Well, Doomturtle the things you are pointing out are at the operational and tactical level. At the 'strategic' level I am talking about the big view- economics, manpower, force generation, strategic positioning, raw materials, etc.
A partial disadvantage of the US/UK/CW is the sensitivity to human losses. A totalitarian state didn't run the country. They get reported quickly in democracies by the press, so a nothing situation like Ortona gets reported as the 'Canadian Stalingrad'. The military is in the end controlled by civilians. The buildup of the US Army reflected the nature of American society. Something like Blitzkrieg would be a hard sell.
Likewise the mass mobilization of the whole economy is something the totalitarian and democratic regimes on the defensive were able to accomplish easily whilst the autocratic regime was not. The Germans were still felt the need to provide largesse for the German population. Compare that to the US where all auto production was ceased the day after Pearl Harbor, not just to rearm but to conserve resources for the war effort. Democracies are quite capable of handling losses so long as the purpose is clear they have confidence in the leadership. |
Italy -> Allies continually lost much more resources because of the Germans ability to enact a defensive war on their terms. Allied solution? Land further up the coast. This achieved little success for months because the German ability to contain the landing zones. By wars end the Allies had yet to break out of Italy into southern Europe. While yes they lost the "WAR" the Germans had managed to stand firm within Italy against allies who were "On the Ball".
Oh, I believe Anzio was well executed up to the point of the landing. After that it failed due to a surfeit of caution. There was so little resistance they thought there was a trap to be sprung. I think Patton would have done better than Clark.
If you were going to choose a front to defend, could you have chosen a better place than Italy? There are only hills and mountains and there is no room for strategic maneuver. It is a defensive dream. It is probably one situation were massed airborne landings might have worked.... but where would you land them? There is a reason it took so much longer than the rest of Europe to unite it. |
There is a difference. The Germans running on "a razors edge" were doing it against the '41 Soviet Army and the US and Brits were moving against the Germans. It is one thing to go up against an opponent that has already proven to be operationally, tactically and strategically deficient and quite another to attack an opponent that has already proven operational and tactical competence and assume or presume they are no longer that incapable.
Even in Case Blue the Soviets, while they had losses, their losses weren't what they had been. They were becoming more adept and losses, while still losses, were progressively less costly. I think that their biggest "take" was 75,000 was seen as a disappointment rather than an accomplishment.
The Allies did try a "fast" redoubling of the penetration idea in Market Garden. And Market Garden was actually a pretty near thing. But they managed to drop an airborne division in such a way that there was 2 Pz divisions between it and the objective. Had they known perhaps it would have been done differently, or the resources gone to Patton, or the 1st Airborne dropped south of the bridge, or if the landings had taken place with less prep but when the Germans were more disorganized, or, or...
I do know landings south of the Arnhem bridge were possible, which would have meant they could have reached the bridge in brigade strength, and would have been closer to the rest of the division and to resupply from dropzones. I don't know if that would have been enough to hold it until relieved, though the one battalion that made it did manage to hold the bridge for several days.
Once Market Garden fails and it was too late to keep the initiative on Patton's front it just doesn't make sense for the allies to take the risks IF THEY DON'T HAVE TO.
I think you are seeing it as a football game a bit. The whole German war was a giant gamble against a superior coalition that fell apart in 1941', and the rest was just them trying to figure out how to avoid total defeat. (which was pretty damn interesting in its own right)
True, the German military weakness was a tendency to be hyperaggressive and execute operations on a razor edge. You can see this from the small unit up to the grand strategic level. It's madness. But it was also a double edged sword.
Case Blue actually had many encirclements- just nothing compared to Barbarossa or Typhoon phase I. The biggest one was the encirclement at Kalach (up to 75,000)and the early ones in the caucasus. The real effect was the rapid gain of territory with the panzer drives, which caused the soviet armies to retreat and lose much of their stores and equipment making them much less effective in future ops. The irony is that the pre-Case Blue encirclements (up to 230,000) and surgical ops were more successful at reducing the soviet oob.
American/British complaints of logistics problems and the British manpower crisis actually pale compared to German problems in 41' and 42'. As early late august 1941, the German mobile forces could only get their strength up to 50-75% maximum in all categories provided a two week refitting period. Their actual strength was around 50% in armor and vehicles operable. By mid-Oct 1941, for instance, the Germans had only 13% of their vehicle fleet still running and were typically getting only 40-60% of the minimum supplies they needed to sustain the offensive. And they were just starting Operation Typhoon!! Then in two weeks, the Vyzama/Bryansk pockets are closed with over a million into the prisoner hauls or dead.
Wars are won at the Strategic level. The allies and the soviets were on the ball on this one. However, other things points out to operational art at the tactical and operational levels- basically the W.Allied armies aren't aggressive, effective, or ambitious enough. Basically the West Front armies and airpower may have needed a different configuration and doctrine other than variations of 'methodical' battle. It would be an attempt to replicate blitzkrieg, although in West. Allied terms. In 1940 you have Rommel's 7.Pz taking 94,000 British and French prisoners before the armistice using german methods. The others did nearly as good in France and in Russia 41'.
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Not sure Sir. Bloodnok will approve of such a thing. He likes his forums neat
Uh oh. We have someone with OCD policing a gamers forum, and an off-topic section of it?!
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with the previous discussion of logistics. it made me ponder what extent the efforts of the RAF and USAF had on logistics and infrastructure during the european theater and if a large impact, to what extent it may've hampered the long term invasion logistics.
A complicated question with a lot of moving parts. At the time they overestimated the success of the bombing campaigns so it is quite likely that resources could have gone to better uses, but you don't really know those things except with 20/20 hindsight.
Certainly they did a lot of damage to industry and infrastructure. Moving production from large scale factories to (essentially) a cottage industry will certainly impede efficiency as well as quality, inventory control, etc. Damaging the road and rail networks, impeding daytime travel, all have the effect of degrading your enemy.
Then there is the question of where else you would be using those materials and resources. I am not sure where all the aluminum would be used, and certainly the use of car factories for the production of planes didn't limit the US making a ton of cars, trucks, ships or anything else. In fact the Avenger torpedo bomber got picked up by GM because they needed things to do in their now shut car factories.
There also doesn't seem to be a shortage of fuel. While the Allies in France stalled do to fuel shortages at the front this was mostly because of transportation and supply limitations within France. There were stockpiles of stuff in Cherbourg and off the the beaches. (Though had supply been even better they might have found out they were using those stockpiles quicker than they could be replenished, and possibly found that fuel in England was in short supply because of use for aviation gas. It is all about the bottlenecks.)
Then there are the men. Certainly bomber and fighter crews were better than average, but I don't know that the numbers of those qualify as huge. A 1,000 US bomber raid means only 10,000 men, less than a US division, and many of them are "just" gunners. There were already 30 divisions in France in the beginning of fall, '44. Not just that, but as I stated above, though not as effective as first thought, the air forces didn't have NO effect.
Then there are outliers like the Mosquito fighter/bomber. It was designed from the outset to use skills and resources for which there was a surplus in England (wood and skilled woodworkers & cabinet makers). They designed it to be made in an already existing cottage industry and ended up with a superlative plane that on its maiden flight was 20 mph faster than a Spitfire and with the range of a bomber. Almost 8,000 were made during the war. I don't think there was a role for planes that it wasn't used for (including fighter).
While using all those resources for the invasion might have made it materially possible to invade sooner, I don't think it would have been a year sooner, and it just wasn't likely that anyone would attempt an invasion across the English channel except in more clement weather (so May, June, July, or August). And they probably would not have been ready in August of '43 as the US had only been at war 1 1/2 years at that point. |
I lifted your question in its own thread. We should perhaps do the same more often, this was more or less a troll thread from the start and discussion has moved far away from the original topic already.
More threads for the library!
I am not in favor of this practice. It makes it more likely that threads and topics will be lost. There are some history buffs here but not enough to make a dynamic thread on every topic.
I say let us grognards discuss the war freely in any thread that seems to be alive. There aren't a whole lot of children involved in these discussions and things that go too far afield can be policed. |
I should add that I am a person who is all in favor of having won the war more quickly.
Given my lineage I would much rather fewer of my people were exterminated. A shorter war would have accomplished that. |
Operational art is accomplishing what you can with the resources at hand.
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This extends past the issue to supply and into the asset utilization of the combat forces along with the nature of the command cadre.
It is possible you are quite right... But if I am an infantryman and have the choice of fighting under a Prussian who studies fine use of minimal necessary materials in an artistic duel or the American logistician who believes in massing a huge punch that you land after blowing up everything on the other side.... And then winding up for another big punch, I would rather be on the side of the US and let the historians disparage the way I won.
So again, if you are an allied commander you hit hard, and if you end up having to stop there isn't a reason to risk a strategic overreach if you can just wait a bit and wind up the next punch.
(If I hear you correctly this is part of the argument that the Germans were not at their best in the West yet they still managed to hold off the Allies because... they were so good? And to an American, to say "you only won because you hit us with much more than you needed to" will often probably only get the response "yeah.... so what's your point?")
Barbarossa and Case Blue was also made in phases and with great logistical problems. However, the advances were more impressive, as well as the operational victories. The Germany army in the West was very much a third-rate force- the Wehr had no operational capability of real substance in WW2 since July. 1943.
Case Blue is in part the counter argument to the whole "encirclement" argument. By Case Blue there just weren't the kind of successful massed encirclements of Soviets. The Soviets had a few more months of experience under them and were much more successful at avoiding that kind of devastation. Likewise the Germans were aware of the dangers, having done it so many times to others. They fought tooth and nail to unplug the Poles who were threatening to close the Falaise pocket and hold it open long enough to allow at least the troops if not the material to escape. |
The US Army had supply issues until they could take Antwerp which then gave them the ability to land supplies closer to the front. Also was one of a few reasons it was a target for the Ardennes Assault. With Antwerp in hand the Allies were able to shorten Red Ball Express route thus increasing the volume of transport in a shorter distance and time.
Well, yes, that is part of the contention I have had all along, that offensives can only last so long as they can keep the forward elements supplied enough to keep moving and with enough "support" (infantry, artillery, supply, etc) keeping up so they don't feel their flanks are ever TOO exposed to constitute a danger.
Once they have to stop for even a few days, particularly with defensive lines before them, it will probably cause a halt in the progress from that breakthrough. They no longer know if the enemey is on the run or has stopped and used the time to re-entrench. Whether the enemy has been reinforced and resupplied, since they are now closer to their home. The advancing units are at the same time themselves weaker. Their supplies are running low, their vehicles are in poorer condition and there are probably far fewer of them then when they started, their ranks are thinner, and they are probably more fatigued. Even in that state they might be in better shape than the enemy. But once they stopped for a few days they no longer know that for sure. And the Allies starting running low and progressing only in fits and starts about the same time they had got to the Seigfried Line/West Wall/German Border, the most natural place for the Wehrmacht to stop its retreat and start again digging in to form a new (and somewhat prepared) defense line.
It is completely natural, and often wise, to pause, refit, reinforce and resupply for a new offensive, particularly if you are the allies and will be stronger when refit than the Wehrmacht will be when it has done its best to resupply. |
Some more on the Allied supply issue in fall of 1944:
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http://www.historynet.com/red-ball-express
"On both fronts an acute shortage of supplies–that dull subject again!–governed all our operations," General Bradley wrote in his autobiography, A General's Life. "Some twenty-eight divisions were advancing across France and Belgium. Each division ordinarily required 700-750 tons a day–a total daily consumption of about 20,000 tons."
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...the Red Ball Express was conceived during a 36-hour brainstorming session among American commanders. Its name came from a railroad phrase–to "red ball" something was to ship it express–and from an earlier Red Ball Express in Britain that rushed supplies to the English ports during the early days of the invasion. The second Red Ball operation lasted barely three months, from August 25 through November 16, 1944, but by the end of those critical months the express line had established itself firmly in the mythology of World War II. More than 6,000 trucks and their trailers transported 412,193 tons of supplies to the advancing American armies from Normandy to the German border.
So the Red Ball Express was transporting some 5,000 tons/day (probably less in the beginning and more towards the end) to divisions needing 20,000 tons when they are on the move.
On some days in late August the US Army recorded fuel usage of 800,000 gallons (that alone is 2,500 tons) and the system for transporting didn't even start until everyone was running out.
They had to scrounge up 6,000 trucks and keep them running. And they were going through tires like crazy. A combination of overloaded trucks, war-ravaged roads, and a 30-35 mph constant speed.
I read in one article (can't find it right now) that at this point and through much of September 3rd Army had its fuel allocations reduced from 400,000 gallons/day to 31,000 with the allocation instead being assigned to US 1st and British 8th Armies for the Northern push over the Rhine. It was later again increased, but that doesn't mean you can move forward. You have to refill the tanks and then stockpile more at/near the front. You have to get them ammunition (remember the artillery is short on ammo) and replace/repair the damaged material. |