^
German Cold War, US-written tactical accounts on the behavior of the 'Soviets' (not Russians- the Germans were also so daft to call the British..'the english') should be approached with heavy caution.
This extends from Balck to Guderian to Raus.
The bias is very strong- The US interviewed these commanders to learn about 'successful' engagements. The Germans rarely talked about when their tactics failed and they tend to excuse away their defeats. The Germans also have very little insight and military intelligence on Soviet forces past the summer of 1941.
What is bad tactics of the day could be good implementation of a larger scale operation or strategy. IMO, learn about Soviet forces from modern russian sources, and learn about German forces accordingly.
To start with, you are of course correct that contemporary German perception of the Soviet approach merits particular caution and has its intrinsic limitations - thats historiography 101. But:
When it comes ie. to the intelligence picture, German insight actually increased exponentially past the beginning of Barbarossa, (before the war it was in most respects abysmal - as evidenced by the fact that it underestimated Soviet strength by almost 50 %) and so did the quality of FHO, their assessments of Soviet strenghts, casualties, and intentions proved by and large fairly reliable whereas the Soviets often operated in the realm of fantasy. The official Soviet history of the Great Patriotic War makes for interesting reading in this regard. As for the alleged German reluctance to discuss their failures or apologetic tendencies in general, this has some truth to it when it comes to particular generals' memoirs (ie. von Manstein etc.), but in general, it is quite simply wrong. If anything, if one constrasts the German tactical treatments, lessons learned etc. with their Soviet counterparts, one is struck by the German willingness not only to discuss their own personal, operational and doctrinal failings but also by their acknowledgments of perceived Soviet superiority in several fields - even though the Germans overall, unsurprisingly, perceived themselves as superior. Soviet analogues on the other hand often, for the lack of a better word, appear borderline bizarre and read more like hagiograhic accolades interspersed with agitprop jargon then serious military literature - for instance, failures (if discussed at all) are virtually never explained in terms of German agency or performance but at most by material shortages, and more commonly by misapplication of political derivatives/"military science" or the shortcomings of certain vilified individuals...
If you read German, look up ie. Middeldorf, Eike: "Taktik im Rußlandfeldzug", and go from there.