not even by the Germans themselves. I can't say about Russia, but I am talking about technical documents here.

You are talking about 'manoeuvre warfare', which Soviets could already practice before great purges. And Zhukov demonstrated it even in 1939 in Nomonhan with strong combined arms/tank movement battle. August Storm was just the development of scale, not new ideas.

The main difference between Soviet and German doctrine as I have said was command and control. This is a necessity when in Soviet Army, in some operations, entire divisions were designated only 1 kilometres of frontage. Soviets exercised strict control of subordinate units and moved them in accordance with overall strategic-operational plan (Soviets and western Allies were more similar in this regard than they were to Germans). This is known as befehlstaktik or 'command push tactics'. The opposite was the German practice of transmitting only intent to forwards officers and allowing them to make uncontrolled decisions, which is known as auftragstaktik or 'mission tactics'.

'Blitzkrieg' is usually used as a term to refer to mobile warfare, but it was not invented by Germans, and not practiced by them first--its actually just development of ancient principles, which you can see in battles like Cannae. The German way of war was to form ad-hoc battlegroups and allow forward commanders to do whatever was necessary to accomplish higher commander's objective. The Soviet way of war was to keep all units tightly controlled and move them inside a strict plan. Neither imply 'blitzkrieg', which is separate idea of combined arms and rapid movement of troops. The Soviet Union was practicing 'blitzkrieg' tactics in 1939 at Nomonhan (Khalkin Gol, whatever) but with befehlstaktik-type control system. When they came to August Storm it was not a copy of German tactics but their own developments, coming from deep operations (superior to whatever Germans practiced) and 1941-45 practical experience.

I use 'blitzkrieg' in inverted commas because it's a meaningless term really.

Also: Bagration is a more impressive operation than August Storm. Japanese had no good tanks or anti-tank guns, were spread out on a huge front without in-depth defences or reserves, and were lacking in ammunition and food, and could not be supported fro Japan itself. By 1945 Kwangtung Army was a shadow of what it was in 30s as the best divisions had been drawn off for Ichi-go and Philippines operations. Soviet operational power was better demonstrated in Bagration than August Storm.

I do not see how it has helped them in the Ardennes. Without air support Allied forces not able to stand the impact caused by the Nazis, even at half strength, like in the Ardennes.

Contrary to popular belief, CAS inflicted few casualties on German tanks in NW Europe. Allied airpower was useful chiefly as interdiction, not combat air support.

Ardennes operation would have failed even without allied air support. German plan was too ambitious (since it was directed by Hitler) and did not anticipate that allies could very quickly move reserves into the battle.

And on final note, Patton didn't want to fight the Soviet Union for any real reason, he just wanted a fight because he was just that type of guy and thought he was the best General ever.

In reality he was an idiot and he would have been out-fought at every level by men like Zhukov, Konev, and Rokossovsky.

And on final note, Patton didn't want to fight the Soviet Union for any real reason, he just wanted a fight because he was just that type of guy and thought he was the best General ever.

In reality he was an idiot and he would have been out-fought at every level by men like Zhukov, Konev, and Rokossovsky.

Totally agree. He was just was hyper aggressive, literally his only claim to fame. The man's affect on US doctrine was so ridiculously small compared to Eisenhower, Marshall or Bradley.

Really he would of been a liability because he would be so aggressive. The Soviets would of had a field day with Patton but would struggle against the slower American commanders who wouldn't attack until they had a secure logistical chain.

Patton's real claim to fame was that he could push his men to exceed their limits and fight harder, against the doctrines of the Whermact this was fine. Soviets not so much.

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKlnjwzT1IruAZFb0EA-5pQ

The biggest ?? with such an alt history is the how the Allied infantry would try to advance against much stronger enemy ground forces than the wehr.

What if soviets attacked Western Europe right after WWII?

Why would they? Churchill and Roosevelt gave them half of Europe.

The main difference between Soviet and German doctrine as I have said was command and control.

You've overlooked three other quintessential most important differences. Die Wehrmacht and Heer in the particular had an undeniably competent commander cadre which had been eliminated from the Soviet order of battle by Stalin's purges of the 30's. Die Wehrmacht comprised of a homogenous extremely well trained all Deutsch volkgenossen rather than a motley crew of souls from a union of different states as the was that of the U.S.S.R., and undeniably, in 1941 their national pride reinstated driven by community ideals with sense of common purpose had the finest espirit de corps arguably of any army in recorded history.

This is known as befehlstaktik or 'command push tactics'. The opposite was the German practice of transmitting only intent to forwards officers and allowing them to make uncontrolled decisions, which is known as auftragstaktik or 'mission tactics'.

Though was introduced in WW1 in the age of modern arms at a tactical level of limited extent with the introduction of Stoßtruppen, "befehlstaktik" was a direct consequence of NSDAP policy introduced in the modernisation of Germany's army after the NSDAP came to power with their opening up of egalitarian access to the Heer officer ranks which has since been adopted by every modern Western army. Notably in the Waffen SS, and I am not glorifying the organisation here merely relating the fact as distinct from the demonisation mythologies, unhampered by an existing class cadre of Junkers class resistant to change to their existing SOP, customs, rituals and traditions, what eventually became the Waffen SS was reknown for its officers of field rank sharing everything in common with the enlisted man, and notably, so many of them were drawn from the ranks e.g. SS-OStrmbf. Peiper. They lived with their men, ate the same meals without special privilige afforded of rank as was commonplace in the Allied armies, most notably so in the Class ridden British services where officers were still generally only advanced from the ranks late in the war, and then only under duress of casualty driven nessessity when a Sandhurst, Oxford or Cambridge graduate of suitable class were unavailable. Even in the RAF this class distinction nonsense prevailed for an aeon with class separation of Sergeant Pilots from Pilot Officers. Both were line pilots rather than there being any distinction on the premise of role, e.g. a flight commander or squadron leader.

'Blitzkrieg' <snip> was not invented by Germans, and not practiced by them first

But die Werhmacht sure perfected it. Let's not take away from the fact that they drove the incompetents from the battlefields of Western Europe in just six weeks in 1940. And similarly, until halted by weather at the very gates of Moscow, in 1941, succeeded in driving the Soviets from the vastness that was their western Soviet Union using "Blitzkrieg".

Yes, undeniably a silly journalistic term which stuck. In comparison, the equally reported but less glamorous term "Sitzkrieg", understandably preferably forgotten, could equally and as easily be applied to the unsuccessful Brit & French 'strategies' of the period.

The Germans learned from the First World War because they had a CIC who had actually been at the pointy end. Whereas the Brits had a cigar puffing, whisky swilling buffoon who as dismissed ex-Lord of the Admiralty, had spent that same time comfortably at home in disgrace. Since stabbing Chamberlain in the back, his only 'action' other than the bloody rhetorical was the ensure the incarceration of those of his own peoples who dissented with his prosecution of a completely unnecessary war on a pretext.

I use 'blitzkrieg' in inverted commas because it's a meaningless term really.

Whilst I take on board the exercise in semantics. I'll bet those Brits waiting on the beach at Dunkirk wouldn't agree with you any more than the occupied French, Belgians, Dutch, Norweigan, Greeks, or Balkan Serbians, Croatians, and Bosnians of the time would if they could speak with us today!

Contrary to popular belief, CAS inflicted few casualties on German tanks in NW Europe.

I disagree. Read reports from the few German survivors of the Falaise Pocket operation in the particular, as well as the statement by AVM 'Johnnie' Johnson about the wholesale slaughter rendered there by rocket firing 20mm cannon equipped fighter bombers. Paraphrased, even he describes it as 'so murderous as to be tantamount to criminal'.

More importantly, whilst "rhubarbs" aka "Feur frei" interdiction ops were always a secondarily tasked of all Allied fighters ranging over Germany after the loss of air supriority by the Luftwaffe from March 1944 onwards, direct support was frequently their designated mission as a form of airborne artillery in support of ground forces. That was the design purpose and direct role of Typhoons and Tempests in the particular. As an ex-birdie I can categorially state that I can tell you that the A-4's primary role is not air to air superiority any more than its WWII predecessors the Corsair or Korean war Skyraider were. We did then, and still do deploy this where we have APs airborne and aboard in ready state.

Ardennes operation would have failed even without allied air support. German plan was too ambitious (since it was directed by Hitler)

Strategically the Ardennes Offensive could have no effect upon the ultimate loss of the war due the single principle of attrition. As an entity of itself, it had potential to achieve what it sought to achieve militarily and politically given its primary objective. Calling Unernehmen Wacht am Rhein which comprised several independent operations a failure before it played out in hindsight reeks of armchair historian plagiury. e.g. Risky as it was and driven by political rather than military objective, nevertheless Arnhem could have been a tactical success rather then the bloody disaster it was. Ultimately its failure lay in its execution due quickly became apparent were unrealistic objectives expected of supporting forces amongs other bungles.

And I must address the final part of your statement above (bracketed) as fallacious as it is obtusely popularist partisan.

The disasters of Arnhem and Singapore were hardly the work of genius, and Churchill can be appropriated blame directly and indirectly for some of the bloodiest military blunders and murderous campaigns in history, e.g. the night area bombing offensive, which remains a disgrace to this day and blight on the otherwise esteemed record of the RAF. And how about the obscenity that was the Dardanelles disaster, Dunkirk and Dieppe -from his memoirs "I thought it most important that a large-scale operation should take place this summer". Churchill insisted the BEF embark for France (resulting in defeat and Dunkirk) and ensured Britain declared war on a pretext against the will of the Crown, many members of parliament and generally the contemorary sentiment and will of the majority of British people hence starting WWII.

Churchill persistently and protractedly refused generous peace terms repeatedly offered to the Crown and importantly, ultimate benefit of the British peoples and their Empire at a time when Britain was on her knees, still unrecovered from economic depression with a huge debt still to be repaid from the war of twenty years previous not finally repaid in full until just recently in 2015!!!!! I'll bet the young people of Britain's new millenium were thankful to him for inheriting that <NOT>. He personally intervened to scuttle even the noble sacrifical attempt made by Hess in May 1941 for which he paid with the rest of his life. Yes, thanks to Churchill, Britain was alone, isolated and starving in service of his political and personal objectives fueled by a whisky soaked ego powering a undeniably powerful rhetoric.

The fact was, in the context of that time, America had not entered the war, and until Roosevelt manipulated it, the American public at large was against her entering any foreign and in the particular, a European war. Britain was alone, on her knees, and starving from the undeniably effective U-boat offensive against merchant shipping.

And after the war, what of Poland's freedom or Czechoslovakia and the Sudatenland then. As if Churchill ever gave a toss about either of those states and their peoples!

The term 'blitzkrieg' is not a term...

Thx. It was interesting info.

Contrary to popular belief, CAS inflicted few casualties on German tanks in NW Europe. Allied airpower was useful chiefly as interdiction, not combat air support.
Ardennes operation would have failed even without allied air support. German plan was too ambitious (since it was directed by Hitler) and did not anticipate that allies could very quickly move reserves into the battle.

I know that the efficiency CAS was significantly lower pilots reports. Nevertheless, the Allies had air support, and the Nazis - not. It is obvious that this was a serious trump for Allied forces.

You've overlooked three other quintessential most important differences. Die Wehrmacht and Heer in the particular had an undeniably competent commander cadre which had been eliminated from the Soviet order of battle by Stalin's purges of the 30's. Die Wehrmacht comprised of a homogenous extremely well trained all Deutsch volkgenossen rather than a motley crew of souls from a union of different states as the was that of the U.S.S.R., and undeniably, in 1941 their national pride reinstated driven by community ideals with sense of common purpose had the finest espirit de corps arguably of any army in recorded history.

Though was introduced in WW1 in the age of modern arms at a tactical level of limited extent with the introduction of Stoßtruppen, "befehlstaktik" was a direct consequence of NSDAP policy introduced in the modernisation of Germany's army after the NSDAP came to power with their opening up of egalitarian access to the Heer officer ranks which has since been adopted by every modern Western army. Notably in the Waffen SS, and I am not glorifying the organisation here merely relating the fact as distinct from the demonisation mythologies, unhampered by an existing class cadre of Junkers class resistant to change to their existing SOP, customs, rituals and traditions, what eventually became the Waffen SS was reknown for its officers of field rank sharing everything in common with the enlisted man, and notably, so many of them were drawn from the ranks e.g. SS-OStrmbf. Peiper. They lived with their men, ate the same meals without special privilige afforded of rank as was commonplace in the Allied armies, most notably so in the Class ridden British services where officers were still generally only advanced from the ranks late in the war, and then only under duress of casualty driven nessessity when a Sandhurst, Oxford or Cambridge graduate of suitable class were unavailable. Even in the RAF this class distinction nonsense prevailed for an aeon with class separation of Sergeant Pilots from Pilot Officers. Both were line pilots rather than there being any distinction on the premise of role, e.g. a flight commander or squadron leader.

Well. I agree with your first paragraph. I was comparing the operational and institutional concepts though (principally ideas and practices), not the quality or constitution of the troops or their motivation or equipment. We could also consider unit structure to be a quintessential difference and even nomenclature. But I wasn't really talking about all that. Regarding befehlstaktik if it wasn't a German invention it wouldn't have a German name. What I mean, though, is that the Soviet Army had a more centralised and controlled command structure than the German Army. The fact that both ended up fighting high-tempo mechanised operations with decisive breakthroughs did not mean the Soviets 'learned' from the Germans neither did it mean they had the same doctrine. They both practiced combined arms, independently, from an early beginning.

You are cherry picking about the SS, however. How about that Oskar Dirlewanger for high quality SS officer material, eh? The German General Staff was not some round table of brilliant knights. They were both deceived by FUSAG and unable to properly realise it to Hitler after it became obvious it was a decoy.

As for the British forces, it's not really true. Rapid military expansion meant that there were officers from the ranks or direct entry officers from 1939. The British Army has always built its strength on NCOs, though, not officers. At any rate, there were many competent and professional British officers, as there were competent and professional German officers. There were many idiots, too, but only in the SS did one find petty criminals elevated to the rank of Brigade Fuhrer.

But die Werhmacht sure perfected it. Let's not take away from the fact that they drove the incompetents from the battlefields of Western Europe in just six weeks in 1940. And similarly, until halted by weather at the very gates of Moscow, in 1941, succeeded in driving the Soviets from the vastness that was their western Soviet Union using "Blitzkrieg".

Yes, undeniably a silly journalistic term which stuck. In comparison, the equally reported but less glamorous term "Sitzkrieg", understandably preferably forgotten, could equally and as easily be applied to the unsuccessful Brit & French 'strategies' of the period.

The Germans learned from the First World War because they had a CIC who had actually been at the pointy end. Whereas the Brits had a cigar puffing, whisky swilling buffoon who as dismissed ex-Lord of the Admiralty, had spent that same time comfortably at home in disgrace. Since stabbing Chamberlain in the back, his only 'action' other than the bloody rhetorical was the ensure the incarceration of those of his own peoples who dissented with his prosecution of a completely unnecessary war on a pretext.

Well, you know what -- it is counterfactual, but here it is anyway. The fact of that matter is that Gamelin (for a bunch of reasons) chose the wrong plan. The Dyle Plan was the cause of the French strategic collapse. The Escaut/Scheldt Plan was much more viable and given that the French had a great deal of minor tactical success against the Germans it is not a long step by any means to suggest that Plan Escaut would have, quite frankly, stopped the 'blitzkrieg' in its tracks.

What is another word for sitzkrieg but materialschlact. The Anglo-French strategy was to wait it out until they had a material superiority to the Germans. This is obvious military sense. It was only the disaster of the Dyle Plan that prevented it from becoming a reality. It was also the reality that Britain learned when in 1918 the British and Canadian Armies drove the German Army from the field. Britain could never afford to keep a huge Army in wartime but it could afford to wait behind the Maginot line until it did have one.

Whilst I take on board the exercise in semantics. I'll bet those Brits waiting on the beach at Dunkirk wouldn't agree with you any more than the occupied French, Belgians, Dutch, Norweigan, Greeks, or Balkan Serbians, Croatians, and Bosnians of the time would if they could speak with us today!

I agree, but I doubt they would be discussing it in terms of the origin of befehlstaktik and the historiography of German operational practice. I suspect they were mainly thinking about whether or not they would survive or be taken prisoner. Since you are an ex-military person I will leave it to yourself as to what you would be thinking about in that situation.

About the airpower I will reply some other time, but I admit that it's not really my best point.

Strategically the Ardennes Offensive could have no effect upon the ultimate loss of the war due the single principle of attrition. As an entity of itself, it had potential to achieve what it sought to achieve militarily and politically given its primary objective. Calling Unernehmen Wacht am Rhein which comprised several independent operations a failure before it played out in hindsight reeks of armchair historian plagiury. e.g. Risky as it was and driven by political rather than military objective, nevertheless Arnhem could have been a tactical success rather then the bloody disaster it was. Ultimately its failure lay in its execution due quickly became apparent were unrealistic objectives expected of supporting forces amongs other bungles.

I think it is a bit much to call me an armchair historian and go on to say 'If the Ardennes Offensive succeeded...' It was based on faulty premises. Besideswhich -- a tactical success for an operation would be considered a failure anyway.

And I must address the final part of your statement above (bracketed) as fallacious as it is obtusely popularist partisan.

The disasters of Arnhem and Singapore were hardly the work of genius, and Churchill can be appropriated blame directly and indirectly for some of the bloodiest military blunders and murderous campaigns in history, e.g. the night area bombing offensive, which remains a disgrace to this day and blight on the otherwise esteemed record of the RAF. And how about the obscenity that was the Dardanelles disaster, Dunkirk and Dieppe -from his memoirs "I thought it most important that a large-scale operation should take place this summer". Churchill insisted the BEF embark for France (resulting in defeat and Dunkirk) and ensured Britain declared war on a pretext against the will of the Crown, many members of parliament and generally the contemorary sentiment and will of the majority of British people hence starting WWII.

Churchill persistently and protractedly refused generous peace terms repeatedly offered to the Crown and importantly, ultimate benefit of the British peoples and their Empire at a time when Britain was on her knees, still unrecovered from economic depression with a huge debt still to be repaid from the war of twenty years previous not finally repaid in full until just recently in 2015!!!!! I'll bet the young people of Britain's new millenium were thankful to him for inheriting that <NOT>. He personally intervened to scuttle even the noble sacrifical attempt made by Hess in May 1941 for which he paid with the rest of his life. Yes, thanks to Churchill, Britain was alone, isolated and starving in service of his political and personal objectives fueled by a whisky soaked ego powering a undeniably powerful rhetoric.

The fact was, in the context of that time, America had not entered the war, and until Roosevelt manipulated it, the American public at large was against her entering any foreign and in the particular, a European war. Britain was alone, on her knees, and starving from the undeniably effective U-boat offensive against merchant shipping.

And after the war, what of Poland's freedom or Czechoslovakia and the Sudatenland then. As if Churchill ever gave a toss about either of those states and their peoples!

Er, it was a criticism of Hitler, not a veneration of Churchill.

Whatever criticisms I have heard of Churchill, and there are many good ones, his decision to fight is not one I have ever heard made by any Briton, especially young ones, with the sole exception of those in national socialist organisations in Britain itself. I think most British people feel that it was the right thing to have done (especially in view of what was afterwards discovered). Whether or not he was a warmonger, his decision to continue the fight was the only justified one. There is no such thing as a 'noble peace' with Nazi Germany. You can consider that obtuse popularism if you like but it is hardly a controversial statement.

Britain was hardly on its knees or alone. It had just driven the Italians from Egypt, finished off the German Navy in Norway, and by November of 1940 had struck a crippling blow against the Regia Marina. It had the capacity to defeat the U-boat threat which diminished not because of a huge quantity of American anti-submarine shipping but the development of tactics and technology. It had behind it the vast mineral resources of its Empire and control of the peripheries of the world, i.e. South America, the Middle East and Eastern Asia.

Britain's industrial strength and its relatively safe position enabled it to stay in the fight precisely because, by June 1941 (but not after December 1941) it was clear that Germany would never be able to directly challenge Britain and in good time Britain could assemble a mechanised Army to retake the continent. As for starving people -- in 1940 and 1941 Britain was still able to provide 2500+ calories to its people. At the same time Germany had to resort to slave labour and even then was providing fewer calories to its people. The German food crisis of 1941 was no joke.

Britain eventually chose the path of the less manpower intensive aerial campaign against Germany. I do not want to discuss Dresden or the Strategic Air Campaign, which I think was morally justified (if ultimately not as effective as it had been thought). I am not losing any sleep over the destruction of Dresden or any other German city. Choose to live by the sword and you should be prepared to die by the sword also.

edit: dumb multiple post sorry

FFS people. The fanboyismo/jingo is cringeworthy, on both sides of the "argument". Not even gonna bother with the larger narratives, but a few remarks before I lose all self respect:

Semantically, Befehlstaktik is the conceptual opposite of Auftragstaktik.
Befehlstaktik is meant to signify the traditionalist, rigid approach to command culture, ie. what the Allies and the Soviets practised, whereas Auftragstaktik is what the Germans (to this day) describe their approach. There has been a large discourse on the merits of either method/culture in Germany from the 19th century onwards, and the matter was by no means considered a settled affair maybe until the publication of HDV 125 during the early days of the Reichswehr, meaning the 1920s.

Churchill had actually been a bataillon commander at the Ypres Salient and did stay long enough to gain a fairly succinct impression of the horrors of modern warfare. He had also been present at Ondurman and the Boer war and certainly cannot be accused of not having witnessed bloodshed first hand.

Werwolf, I would most certainly advise some of the more recent scholarly literature on the topic of the Waffen-SS. You seem to be somewhat afflicted by the fanboyismo virus, no offence. The Waffen-SS was certainly neither a paragon of homogenity(in whatever sense, for good and bad) nor of egalitarianism.

Eh. Enough of this lest I waste my afternoon here.

Aren't we talking counterfactuals here?
In any case, the "Soviet people" frankly don't matter or are quantité négligeable in this equation.

The German people for one were strongly opposed to and highly anxious about any military action prior to WW2 yet were manipulated/cajoled into accepting the seemingly inevitable easily enough and would in the majority still fight on to the very destruction of their homeland despite obviously hopeless odds.
There are perks to living in a totalitarian dictatorship after all. Not to mention that in 1945 after the victory over Nazi Germany, internal control and legitimacy of the Soviet regime were far better consolidated than they had been in 1941.
I might add that the Soviet Union immediately prior to Barbarossa engaged in no less than three wars of an undoubtedly aggressive nature (Finland, the Baltics, Poland), which granted were far less traumatic but still.

First, sorry sorry, I don't want you to sit here and waste a day of good weather, I don't either. Wait till its raining and answer if you wish to.

But aren't this quite the oversimplification? I mean you are correct that the Germans could be coerced to fight WW2 as an aggressive war, and Im sure the Soviet state would be able to do the same against germany in 1940.
And yes they did before in several places, but this is 1945. People have already been working +10h shifts for the last 4 years.
Manpower is running thin, everyone lost someone, and frankly war weariness has just been replaced by huge sigh of relief that its finally over. All I'm saying is that it is a huge difference between the situation in 1939 and 45.

I don't think we should just write off political moods in totalitarian states, "not even the Emperor can go against the mob" as it were.
Just looking at the time spent by party officials and the NKVD in order to try and check the mood of the people kinda gives a hint that the Soviet authorities were quite concerned with their political standing. I mean Stalin staying in the capital in '41 and the reversing of previous order to blow up all factories is very much a result of civilian political uproar. No?

My entire point is: For the USSR to get everyone onboard with fighting a new TOTAL war when the people have been 'running on fumes' for the better part of 2 years would require a great reason for them to do so. And frankly I cannot see a reason that might give it.

Soo, can anyone of you counter-factual thinkers come up with a feasible Causus-Belli, that would make the Soviet people willing to fight a war of aggression against the west in 1945?

Otherwise the entire premise kinda falls on its head, and all talk of carriers, B-29s, tactics, industrial output, logistics would be moot no?

It's a cold war gone hot scenario, communism vs capitalism.

I don't think it's really that hard to see it as feasible, uncle joe selling the story that the red army is pre-emptively "protecting" the peoples revolution in western Europe from the grips of the imperialist UK/US.

Bearing in mind western europe was borderline on starvation mode near the end of the war, and there were a lot of communists in Italy, Spain, France etc.

It's not too far fetched, especially as the Korean war sparked off only a few years after Germany's fall.

The german doctrinal methods up to the end of 42 were heavily biased/optimized towards maneuver warfare (and operational/tactical approaches), short ranged thinking, and fighting "on the fly". The German military was very biased towards developing operations/tactics but not developing strategic capabilities. The training of their general staff reflected this. It was a critical weakness among some strengths.

The mature soviets were very strategically/command oriented and had some of their own (quite disturbing) defects as well, partly due to the excesses of soviet communism. They were very biased towards optimizing strategy and operations while neglecting tactics. I find the distinction between the two opponents very interesting.

What has always stood out for me in 44/45 was the noticeable mismatch between allied material resources/equipping and their ability to generate military power. There were likely to have been tactical/operational defects in US/UK methods that were smoothed over by vastly superior force deployments and victory. Basically the allies were not resource efficient either in the air or on the ground. Their system was biased towards reducing short-term casualties which also bore noticeable disadvantages in operations and tactics. (throwing the baby out with the bathwater)

It's a cold war gone hot scenario, communism vs capitalism.

I don't think it's really that hard to see it as feasible, uncle joe selling the story that the red army is pre-emptively "protecting" the peoples revolution in western Europe from the grips of the imperialist UK/US.

Bearing in mind western europe was borderline on starvation mode near the end of the war, and there were a lot of communists in Italy, Spain, France etc.

It's not too far fetched, especially as the Korean war sparked off only a few years after Germany's fall.

Well even that would have required first some incentive on behalf of the west, say round up all the reds and shoot them. And why would that happen?

Korea is a good example, but a major difference. It was a case of the Soviets supporting the north 'under the table' with arms and soldiers, not a complete invasion of a continent with the entire might of the soviet army, which required huge efforts on the home front just to move around.

I don't think it's really that hard to see it as feasible, uncle joe selling the story that the red army is pre-emptively "protecting" the peoples revolution in western Europe from the grips of the imperialist UK/US.

But there was no people's revolution in Western Europe. So that would make for a better starting point.

One could imagine that Italian communists might have taken power, and called on the USSR for help. The USSR would probably have responded to that, if only for the sake of its self-image, but this is still a long way from launching an outright invasion of western Europe. It would much more likely have played out like the rest of the Cold War did.

All in all, I fall on the side that sees the alleged threat of a Soviet assault on Europe as mainly Western propaganda. The US likes to present itself as the saviour of civilisation and freedom - just ask them, they'll tell you - and for that to work there has to be a great Evil which they strive to resist. Since the end of the Cold War, they've simply moved on to other great Evils.