Profile of JWR

You've overlooked three other quintessential most important differences. Die Wehrmacht and Heer in the particular had an undeniably competent commander cadre which had been eliminated from the Soviet order of battle by Stalin's purges of the 30's. Die Wehrmacht comprised of a homogenous extremely well trained all Deutsch volkgenossen rather than a motley crew of souls from a union of different states as the was that of the U.S.S.R., and undeniably, in 1941 their national pride reinstated driven by community ideals with sense of common purpose had the finest espirit de corps arguably of any army in recorded history.

Though was introduced in WW1 in the age of modern arms at a tactical level of limited extent with the introduction of Stoßtruppen, "befehlstaktik" was a direct consequence of NSDAP policy introduced in the modernisation of Germany's army after the NSDAP came to power with their opening up of egalitarian access to the Heer officer ranks which has since been adopted by every modern Western army. Notably in the Waffen SS, and I am not glorifying the organisation here merely relating the fact as distinct from the demonisation mythologies, unhampered by an existing class cadre of Junkers class resistant to change to their existing SOP, customs, rituals and traditions, what eventually became the Waffen SS was reknown for its officers of field rank sharing everything in common with the enlisted man, and notably, so many of them were drawn from the ranks e.g. SS-OStrmbf. Peiper. They lived with their men, ate the same meals without special privilige afforded of rank as was commonplace in the Allied armies, most notably so in the Class ridden British services where officers were still generally only advanced from the ranks late in the war, and then only under duress of casualty driven nessessity when a Sandhurst, Oxford or Cambridge graduate of suitable class were unavailable. Even in the RAF this class distinction nonsense prevailed for an aeon with class separation of Sergeant Pilots from Pilot Officers. Both were line pilots rather than there being any distinction on the premise of role, e.g. a flight commander or squadron leader.

Well. I agree with your first paragraph. I was comparing the operational and institutional concepts though (principally ideas and practices), not the quality or constitution of the troops or their motivation or equipment. We could also consider unit structure to be a quintessential difference and even nomenclature. But I wasn't really talking about all that. Regarding befehlstaktik if it wasn't a German invention it wouldn't have a German name. What I mean, though, is that the Soviet Army had a more centralised and controlled command structure than the German Army. The fact that both ended up fighting high-tempo mechanised operations with decisive breakthroughs did not mean the Soviets 'learned' from the Germans neither did it mean they had the same doctrine. They both practiced combined arms, independently, from an early beginning.

You are cherry picking about the SS, however. How about that Oskar Dirlewanger for high quality SS officer material, eh? The German General Staff was not some round table of brilliant knights. They were both deceived by FUSAG and unable to properly realise it to Hitler after it became obvious it was a decoy.

As for the British forces, it's not really true. Rapid military expansion meant that there were officers from the ranks or direct entry officers from 1939. The British Army has always built its strength on NCOs, though, not officers. At any rate, there were many competent and professional British officers, as there were competent and professional German officers. There were many idiots, too, but only in the SS did one find petty criminals elevated to the rank of Brigade Fuhrer.

But die Werhmacht sure perfected it. Let's not take away from the fact that they drove the incompetents from the battlefields of Western Europe in just six weeks in 1940. And similarly, until halted by weather at the very gates of Moscow, in 1941, succeeded in driving the Soviets from the vastness that was their western Soviet Union using "Blitzkrieg".

Yes, undeniably a silly journalistic term which stuck. In comparison, the equally reported but less glamorous term "Sitzkrieg", understandably preferably forgotten, could equally and as easily be applied to the unsuccessful Brit & French 'strategies' of the period.

The Germans learned from the First World War because they had a CIC who had actually been at the pointy end. Whereas the Brits had a cigar puffing, whisky swilling buffoon who as dismissed ex-Lord of the Admiralty, had spent that same time comfortably at home in disgrace. Since stabbing Chamberlain in the back, his only 'action' other than the bloody rhetorical was the ensure the incarceration of those of his own peoples who dissented with his prosecution of a completely unnecessary war on a pretext.

Well, you know what -- it is counterfactual, but here it is anyway. The fact of that matter is that Gamelin (for a bunch of reasons) chose the wrong plan. The Dyle Plan was the cause of the French strategic collapse. The Escaut/Scheldt Plan was much more viable and given that the French had a great deal of minor tactical success against the Germans it is not a long step by any means to suggest that Plan Escaut would have, quite frankly, stopped the 'blitzkrieg' in its tracks.

What is another word for sitzkrieg but materialschlact. The Anglo-French strategy was to wait it out until they had a material superiority to the Germans. This is obvious military sense. It was only the disaster of the Dyle Plan that prevented it from becoming a reality. It was also the reality that Britain learned when in 1918 the British and Canadian Armies drove the German Army from the field. Britain could never afford to keep a huge Army in wartime but it could afford to wait behind the Maginot line until it did have one.

Whilst I take on board the exercise in semantics. I'll bet those Brits waiting on the beach at Dunkirk wouldn't agree with you any more than the occupied French, Belgians, Dutch, Norweigan, Greeks, or Balkan Serbians, Croatians, and Bosnians of the time would if they could speak with us today!

I agree, but I doubt they would be discussing it in terms of the origin of befehlstaktik and the historiography of German operational practice. I suspect they were mainly thinking about whether or not they would survive or be taken prisoner. Since you are an ex-military person I will leave it to yourself as to what you would be thinking about in that situation.

About the airpower I will reply some other time, but I admit that it's not really my best point.

Strategically the Ardennes Offensive could have no effect upon the ultimate loss of the war due the single principle of attrition. As an entity of itself, it had potential to achieve what it sought to achieve militarily and politically given its primary objective. Calling Unernehmen Wacht am Rhein which comprised several independent operations a failure before it played out in hindsight reeks of armchair historian plagiury. e.g. Risky as it was and driven by political rather than military objective, nevertheless Arnhem could have been a tactical success rather then the bloody disaster it was. Ultimately its failure lay in its execution due quickly became apparent were unrealistic objectives expected of supporting forces amongs other bungles.

I think it is a bit much to call me an armchair historian and go on to say 'If the Ardennes Offensive succeeded...' It was based on faulty premises. Besideswhich -- a tactical success for an operation would be considered a failure anyway.

And I must address the final part of your statement above (bracketed) as fallacious as it is obtusely popularist partisan.

The disasters of Arnhem and Singapore were hardly the work of genius, and Churchill can be appropriated blame directly and indirectly for some of the bloodiest military blunders and murderous campaigns in history, e.g. the night area bombing offensive, which remains a disgrace to this day and blight on the otherwise esteemed record of the RAF. And how about the obscenity that was the Dardanelles disaster, Dunkirk and Dieppe -from his memoirs "I thought it most important that a large-scale operation should take place this summer". Churchill insisted the BEF embark for France (resulting in defeat and Dunkirk) and ensured Britain declared war on a pretext against the will of the Crown, many members of parliament and generally the contemorary sentiment and will of the majority of British people hence starting WWII.

Churchill persistently and protractedly refused generous peace terms repeatedly offered to the Crown and importantly, ultimate benefit of the British peoples and their Empire at a time when Britain was on her knees, still unrecovered from economic depression with a huge debt still to be repaid from the war of twenty years previous not finally repaid in full until just recently in 2015!!!!! I'll bet the young people of Britain's new millenium were thankful to him for inheriting that <NOT>. He personally intervened to scuttle even the noble sacrifical attempt made by Hess in May 1941 for which he paid with the rest of his life. Yes, thanks to Churchill, Britain was alone, isolated and starving in service of his political and personal objectives fueled by a whisky soaked ego powering a undeniably powerful rhetoric.

The fact was, in the context of that time, America had not entered the war, and until Roosevelt manipulated it, the American public at large was against her entering any foreign and in the particular, a European war. Britain was alone, on her knees, and starving from the undeniably effective U-boat offensive against merchant shipping.

And after the war, what of Poland's freedom or Czechoslovakia and the Sudatenland then. As if Churchill ever gave a toss about either of those states and their peoples!

Er, it was a criticism of Hitler, not a veneration of Churchill.

Whatever criticisms I have heard of Churchill, and there are many good ones, his decision to fight is not one I have ever heard made by any Briton, especially young ones, with the sole exception of those in national socialist organisations in Britain itself. I think most British people feel that it was the right thing to have done (especially in view of what was afterwards discovered). Whether or not he was a warmonger, his decision to continue the fight was the only justified one. There is no such thing as a 'noble peace' with Nazi Germany. You can consider that obtuse popularism if you like but it is hardly a controversial statement.

Britain was hardly on its knees or alone. It had just driven the Italians from Egypt, finished off the German Navy in Norway, and by November of 1940 had struck a crippling blow against the Regia Marina. It had the capacity to defeat the U-boat threat which diminished not because of a huge quantity of American anti-submarine shipping but the development of tactics and technology. It had behind it the vast mineral resources of its Empire and control of the peripheries of the world, i.e. South America, the Middle East and Eastern Asia.

Britain's industrial strength and its relatively safe position enabled it to stay in the fight precisely because, by June 1941 (but not after December 1941) it was clear that Germany would never be able to directly challenge Britain and in good time Britain could assemble a mechanised Army to retake the continent. As for starving people -- in 1940 and 1941 Britain was still able to provide 2500+ calories to its people. At the same time Germany had to resort to slave labour and even then was providing fewer calories to its people. The German food crisis of 1941 was no joke.

Britain eventually chose the path of the less manpower intensive aerial campaign against Germany. I do not want to discuss Dresden or the Strategic Air Campaign, which I think was morally justified (if ultimately not as effective as it had been thought). I am not losing any sleep over the destruction of Dresden or any other German city. Choose to live by the sword and you should be prepared to die by the sword also.

In Russia, it is believed that in 44-45 years, the Red Army began to successfully use elements of the blitzkrieg tactics. The most typical example lead the rout of one milion Japanese Army in Manchuria for 1 month.

The term 'blitzkrieg' is not a term used in a serious operational discussion either in Germany or in the West since it was a term made up by British journalists and not even by the Germans themselves. I can't say about Russia, but I am talking about technical documents here.

You are talking about 'manoeuvre warfare', which Soviets could already practice before great purges. And Zhukov demonstrated it even in 1939 in Nomonhan with strong combined arms/tank movement battle. August Storm was just the development of scale, not new ideas.

The main difference between Soviet and German doctrine as I have said was command and control. This is a necessity when in Soviet Army, in some operations, entire divisions were designated only 1 kilometres of frontage. Soviets exercised strict control of subordinate units and moved them in accordance with overall strategic-operational plan (Soviets and western Allies were more similar in this regard than they were to Germans). This is known as befehlstaktik or 'command push tactics'. The opposite was the German practice of transmitting only intent to forwards officers and allowing them to make uncontrolled decisions, which is known as auftragstaktik or 'mission tactics'.

'Blitzkrieg' is usually used as a term to refer to mobile warfare, but it was not invented by Germans, and not practiced by them first--its actually just development of ancient principles, which you can see in battles like Cannae. The German way of war was to form ad-hoc battlegroups and allow forward commanders to do whatever was necessary to accomplish higher commander's objective. The Soviet way of war was to keep all units tightly controlled and move them inside a strict plan. Neither imply 'blitzkrieg', which is separate idea of combined arms and rapid movement of troops. The Soviet Union was practicing 'blitzkrieg' tactics in 1939 at Nomonhan (Khalkin Gol, whatever) but with befehlstaktik-type control system. When they came to August Storm it was not a copy of German tactics but their own developments, coming from deep operations (superior to whatever Germans practiced) and 1941-45 practical experience.

I use 'blitzkrieg' in inverted commas because it's a meaningless term really.

Also: Bagration is a more impressive operation than August Storm. Japanese had no good tanks or anti-tank guns, were spread out on a huge front without in-depth defences or reserves, and were lacking in ammunition and food, and could not be supported fro Japan itself. By 1945 Kwangtung Army was a shadow of what it was in 30s as the best divisions had been drawn off for Ichi-go and Philippines operations. Soviet operational power was better demonstrated in Bagration than August Storm.

I do not see how it has helped them in the Ardennes. Without air support Allied forces not able to stand the impact caused by the Nazis, even at half strength, like in the Ardennes.

Contrary to popular belief, CAS inflicted few casualties on German tanks in NW Europe. Allied airpower was useful chiefly as interdiction, not combat air support.

Ardennes operation would have failed even without allied air support. German plan was too ambitious (since it was directed by Hitler) and did not anticipate that allies could very quickly move reserves into the battle.

What if soviets attacked Western Europe right after WWII:
1) Soviet forces successfully advance to Europe, using the experience of four years war against Nazis.
The Red Army in the battle hardened, lead by experienced commanders and using blitzkrieg tactics (remember at the defeat of the Kwantung Army).]

Soviet military doctrine in WWII is not 'blitzkrieg' (there is no such thing as 'blitzkrieg') but concept drawn up by Tukhachevsky Triandafillov in the 30s. The Soviet way of fighting was completely different to the Germans, principally in its method of command and control (which is known as befehlstaktik as opposed to principle which dominated in German army called aufstragstaktik).

Allies were also capable of manoeuvre warfare, as was aptly shown in Northwest Europe 44-45 and Italy in early 1945.

8) Bad end.

agree with this though, lol

and the British are terrible at waging land wars in Europe.

Wrong. 1918 never forget.



In 1945 the Soviets still had serious problems economically. Their military was essentially capitalised by the US and they received substantial food from foreign sources. They had also taken staggeringly high casualties, whereas the US had not. On the other hand they possessed substantial forces in Europe itself, especially relative to the US.

re: US manpower. The US restrained itself to 100 divisions intentionally to maintain manpower for its workforce. Fewer casualties meant experience was retained for longer and the original green US army was pretty much a mean fighting machine by 1945, but otoh a lot of soldiers simply wanted to go home.

Engaging in counter-factuals is a bit silly though.

I don't really understand the faction design behind British Forces.

Infantry section is beast behind cover. But now Volks got incendiaries and Axis have all sorts of things including rifle grenade (which is a superhard counter to IS) what's the point? it's only good if you're shooting at something that doesn't have a grenade, or is suppressed. so it's ok against pios. great.

you could suppress with vickers but vickers (when not broken) has a super long burst time and suppresses on second burst only. it's not difficult to flank.

the base artillery is a neat idea but you have to use royal artillery commander to call it down without being literally on top of the enemy and even when you get airburst, it doesn't fire airbursts every time (is this a bug?) as others have noted it's utterly useless against anything except a really big building. it can force MG42 out of a church. it can't even counter mg pits.

it's the only artillery you get except sexton (LOL) and mortar pit. so ok good idea. give Brits emplacements for some core units like heavy anti tank and anti infantry and indirect. then make their units strong in cover so they are a 'defensive faction'. Except it only works in a vacuum.

I don't understand. Relic don't play the game? did they not think about the other factions?

- IS can shoot good in cover but if enemy is competent they get grenades. or even suppressing ISG etc.

- if emplacements are too strong they are OP, axis don't have good units to counter them. if they're too weak they're both a waste of resources but what's more their presence means Brits don't get any good indirect. mortar pit with early brace/standfast was op, but now brace nerfed and incendiaries buffed its weak so brits now dont have indirect fire.

- there are no assault weapons at all except cdos. so when enemy is spamming grenades and incendiaries at you what can you do. the LMG is strong but it can't shoot on the move.

- bren gun carrier. cool vehicle. you can't shoot out of it for some bizarre reason. against OKW it is strong. but against wehr it dies because of faust. so you give brits one unit that's super good against OKW but pointless against wehr especially because the fuel means they get 222 first. why not make a unit that is acceptable against both factions rather than strong vs one and useless vs other. its pathfinding is also horrible but i guess that isn't game design. it does have some use later on as a command vehicle though. and WASP used to be nice.

don't get me wrong the faction is fun to play and all, and it has some nice things. the mines are good. the tanks are great. the AT gun even I think is nice. commandos duh. but the basic core units are so broken in that they're either really fucking powerful or really fucking weak. I don't understand this type of balance and wish we could go back to COH1 where it was less prevalent.

edit: btw brits do have some useless commander abilities. the tactical support commander is probably the most pointless one.