Operation Barbarossa

what went wrong in the east for the germans ? What was the turning point ? Stalingrad ? Kursk ?

Personally i think the germans losing first Stalingrad meant that the german army was no longer invincible .

By the Battle of Kursk the germans had low numbers of serviceable tanks and low anti tank guns .


Germans
Operation Citadel:
780,900 men
2,928 tanks
9,966 guns and mortars
2,110 aircraft

Soviets
Operation Citadel:
1,910,361 men
5,128 tanks
25,013 guns and mortars
2,792 to 3,549 aircraft

afterwards it germans adopted mobile defence and elastic defence while the soviets push deep in the rear areas of the germans with combined arms coordination .

Also before Kursk there was a failure in capturing Moscow and that was not good for the germans because moscow was a main objective of the campaign , if not the only main objective .

Winter played a big part too off course .

I've read a great deal (maybe around 20) books on the topic, including war diaries.

The Axis had no business in the USSR. They lost as soon as they entered it. There was a brief 'opening' for a rapid victory in July 1941 and that's it.

The source of Axis combat power was strong 'blitzkrieg' strategic offensives. They were nothing without it, and Case Blue 1942 was the last strong (albeit flawed) blitzkrieg. They perform far worse in the defense.

With the Axis/Germans it was not so much about production but rapid and decisive operations early on in the war. 39-42 German combat power was largely through their panzer divisions and large numbers of well trained infantry with good tactical skills, not at all due to advantages from equipment or firepower. The key to ending the axis and ending strategic blitzkrieg was to devastate the german infantry arm and destroy german mobility (horses, vehicles), which was accomplished by Nov, 1942.

The Axis took around 1 million casualties on the Eastern Front by the end of 1941. They took 2 1/2 million by the end of Stalingrad ( Feb 1943). They took 5 million on the Eastern front (alone) by May 1944.

Another big impact had the postponed start of the campaign. Initially, operation bararossa was scheduled for april i believe, but was continuously postponed until june. This limited the effective time frame until the start of the winter.

The winter of 1941 came earlier than expected and German troops were not prepared for it (Lack of winter clothing, vehicles/guns not suitable for winter conditions). This led to the halt of the German offensive and can be regarded as a crucial and decisive factor in the failure of the eastern campaign.

My opinion is that the Germans primarily failed because they didn't reach Moscow and cut it off from other cities before the Winter 1941-2.

I think the Operation Barbarossa was initially scheduled for May 15th.

Another factor about the blitzkrieg is that it worked well in Western Europe due to the short distances between nations. However, it failed on the eastern front due to the vast distances between the German armies and their objectives. Plus, there is the possible heavy resistance that the Russians could produce while supply lines would be stretched out due to the fact that the said armies made quick movements ahead of their own supply lines.

Russians already had expiriens of lossing Moscow.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_invasion_of_Russia

They could get the second time a burned city. THey WOULD went 1000 km and only 11000 thru Sibera without roads left till japan.

Another big impact had the postponed start of the campaign. Initially, operation bararossa was scheduled for april i believe, but was continuously postponed until june. This limited the effective time frame until the start of the winter.

The winter of 1941 came earlier than expected and German troops were not prepared for it (Lack of winter clothing, vehicles/guns not suitable for winter conditions). This led to the halt of the German offensive and can be regarded as a crucial and decisive factor in the failure of the eastern campaign.

This analysis works only if you believe it was the weather that stopped the Germans. I would disagree with that. It was the distance and the Soviets that stopped them. The force that made it near to Moscow was a completely spent force. Offensive operations even against a weakly defended Moscow was impossible. And Moscow was not weakly defended.

Had they started earlier they a) might have still faced the mud of the spring thaws, and B) the Soviet response of rebuilding their reserves, which was the biggest obstacle the Germans had, would also have started sooner.

The Germans would have failed regardless. In all their operations they still took 25% casualties (725,000) in '41, which is low in comparison to what they achieved, but it wasn't replaceable. The Russians were reinforcing their army to the tune of 500,000 a month with the millions (14 million at the start of Barbarossa) of men they had who had military experience.

The problem is one of comparing armchair generals (and Austrian corporals) to real generals and logisticians.

The "operational arts" generals were correct that they could defeat the Soviet military in the first 700km. What was wrong was that this would be sufficient to knock out the soviets, which is really a political determination, but one most of the generals were inclined, in '41 and after all their successes, to agree with.

Those same generals extended their successes even further and then wrote memoirs that had it not been for this (lates start?) or that (winter) they would have beat the Russians. So the armchair generals try to figure out how to start sooner. Or start later but with more panzers.

But what the germans needed was a "mulberry"-like project that would retool the rail and road infrastructure, as well as sufficient trucks and rolling stock (locomotives, railcars) to make supply possible. This never happened. So they were doomed from the start despite most everything in the first months going their way.

The problem is one of comparing armchair generals (and Austrian corporals) to real generals and logisticians.

The "operational arts" generals were correct that they could defeat the Soviet military in the first 700km. What was wrong was that this would be sufficient to knock out the soviets, which is really a political determination, but one most of the generals were inclined, in '41 and after all their successes, to agree with.

Those same generals extended their successes even further and then wrote memoirs that had it not been for this (lates start?) or that (winter) they would have beat the Russians. So the armchair generals try to figure out how to start sooner. Or start later but with more panzers.

But what the germans needed was a "mulberry"-like project that would retool the rail and road infrastructure, as well as sufficient trucks and rolling stock (locomotives, railcars) to make supply possible. This never happened. So they were doomed from the start despite most everything in the first months going their way.

Good anaylsis of the situation.

The problem is one of comparing armchair generals (and Austrian corporals) to real generals and logisticians.

The "operational arts" generals were correct that they could defeat the Soviet military in the first 700km. What was wrong was that this would be sufficient to knock out the soviets, which is really a political determination, but one most of the generals were inclined, in '41 and after all their successes, to agree with.

Those same generals extended their successes even further and then wrote memoirs that had it not been for this (lates start?) or that (winter) they would have beat the Russians. So the armchair generals try to figure out how to start sooner. Or start later but with more panzers.

But what the germans needed was a "mulberry"-like project that would retool the rail and road infrastructure, as well as sufficient trucks and rolling stock (locomotives, railcars) to make supply possible. This never happened. So they were doomed from the start despite most everything in the first months going their way.

You have said this before in an another discussion. Can you give some proofs to your strong claims that the Germans were incapable in doing this?

My objection is primary logical. If Germans did advance almost to Moscow (that is a fact), what could have prevented them advancing 100km further if they had got more better conditions or started a little earlier? How can further 100km matter, so that it is according to your opinion completely impossible to acceive this? Or is it so, that advancing 100km further doesn't matter at all?

This analysis works only if you believe it was the weather that stopped the Germans. I would disagree with that. It was the distance and the Soviets that stopped them. The force that made it near to Moscow was a completely spent force. Offensive operations even against a weakly defended Moscow was impossible. And Moscow was not weakly defended.

Had they started earlier they a) might have still faced the mud of the spring thaws, and B) the Soviet response of rebuilding their reserves, which was the biggest obstacle the Germans had, would also have started sooner.

The Germans would have failed regardless. In all their operations they still took 25% casualties (725,000) in '41, which is low in comparison to what they achieved, but it wasn't replaceable. The Russians were reinforcing their army to the tune of 500,000 a month with the millions (14 million at the start of Barbarossa) of men they had who had military experience.

I absolutely agree with you. Yet, I think the weather in combination played a significant role in combination with the overextended supply lines and depleted forces. The lack of winter-proof equipment such as locomotives made the situation even worse.

Once the Soviets started to move their industrial facilities east toward the Ural mountains, the Germans did not have a chance due to the vast distances.

You have said this before in an another discussion. Can you give some proofs to your strong claims that the Germans were incapable in doing this?

My objection is primary logical. If Germans did advance almost to Moscow (that is a fact), what could have prevented them advancing 50-100km further if they had got more better conditions or started a little earlier? How would further 50-100km have mattered, so that it was according to your opinion completely impossible to acceive this?

Advancing TO Moscow is not enough. You need to arrive with enough force to encircle Moscow, which takes much more, and is much more complicated, than just advancing those 50-100km even if you are doing it against weak defenses. The Germans were better equipped, and in a stronger position, in Stalingrad, which is a town in comparison to Moscow. yet they fared poorly.

In Moscow they would not have been going up against weak defenses. They were going up against prepared and strengthened defenses as well as a strategic reserve built up for the purpose of a counter attack. And they were doing it with minimal supplies and strength and at the end of a thin and tenuous supply line.

In fact I want to change my argument. The Germans were LUCKY they didn't accomplish more and faster. Had they reached Moscow by the time they ended up starting Operation Typhoon, you would probably have AGC now at the far end of their supply, which is now cut off by the Rasputitza, while the Soviets have their best infraxtructure (that leading to Moscow) available to them. How well would AGC at Moscow have fared without supply for 8 weeks? it might have brought about the German defeat even earlier.

You have said this before in an another discussion. Can you give some proofs to your strong claims that the Germans were incapable in doing this?

My objection is primary logical. If Germans did advance almost to Moscow (that is a fact), what could have prevented them advancing 100km further if they had got more better conditions or started a little earlier? How can further 100km matter, so that it is according to your opinion completely impossible to acceive this? Or is it so, that advancing 100km further doesn't matter at all?

The problem is that the Soviets could keep retreating all through Siberia to preserve their forces and then counterattack. Taking Moscow would have made a difference and perhaps might have forced the soviets into a surrender conceding large parts of the country but the Germans couldn't destroy the Soviet army in being to cause complete surrender as was part of the plan - it was too big and they had underestimated its size and it could trade space (lots of it as others pointed out) for time. The German belief was that hopefully the initial defeats would cause a political and military collapse rather like WW1 where army discipline dissolved and parts of the population revolted which if you look at the Russian civil war was not that far fetched.

Advancing TO Moscow is not enough. You need to arrive with enough force to encircle Moscow, which takes much more, and is much more complicated, than just advancing those 50-100km even if you are doing it against weak defenses. The Germans were better equipped, and in a stronger position, in Stalingrad, which is a town in comparison to Moscow. yet they fared poorly.

In Moscow they would not have been going up against weak defenses. They were going up against prepared and strengthened defenses as well as a strategic reserve built up for the purpose of a counter attack. And they were doing it with minimal supplies and strength and at the end of a thin and tenuous supply line.

In fact I want to change my argument. The Germans were LUCKY they didn't accomplish more and faster. Had they reached Moscow by the time they ended up starting Operation Typhoon, you would probably have AGC now at the far end of their supply, which is now cut off by the Rasputitza, while the Soviets have their best infraxtructure (that leading to Moscow) available to them. How well would AGC at Moscow have fared without supply for 8 weeks? it might have brought about the German defeat even earlier.

Ok, we have discussed also this earlier. I say, if the Germans had advanced 100km further, they would have surrounded Moscow and cut off the city from the rest of the Sovjet Union, and by that action they would had bring the city into starvation.

You don't give proofs for your claims, you only say that they were at the end of their supply line. But I ask again: How would that 50-100km matter dramatically? Or where exactly did the German supply line reach a point that they can't advance further, and why?

The problem is that the Soviets could keep retreating all through Siberia to preserve their forces and then counterattack. Taking Moscow would have made a difference and perhaps might have forced the soviets into a surrender conceding large parts of the country but the Germans couldn't destroy the Soviet army in being to cause complete surrender as was part of the plan - it was too big and they had underestimated its size and it could trade space (lots of it as others pointed out) for time. The German belief was that hopefully the initial defeats would cause a political and military collapse rather like WW1 where army discipline dissolved and parts of the population revolted which if you look at the Russian civil war was not that far fetched.

This is a good point. Maybe the capturing of Moscow would not have mattered so much at all. My current opinion is that it would have mattered, because by that action, all of the Sovjet Union west of Moscow (including Leningrad and Ukraine and Caucasus) would have been cut off from the Sovjet Union in Siberia. The city of Moscow was a communication hub that connects the country together. The Sovjet Union would been only a small player then, because they would only control the land and the resources east of Moscow, and the Germans could have hold them there.

Ok, we have discussed also this earlier. I say, if the Germans had advanced 100km further, they would have surrounded Moscow and cut off the city from the rest of the Sovjet Union, and by that action they would had bring the city into starvation.

You don't give proofs for your claims, you only say that they were at the end of their supply line. But I ask again: How would that 50-100km matter dramatically? Or where exactly did the German supply line reach a point that they can't advance further, and why?

Again you are being an armchair general. To attack units need to be at high levels of supply and readiness. The consumption of fuel and ammunition while on the attack are orders of magnitude greater than what is necessary for defense. A unit at 70-80% of its strength but at 20-30% of it's ammunition and fuel reserves is in no shape to attack. But that would be optimistic compared to what we know of the forces that reached Moscow. Panzer divisions at the end of Typhoon were at 25% tank strength. The artillery was down to 10% of the supply needed for the missions asked of it. Fuel for even those few vehicles left was in short (to no) supply.

Again you are being an armchair general. To attack units need to be at high levels of supply and readiness. The consumption of fuel and ammunition while on the attack are orders of magnitude greater than what is necessary for defense. A unit at 70-80% of its strength but at 20-30% of it's ammunition and fuel reserves is in no shape to attack. But that would be optimistic compared to what we know of the forces that reached Moscow. Panzer divisions at the end of Typhoon were at 25% tank strength. The artillery was down to 10% of the supply needed for the missions asked of it. Fuel for even those few vehicles left was in short (to no) supply.

I have never been an armchair general and will never be. I try to understand things, therefore I ask questions. You have said all this in another words earlier, but not given proofs or answered my questions that I have asked earlier (of course you can still answer them).

I try in an another way. B.H. Liddell Hart writes (History of the Second World War 1970, page 168): "So the push for Moscow was resumed on November 15, when there was a momentary improvement in the weather. But after two weeks' struggle in mud and snow, it was brought to a halt twenty miles short of Moscow."
Let say the weather had been much better, and all the 2 weeks struggle had been in extremely good weather, could they have reached further? The fact is that they struggled for 2 weeks and used fuel and other resources, as they could have done if the weather would have been better. Or does the supply line end somewhere where the advancing could not reach further, where and why?

I have never been an armchair general and will never be. I try to understand things, therefore I ask questions. You have said all this in another words earlier, but not given proofs or answered my questions that I have asked earlier (of course you can still answer them).

I try in an another way. B.H. Liddell Hart writes (History of the Second World War 1970, page 168): "So the push for Moscow was resumed on November 15, when there was a momentary improvement in the weather. But after two weeks' struggle in mud and snow, it was brought to a halt twenty miles short of Moscow."
Let say the weather had been much better, and all the 2 weeks struggle had been in extremely good weather, could they have reached further? The fact is that they struggled for 2 weeks and used fuel and other resources, as they could have done if the weather would have been better. Or does the supply line end somewhere where the advancing could not reach further, where and why?

Supply lines (whether military or business, etc.) are complicated things. Things have to happen according to plan. not only do the supplies have to be in the right place and time so does the fuel, parts, equipment personnel, etc. Kinks in the supply line can have huge implications to the efficiency.

Just one example is the rail net in Russia. A lot has been made about the difference in gauge. But that limits the scope of the problem. First of all the lines were single tracks and there was only one to each major Russian center being attacked (North, Center and South). One track, even assuming 100% efficiency, is not a lot of capacity with which to supply a whole army group.

But the gauge was different. And it isn't the gauge itself that is the problem, that is actually fairly easy to change (since German gauge is narrower the railbed, the part that takes the most effort, is still completely usable, just undo the ties and move them closer). But this implies the need to use German rolling stock, not Russian rolling stock.

But that leads to two more problems. first, there just wasn't enough German rolling stock. Second, that rolling stock was ill suited for Russian tracks. You see the Russians worked with trains that held more water and coal than German trains, and hence their water and coaling stations were much farther apart than those in the more densely populated Western Europe. So you have to relay the tracks, build new coaling stations, and still are left with only one track and insufficient rolling stock. Until the coaling/watering stations are built you essentially can't use the tracks.

The alternate plan is also less than ideal. The use of Russian rolling stock. But this implies 1) that the Russians cooperate by leaving this intact. and 2) it imposes further inefficiencies because once you reach the end of the German rail you have to unload everything and reload it onto Russian rail. This is not insumountable but if you didn't plan for it (and the Russians didn't cooperate by leaving you rolling stock) you are still delayed until those pieces are put in place.

But you had best prepare for one of those plans or you just aren't planning for an offensive all the way to Moscow.

I'll add that you have to get the supplies form the railhead to the troops, implying distances upwards of 100 miles in some cases, and the Germans just didn't have enough trucks for this.

All of these problem exist before you take into account the fact that you have to do it all in the presence of large partisan forces who want to create as many problems for you as they can.

All these thing are good general answers to questions what can go wrong with an invasion as the Operation Barbarossa. But this doesn't answer that specific question about why the Germans according to your opinion could not have reached little further if the conditions would have been better.

I am not a specialist on military logistics, therefore I want to know these things. If you claim that I have wrong because of I don't have knowledge of logistics, then it is good if you can prove your arguments for me. As I said earlier, I don't understand why the Germans could not reached further in case of good weather, if they tried so hard in bad weather and conditions and wasted resourses on that.