How Could the Axis Won the War ?

1) Dunkirk was a great morale boost, but it's loss would not have lead to any sort of British capitulation. The lack of a morale boost is not the same as a hit to morale. And after the fall of all of France there really wasn't much of a greater morale hit to be taken at that point.

Of course the British would not have capitulated, but it would not have been good for British morale if the Germans would have killed or captured the whole force in Dunkirk, instead the Brits got a morale boost from this, when they escaped from Dunkirk

2) The Germans really weren't all that interested in North Africa and never committed much to it, nor do I think they could have/would have in May 1940. They had just conquered France and were looking to England. Even when they did "care" all you got was the Afrika Corps, which was not that much of a commitment.

Yes, I agree, but I think this was a great mistake made by Hitler and the other German military leaders. They should have sent a bigger force to Africa in the late summer of 1940, and driven the Brits out of North Africa.

3) Barbarossa could only have been started so much sooner. The rasputitza (mud season when the roads become impassable) existed in the spring as well as the fall. And this would only have helped if you think that it was the winter that stopped the Germans, and not the fSoviet ability to mobilize so many more men as fast as they did. Or that defeat of the Russians necessitated a supply chain far in excess of what was expected to be needed. As one Russian general said about the theory that the winter was so aweful to the Germans, "we had to fight in it too".

Of course the weather was the same for both, but the Russians had better winter equipment and were better prepared for the winter. I also think the Germans would have advanced further if they would have started the Operation Barbarossa earlier. I do not know how fast they advanced per day or week, but if they would have started 5-6 weeks earlier, then they would have advanced so much further.

The Germans executed Barbarossa essentially as they planned it. it probably could not have gone any better. But they failed not because of the timing of Barbarossa but because they didn't understand how resilient their enemy was going to be. The Soviet Union had 14 million men with military experience who didn't show up in rolls of their strength.

So many of these theories are ask about how much better the Germans could have done it. But you don't get to have perfection No one seems to theorycraft the allied side. Zhukov could have done a more focused counter attack in Dec. of '41 instead of the broader front approach he used, and it would probably have destroyed Army Group Center already in 1941. Had Stalin permitted retreats more units would have remained operational through the fall of 1941. There are lots of "what ifs" on the allied side as well.

The most German leaders were of course too optimistic and were not completely aware of the long distances in Sovjet Union, which is a far bigger country than France. But the fact is that they advanced in Russia until the winter come, and probably they would have advanced further if they have started the attack earlier. How much better it would have been, we can never know, but better for sure.

Of course the British would not have capitulated, but it would not have been good for British morale if the Germans would have killed or captured the whole force in Dunkirk, instead the Brits got a morale boost from this, when they escaped from Dunkirk


Yes, I agree, but I think this was a great mistake made by Hitler and the other German military leaders. They should have sent a bigger force to Africa in the late summer of 1940, and driven the Brits out of North Africa.

Of course the weather was the same for both, but the Russians had better winter equipment and were better prepared for the winter. I also think the Germans would have advanced further if they would have started the Operation Barbarossa earlier. I do not know how fast they advanced per day or week, but if they would have started 5-6 weeks earlier, then they would have advanced so much further.

The Germans executed Barbarossa essentially as they planned it. it probably could not have gone any better. But they failed not because of the timing of Barbarossa but because they didn't understand how resilient their enemy was going to be. The Soviet Union had 14 million men with military experience who didn't show up in rolls of their strength.

So many of these theories are ask about how much better the Germans could have done it. But you don't get to have perfection No one seems to theorycraft the allied side. Zhukov could have done a more focused counter attack in Dec. of '41 instead of the broader front approach he used, and it would probably have destroyed Army Group Center already in 1941. Had Stalin permitted retreats more units would have remained operational through the fall of 1941. There are lots of "what ifs" on the allied side as well.

The most German leaders were of course too optimistic and were not completely aware of the long distances in Sovjet Union, which is a far bigger country than France. But the fact is that they advanced in Russia until the winter come, and probably they would have advanced further if they have started the attack earlier. How much better it would have been, we can never know, but better for sure.


It wasn't the weather that stopped the Germans, hence starting sooner would not have changed much. It was the logistics and the speed with which the Russians rebuilt and re-armed their forces. That part doesn't change. The Germans by end of november (the coming of winter) had lost 725,000 men of their original forces and over all those months were able to replace 100,000. They were out of manpower reserve.

Panzer units were down to 25% of their effective panzers. The artillery were running 75-90% short of the ammunition needed for the missions for which they were called upon. .... And they had yet to assault Moscow with this now depleted and ill-supplied force.

During this time the soviets were rebuilding and re-equiping the army to the tune of about 500,000 men PER MONTH. They started the war with 14 million men with military experience.

The Germans knew it was impossible with the onset of winter. Had they arrived in October they would have still had to wait out the rasputitsa. And when they tried it would have proved disastrous. Moscow was by this time well defended. There were now even enough forces to hurl a counter attack at the Germans and drive them back 100-250 km in the counter attack. Had they surrounded Moscow or entered it they might have lost another 300,000 men (and shortened the war).

I also don't think north Afrika was an option. Logistically they didn't have were to go or how to get there. They didn't have a navy, there is no appreciable rail or road network in Syria/Iraq, and that even if you commit a few more divisions you have to supply them by truck from Tunis or Lybia (hundreds to thousands of kilometers).

I see people who like to throw around what a few hundred extra pnzers here or there might have accomplished but forget that it was a struggle to keep supplied the ones they already had.

US military maxim: "Generals win battles. Logisticians win wars."

a) The Germans could have cut the communications network to and from Moscow, that is the railroads and the most important roads. The city was a big communications hub for the Sovjets during WW2. Because of this, the Germans could have captured the other cities faster elsewhere, that is...
b) ... Leningrad and cutting the communications to Murmansk,
c) ... and Ukraine and Caucasus,
... because the Germans would have made it more worse for the Sovjets to supply their troops and the citizens in Moscow and the inhabitants west of Moscow.

Sovjet would have been pretty much isolated then, because the Germans would have cut the most important links for the Sovjets to the other countries. We know what happened to Leningrad because of the siege. But it would have been more worse, if the Germans would also cut the links between these two cities and also isolated Moscow.

Of course this is only speculation, but it could be a possible scenario for what would happen if they would have advanced little further.

"A little further"? How much further. 30 Km gets them TO Moscow. not all the way around, which implies a depleted, attrited and exhausted Army Group Center must now wage an assault against the most heavily defended point in the Soviet Union, around which were massing the forces that were great enough to counter attack.

Again, it wasn't the weather that stopped the Germans, and had they started sooner they would have got farther. It was the Soviet resistance and rebuilding of their military. That part continues apace with the new earlier start date.

It isn't as if instead of starting on June 22nd they start on May 22nd but now the Russians don't start their cycle until June 22nd. And much of what we think we know of the campaign was written after the war by German generals who wrote often self-serving memoirs about how the wins were their brilliance and the losses were to blame on Hitler or the weather.

We don't go into how much the same weather factors might have hampered the Soviets because most of the soviet history has only been opened to us in the last 20 years.

If the Allies didn't break the Enigma code, pure speculation whether you think they could've won the war or not after it though. But this was a huge win for the Allies.

I also don't think north Afrika was an option. Logistically they didn't have were to go or how to get there. They didn't have a navy, there is no appreciable rail or road network in Syria/Iraq, and that even if you commit a few more divisions you have to supply them by truck from Tunis or Lybia (hundreds to thousands of kilometers).

I see people who like to throw around what a few hundred extra pnzers here or there might have accomplished but forget that it was a struggle to keep supplied the ones they already had.

US military maxim: "Generals win battles. Logisticians win wars."

I have a different opinion. I think that North Africa was an option, and the Germans should have make use of it.
(1) The logistics could have worked on land through Africa and through Turkey. There was a railway line from Berlin to Middle East that worked at least before the war. Of course the Germans could take the oilfields in Middle East and secure the fuel for them.
(2) The logistics could have worked also on sea, if the Germans would have captured Malta and some other important British bases on eastern Mediterranean. That was one of the major mistakes that they made, because they could have cut off the whole eastern Mediterranean by holding southern Italy, Sicily, Tunis and Malta, and capturing Egypt.

The Germans should have forget the invasion of Great Britain and tried to do this already in 1940 when the British was weaker there.

"A little further"? How much further. 30 Km gets them TO Moscow. not all the way around, which implies a depleted, attrited and exhausted Army Group Center must now wage an assault against the most heavily defended point in the Soviet Union, around which were massing the forces that were great enough to counter attack.

The Germans did not need to make a complete circumvallatio to make serious damage. That was not even the case in Leningrad (for example the Finns could have done more damage, but they chose not to do it). The Germans could have only destroyed the most important roads and railways to Moscow to make an impact. The Russians soldiers and civilians need food, and they also need ammunitions and new weapons to hold back the Germans.

And much of what we think we know of the campaign was written after the war by German generals who wrote often self-serving memoirs about how the wins were their brilliance and the losses were to blame on Hitler or the weather.

It is true that the generals blame the loss on Hitler after the war. But I think they were right on this. The Germans lost the war primarily because of Hitler, who made bad decisions. Stalin made better decisions and won the war, thus Stalin was a better warlord than Hitler.

Fine. Have it your way. Nazi Germany was so superior that they were really only a mistake or two away from winning the war.

Sheesh, you people really want to argue your way into this even though the numbers just don't add up.

Hitler was the reason for the early successes. He understood his political position for the most part much better than his generals. He is the one who succeeded in bluffing his way in to the Austria and Czechoslovakia, who made the decision to invade France, etc.

"There was a railway line from Berlin to Middle East that worked at least before the war."

To the "middle east"? Where? The rail line that went through Syria was not completely operational and there is only one line. It is the only heavy rail. There was a light rail that was operational but not suitable for freight. Rail it easily interdicted by land and air and the Germans did not have the infrastructure and logistics in the area that the British had.

There was nothing that would have won Germany the war. That is all fanboi fantasy and never backed up by the logistics.

If a fanboi had a plan to increase the rail logistical operations in the east by 1941, or some way to supply all the additional divisions they always include in their plans, maybe it will make sense.

This is the problem of having people wanting to win wars while still thinking like Austrian corporals, rather than those trained as logistical quant jocks at West Point. Corporals talk about early adoption of a T-26E1 while the adults in the room realize it would delay the arrival in combat of effective tank, and there would be far fewer of them when they had very effective late variants of the M4.

By 1942-3, the allies were never poorer generals or combatants than the Germans. They just chose to fight differently. And they won. hands down. And would have even had the Germans decided to use 20/20 hindsight and do things differently.

Fine. Have it your way. Nazi Germany was so superior that they were really only a mistake or two away from winning the war.

I am not saying this, only that it would have gone much better, if the decisions would have been made by more qualified people than Hitler. I have also said that the Germans made more than one or two mistakes, and I have presented some of them here.

Hitler was the reason for the early successes. He understood his political position for the most part much better than his generals. He is the one who succeeded in bluffing his way in to the Austria and Czechoslovakia, who made the decision to invade France, etc.

Hitler was the reason for that they started the war, but for example the invasion of France was planned by Manstein and executed by the German generals. Of course, the German generals would never started the war, so in that way Hitler "was the reason for the early successes". But if Hitler just started the war, and then given the task of leading the war to a German joint of staff lead by Manstein, the outcome of the war would have been completely different I think. I am not claiming that they would necessary have won the war, but it would have gone better for them.

There was nothing that would have won Germany the war. That is all fanboi fantasy and never backed up by the logistics. [...] By 1942-3, the allies were never poorer generals or combatants than the Germans. They just chose to fight differently. And they won. hands down. And would have even had the Germans decided to use 20/20 hindsight and do things differently.

The allies had better leadership, because their decisions were made by qualified generals, but for the Germans, Hitler was making the most important decisions. That was a huge advantage for the allies. For example Hitler never allowed strategic/tactical retreats followed up by counterattacks, which were the thing that the Germans were good at.

The allies had better leadership, because their decisions were made by qualified generals, but for the Germans, Hitler was making the most important decisions. That was a huge advantage for the allies. For example Hitler never allowed strategic/tactical retreats followed up by counterattacks, which were the thing that the Germans were good at.

True and the germans adopted a mobile and elastic defence after kursk and north africa .

True and the germans adopted a mobile and elastic defence after kursk and north africa .

Hitler made so many horrible decisions during the war that needlessly got germans killed and just bad ideas on constructing a war economy built for a war of attrition on the home front as well.

On the one hand I will grant that the people who survived the war can always attribute their shortcomings to Hitler since he's no longer around to defend himself, but let's be real here. Hitler was a politician, not a military mind. He was a freakin Corporal at his highest rank in WWI. You can't tell me a corporal knows more about how to run a 5 million man strong Axis army than some of the greatest military minds ever like Rommel, Model, Heinz Guderian or Gotthard Heinrici.

Hitler made so many piss poor decisions along the way, for example ordering his men to never retreat under any circumstances needlessly got hundreds of thousands of german soldiers killed, maybe even millions. Someone correct me if I'm wrong but I thought the 6th army got annihilated at Stalingrad specifically BECAUSE Hitler refused to retreat when the battle was not going their way Getting bogged down in urban battles that bled manpower and annihilated entire armies from his most experienced troops vastly hurt the german war effort. Luftwaffe's pilots were quite shitty at the end of the war, he should have done what the Americans did, once someone became a fighter ace, rotate them away from the front lines to train the new pilots so they don't get shot down so easily.

Heinz Guderian did not support the Kursk offensive at all, when he wrote the book "Achtung!-Panzer!" He said the Kursk Offensive was missing two key prerequisites for a successful tank offensive which #1 open ground that's friendly to tanks (anti-tank ditches and thousands of minds spread across a vast front is NOT territory that's friendly to tanks) and #2 which is even more important, the element of surprise. Kursk had zero element of surprise associated with it since the Russians had built up the largest defensive works for a battle, 3 layers thick that ground down the german panzer offensive and opened the opportunity for a massive counter attack for the soviets.

If Germany was going to starve Great Britain into submission, they needed at least 370 U-Boats at the outset of the war, not 37.

Hitler had really bad ideas when it came to tank design. He was under this really bad assumption that "bigger = better". The KT for example got half a mile offroad PER 1 GALLON OF FUEL. For a fuel starved nation in the late war, this is NOT the tank you want to be fielding, not to mention only the largest of bridges could actually cross a KT, which were few and far between by 1944/45.

He had crazy ideas, some of us know about the Maus which was a 180 ton steel behemoth that would have largely been useless. THey only made like 1 prototype and it sit's in a Russian tank museum today. BUt did anyone know about the Ratt!? This thing was going to be like 1000 or 2000 tons land ship, something crazy, it was going to have naval guns, anti-air defenses, machine guns everywhere it was going to be a mega-tank with like a 40 man crew. Yea that would easily get annihilated in some kind of airstrike or artillery bombardment. Luckily someone finally put Hitler in his place and convinced him the Ratt would have been a horrible choice of tank design to invest Germany's research and development into.

This was also one of the problems with the massive railway artillery Germany used which they only had like 2 guns total, it was so big it was also incredibly vulnerable to where it basically couldn't be used much without having to retreat it for risk of losing it. The logistics of running the Railway artillery, you had to have workers lay down tracks AHEAD of the railway gun just to get it in place where it needed to go, whether that was Leningrad or Crimea or wherever they sent them to.

The Japanese also ran into this problem with their mega-battleship Yamato, it was so big and such a heavy investment of country resources that it was essentially too risky to use it in any actual battles, which is why it only finally got pulled out for the Battle of Okinawa (where it was promptly sunk with few losses for the Allies) when the war was desperate and futile at that point.

If Germany did their war effort correctly, instead of making 100's of designs on the drawing board for tanks, planes, guns, ships and such, they would have heavily invested into a handful of efficient designs and endlessly churned out that ONE good design. They only had like 1,300 tigers throughout the entire war, if they had simplified the design and made it more efficient they needed at least 13,000 of that design to make any kind of impact on the war effort.


I think those first 2 years of the Eastern front more German soldiers died of exposure than they did combat, winter clothing would have gone a long way in keeping them alive. For the battle of Moscow, which to me was the turning point in the war, not Stalingrad.


One more paragraph and I'm done because I could easily turn this post into a hundred pages if given time as an amateur historian with my knowledge base of WWII.

Simple things could have done wonders for the german war effort, winter clothing which was already mentioned. But just the basic infantry rifle. Besides the US every major country was still sporting bolt-action rifles for their front line infantry rifle. Basically a bunch of guys running around with sniper rifles without the scope. If Germany had mass produced the STG44 BEFORE starting the war, they very well may have had a significant head start on the types of infantry engagements WWII had, because the bolt action rifles iron sights and range was good up to like 5 kilometers but the days of a massive wall of infantry marching towards you from off in the distance was over, most infantry battles were occurring at ranges of 200 meters or less I believe.

One last thing, BF-109 flying across the English Channel with only 15 minutes of fuel once they got their, BF-109's were defensive planes, not offensive planes. Should have gone with the FW-190 if he wanted to wage an offensive air war against Britain early on where the planes actually had some fuel left over once they crossed the English channel.

Here is a goof ball thought I had, what if Germany had waited. As in not started expanding till the late 40s or even 50s undoubtedly Germans where and are more friendly to the west than the east. When Russia and Japans expansionist tenancies reached a peak they could have come in on a more allied footing and hey after the fighting lets just leave a few "peacekeepers" in the more eastern countries and hey didn't we just prove how nice we are and how those restrictions after ww1 were excessive!

If someone spirited in a couple of well made concrete Autobahns in the USSR the Germans might have stood a better chance. But as people have already pointed out it's hard for the Germans to be able to claim success of their warplans any more then they could IRL.
Their war plans were most likely superseded by reality, problem is the result never materialized because they fundamentally underestimated the fighting will of their enemy and the economical capacity at his disposal.


Logistics is the key here. Germany had winter equipment for the Russian winter (what you don't think any of them understood that Russia is cold?) However they thought they were close to winning at all times in early 1941. ("Just three more weeks") So when they started to ship it all much of the Winter gear was stuck in the gridlock that ran the entirety of their advance.

About Case Blue: The entire notion that the campaign would be a success and turn the war on its head is laughable.
The plan is doomed from the start. Even if they take the oilfields they would run into some problems:
A way to move it safely back to Europe, considering the roads are non-existent and the Sea is contested.
If they manage somehow to get it to Europe, oh shit their refineries are already working at maximum capacity so they cant turn it into a useful product.
The Soviets blew everything up when they retreated and in the oiltowns the germans took, they poured concrete into the wells. Most of these the Soviets didn't get up and running again until the late 40s.

Case Blue is a hole-in-the-head idea from the start, just like Barbarossa. They figure out a good battleplan but cannot see what will happen after it is a success. If successful they deny the Soviets some 2/3 of their domestic raw oil production, but germany will not gain a barrel. They'd still run out of fuel in '44

And whilst on the topic: It was of vital importance and makes 100% military sense that Stalingrad has to be taken. You don't leave a huge beachhead on your side of a natural boundary you are trying to defend. Of course retreating from it was denied! A retreat would have threaten the entire ARMYGROUP fighting in the Caucasus! An Army vs an Armygroup and you can save one, which do you choose?

The germans fought well and fought hard, but there is no conciveable way they could have won. Unless you spirit in authobans all over easter europe.

Garden it, just read this thread: Paradox forums

Logistics is the key here. Germany had winter equipment for the Russian winter (what you don't think any of them understood that Russia is cold?) However they thought they were close to winning at all times in early 1941. ("Just three more weeks") So when they started to ship it all much of the Winter gear was stuck in the gridlock that ran the entirety of their advance.

The historian Andrew Roberts has claimed that the reason for not giving the German Wehrmacht soldiers winter equipment was not about logistics, but more about that Hitler refused to allow them that.

For example, read this article!

For someone who knows nothing about WWII this thread is rather fascinating.

I am not saying this, only that it would have gone much better, if the decisions would have been made by more qualified people than Hitler. I have also said that the Germans made more than one or two mistakes, and I have presented some of them here.


Hitler was the reason for that they started the war, but for example the invasion of France was planned by Manstein and executed by the German generals. Of course, the German generals would never started the war, so in that way Hitler "was the reason for the early successes". But if Hitler just started the war, and then given the task of leading the war to a German joint of staff lead by Manstein, the outcome of the war would have been completely different I think. I am not claiming that they would necessary have won the war, but it would have gone better for them.


The allies had better leadership, because their decisions were made by qualified generals, but for the Germans, Hitler was making the most important decisions. That was a huge advantage for the allies. For example Hitler never allowed strategic/tactical retreats followed up by counterattacks, which were the thing that the Germans were good at.

I actually don't believe the German generalship as a whole had the skill set to win this war. They could win battles, which was enough going up against Poland and France, but they didn't have the tools (or the skill set) to execute a Sea Lion nor to defeat Russia.

My short version of why is this:



But this is an attempt at the long version.



It is a BBC documentary about design and design philosophy, but if you look at some of what they present it is also about war-making philosophy. How the allied priority was first and foremost to get the quantities needed to win, not just the quality. They look at the design and production of the Sten, the Tiger, the T-34, the Mosquito, the Liberty Ship and Germany's Type 52 locomotive. It is the fact that I have never heard before this of that locomotive that points to the difference in outlook of the allies vs the axis and the axis fanbois. It is precisely the lack of focus on things like trucks, trains, railways, etc that the Germans could not have won the war.

Compare that to the Allied preparation for Normandy. They tried to plan for the lack of rail, harbors, etc. They never assumed the enemy would cooperate. They sacrificed better tanks for more tanks that could be delivered by the supply train they had. They had practiced the doctrine of amphibious assault for a couple of decades and spent years building purpose-built equipment. It is the thinking of logisticians over gamers, Austrian corporals, and Prussians schooled in the "operational arts". After all, they did have 76mm Shermans in England, but the calculation not to bring them over was actually pretty good for the first few weeks (they didn't face German heavies). They did get much stronger Shermans by October (over 200 Jumbos) but for the sake of mobility and upkeep they declined. Most US formations just didn't go up against German armored formations, but they almost always had Shermans at their beck and call.

The historian Andrew Roberts has claimed that the reason for not giving the German Wehrmacht soldiers winter equipment was not about logistics, but more about that Hitler refused to allow them that.

For example, read this article!

Whether the article is true or not it simply would not have mattered.

The German logistics were extremely hampered and would have been regardless. Any ton of winter clothing is a ton of fuel or ammunition or spare parts or replacement equipment, or food that is not going to get to the troops.

The Allies faced the same zero-sum decisions in 1944 and they had an even more robust supply chain and logistical plan than the Germans in 1941. They did manage to get winter clothing to most of the frontline troops. While it is kind of famous that the 101st Airborne went into Bastogne without proper winter gear they also didn't have anywhere close to a full load of weapons and food either. They were doing R&R and the limited supplies were going to frontline troops.

I actually don't believe the German generalship as a whole had the skill set to win this war. They could win battles, which was enough going up against Poland and France, but they didn't have the tools (or the skill set) to execute a Sea Lion nor to defeat Russia.
[...]
It is a BBC documentary about design and design philosophy, but if you look at some of what they present it is also about war-making philosophy. How the allied priority was first and foremost to get the quantities needed to win, not just the quality.

I have same opinion about the need for quantity as well and I also think that the Germans made a mistake when they had
a) several organisations inside the military forces (for example: Wehrmacht, SS and Luftwaffe had all infantry forces).
b) they had several weapon projects, that indirectly hindered the Germans to get enough quantity.

But I think most of this had to do with Hitler and the Nazi ideology. Hitler had some kind of strange interest in different super-weapons, which looked cool for him on the paper, but which was completely useless on the battlefield (for example the Maus). But I don't think the German generals could influence this so much. It was Hitler who was the dictator. For example Guderian mentions this quantity problem in his memoirs, when he mentions about the production of tanks and tank-destroyers.

Hitler had also a great distrust in the German (mostly Prussian aristocratic) generals. Therefore he didn't listen to them and made instead his own decisions. Hitler chose Keitel as the leader for the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, not because of his military skills, but because he would do exactly as Hitler wanted. At least the other general had this opinion at the time of Keitel's appointment and also later.

I do not believe that the German generals had so much power to influence Hitler in his decisions, either in military decisions or in production decisions. Therefore we don't know if "the German generalship as a whole had the skill set to win this war", because they didn't get the opportunity to show their skills.

^
The General Staff was strong until the failure of OP Typhoon. Their key strategic misstep was to believe that the SU would fall quickly and then they could devote their war economy to fighting the allies. When this proved to be false, they literally had to shift their war economy on the fly, which made the situation very inefficient well into 1942.

Hitler's faith in his generals fell apart in Russia and from then on, he increased his interference in strategy. By the fall of 1941, he fired the classic blitzkrieg leaders of Army Group South and the Chief of the general staff- a real watermark as he cleaned house. The Germans/Axis should seen as the underdog in WW2, that has to win through strategic trickery and leveraging their strengths & gambling rather than anything truly sustainable.

The German generals largely did well tactically and operationally into 1942. Afterwards they largely fell apart. The thing with bad strategy and strategic position is that it flows downward, and ruins all operations.

If you look at the course of the war, literally they lost every battle from late 1942 onward. Before that, they won most of their battles or performed well. In the eastern front, they were losing ground everywhere (North, Center, South) by early 1943. Ditto for North Africa.

A major strength of the nazis/soviets that is not discussed often (usually people focus on the negatives) is their ability to harness political will (sometimes literally by gunpoint) and attack in a way that is difficult for a western democracy. Their offensives have mechanics that push their combat manpower and risk tolerance to the limits, which gives them options that west. allied forces do not have.