very good summary . a +
#Ackshually,
1) Harder to do than you think.
2) With what navy/landing experince? The Kriegsmarine spent all of their fleet securing Norway and was in no fighting shape afterward. Operation Sealion was doomed to fail.
3) Uh huh. Killing an ally totally helps. Besides, it wasn't "General Winter" who stopped the Germans; they were already losing momentum in the fall. The Red Army stopped them, and winter simply just magnified the problems after they had already been caused.
4) The generals aren't perfect, either. The high command wanted to hit Moscow, but honestly Stalingrad was a better target. Contrary to popular belief, the reason why the battle at Stalingrad was so important was not because of the name, but rather that whoever controls the Volga has a big strategic advantage in controlling the oil fields southwest of Stalingrad. The Red Army needed the extra fuel, and so did the Wehrmacht, which is why they fought so bitterly for it. It had military significance rather than political significance - who's to say that the Russians wouldn't simply pull out of Moscow like they did to Napoleon? Moscow was purely a political target, and Hitler was in the right to stress the importance of Stalingrad. Although cooperation between the two parties would have helped the situation, they both made mistakes and share the same amount of blame.
5) The reason why the shift in production to heavy tanks was that in the late war, Germany had no hope in matching the industrial capacity of the other nations. A Pz4 was maybe the equal, or in some cases even inferior to some of the Allied tanks - the Pz4 was slower and less maneuverable than any of the contemporary Allied mediums and in some cases (as the T-34-85, Easy 8) outgunned. Even if optimistically assuming the Pz4 to [contemporary Allied medium tank] loss ratio was 1:1, Germany couldn't even begin to match the productions of Shermans, Cromwells, or T-34s singularly, let alone all combined, so the idea was to create tanks that would be able to handle many Allied tanks at once to compensate. Obviously it wasn't enough, but pursuing the medium tank only route is an equally bad idea that would have failed equally as spectacularly.
While Pz4s were outdated, the more modern Panthers were not the best tanks for the job either. A tank has to engage infantry as well, since in the end, the infantry is what holds ground, not the air force or the vehicles - such are merely tools for the infantry to do it's job better. The high velocity gun had poor high-explosive performance, and while the gun had excellent armor penetration, it was overkill for most Allied tanks, barring the IS-2. Note that the Pershing and Comet tanks were used exceedingly rarely, towards the very very end of WWII, and were thus not a big enough factor to warrant such a high velocity gun. Additionally, Panthers would break down more often the Pz4s and took 10 hours(!) to replace a simple roadwheel. It should also be noted that Panthers were basically heavy tanks under the doctrines of any other nation. The Germans simply called their equipment by whatever role they were used for: the MG42/34 was simultaneously the LMG, MMG, and HMG and were referred to as all three in differing circumstances, even though it was by definition just only a LMG/MMG, firing the same 7.92mm Mauser round as the K98, and by no means a true HMG, which is supposed to fire larger caliber rounds than the standard rifle). Similarly, the Panther, while by specifications a heavy tank, was used at the tactical and strategic levels as a medium tank, and henceforth known as one. The idea that Panthers are somehow massively cheaper and easier to produce by the logic that they are mediums rather than heavies is very wrong. Perhaps maybe a Panther was massively cheaper than the Tiger B, but also keep in mind that the Tiger B was the heaviest turreted armored vehicle extensively used, ever. Regardless, the Panther was not an easy to produce vehicle by any means, and could only be considered "relatively cheap" when compared to massive super heavy tanks that the Wehrmacht was fielding.
The biggest reason why the Germans lost the war was a severe shortage of logistics vehicles and capacity. Everything else, including the lack of a Strategic Air Command, the lack of amphibious equipment and men, and the many internal rivalries between the OKW, OKH, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine and even Hitler himself, although devastating enough by themselves, were trifling in comparison to the chronic logistical nightmare that any branch of the German Reich had to deal with. It's quite clear how Germany lost the war the moment they started it.
"Amateurs talk about tactics. Professionals study logistics." -General Barrow, USMC