The main difference between Soviet and German doctrine as I have said was command and control.
You've overlooked three other quintessential most important differences. Die Wehrmacht and Heer in the particular had an undeniably
competent commander cadre which had been eliminated from the Soviet order of battle by Stalin's purges of the 30's. Die Wehrmacht comprised of a
homogenous extremely well trained all
Deutsch volkgenossen rather than a motley crew of souls from a union of different states as the was that of the U.S.S.R., and undeniably, in 1941 their national pride reinstated driven by community ideals with sense of common purpose had the finest
espirit de corps arguably of any army in recorded history.
This is known as befehlstaktik or 'command push tactics'. The opposite was the German practice of transmitting only intent to forwards officers and allowing them to make uncontrolled decisions, which is known as auftragstaktik or 'mission tactics'.
Though was introduced in WW1
in the age of modern arms at a tactical level of limited extent with the introduction of Stoßtruppen, "befehlstaktik" was a direct consequence of NSDAP policy introduced in the modernisation of Germany's army after the NSDAP came to power with their opening up of egalitarian access to the Heer officer ranks which has since been adopted by every modern Western army. Notably in the Waffen SS, and I am not glorifying the organisation here merely relating the fact as distinct from the demonisation mythologies, unhampered by an existing class cadre of Junkers class resistant to change to their existing SOP, customs, rituals and traditions, what eventually became the Waffen SS was reknown for its officers of field rank sharing everything in common with the enlisted man, and notably, so many of them were drawn from the ranks e.g. SS-OStrmbf. Peiper. They lived with their men, ate the same meals without special privilige afforded of rank as was commonplace in the Allied armies, most notably so in the Class ridden British services where officers were still generally only advanced from the ranks late in the war, and then only under duress of casualty driven nessessity when a Sandhurst, Oxford or Cambridge graduate of suitable class were unavailable. Even in the RAF this class distinction nonsense prevailed for an aeon with class separation of Sergeant Pilots from Pilot Officers. Both were
line pilots rather than there being any distinction on the premise of role, e.g. a flight commander or squadron leader.
'Blitzkrieg' <snip> was not invented by Germans, and not practiced by them first
But die Werhmacht sure perfected it. Let's not take away from the fact that they drove the incompetents from the battlefields of Western Europe in just six weeks in 1940. And similarly, until halted by weather at the very gates of Moscow, in 1941, succeeded in driving the Soviets from the vastness that was their western Soviet Union using "Blitzkrieg".
Yes, undeniably a silly journalistic term which stuck. In comparison, the equally reported but less glamorous term "Sitzkrieg", understandably preferably forgotten, could equally and as easily be applied to the unsuccessful Brit & French 'strategies' of the period.
The Germans learned from the First World War because they had a CIC who had actually been at the pointy end. Whereas the Brits had a cigar puffing, whisky swilling buffoon who as dismissed ex-Lord of the Admiralty, had spent that same time comfortably at home in disgrace. Since stabbing Chamberlain in the back, his only 'action' other than the bloody rhetorical was the ensure the incarceration of those of his own peoples who dissented with his prosecution of
a completely unnecessary war on a pretext.
I use 'blitzkrieg' in inverted commas because it's a meaningless term really.
Whilst I take on board the exercise in semantics. I'll bet those Brits waiting on the beach at Dunkirk wouldn't agree with you any more than the occupied French, Belgians, Dutch, Norweigan, Greeks, or Balkan Serbians, Croatians, and Bosnians of the time would if they could speak with us today!
Contrary to popular belief, CAS inflicted few casualties on German tanks in NW Europe.
I disagree. Read reports from the few German survivors of the Falaise Pocket operation in the particular, as well as the statement by AVM 'Johnnie' Johnson about the wholesale slaughter rendered there by rocket firing 20mm cannon equipped fighter bombers.
Paraphrased, even he describes it as 'so murderous as to be tantamount to criminal'.
More importantly, whilst "rhubarbs" aka "Feur frei" interdiction ops were always a
secondarily tasked of all Allied fighters ranging over Germany after the loss of air supriority by the Luftwaffe from March 1944 onwards,
direct support was frequently their designated mission as a form of airborne artillery in support of ground forces. That was the design purpose and direct role of Typhoons and Tempests in the particular. As an ex-birdie I can categorially state that I can tell you that the A-4's primary role is not air to air superiority any more than its WWII predecessors the Corsair or Korean war Skyraider were. We did then, and still do deploy this where we have APs airborne and aboard in ready state.
Ardennes operation would have failed even without allied air support. German plan was too ambitious (since it was directed by Hitler)
Strategically the Ardennes Offensive could have no effect upon the ultimate
loss of the war due the single principle of attrition. As an entity of itself, it had
potential to achieve what it sought to achieve militarily and politically given its primary objective. Calling Unernehmen Wacht am Rhein which comprised several independent operations a failure before it played out in hindsight reeks of armchair historian plagiury. e.g. Risky as it was and driven by political rather than military objective, nevertheless Arnhem could have been a tactical success rather then the bloody disaster it was. Ultimately its failure lay in its execution due quickly became apparent were unrealistic objectives expected of supporting forces amongs other bungles.
And I must address the final part of your statement above (bracketed) as fallacious as it is obtusely popularist partisan.
The disasters of Arnhem and Singapore were hardly the work of genius, and Churchill can be appropriated blame directly and indirectly for some of the bloodiest military blunders and murderous campaigns in history, e.g. the night
area bombing offensive, which remains a disgrace to this day and blight on the otherwise esteemed record of the RAF. And how about the obscenity that was the Dardanelles disaster, Dunkirk and Dieppe -from his memoirs "I thought it most important that a large-scale operation should take place this summer". Churchill insisted the BEF embark for France (resulting in defeat and Dunkirk) and ensured Britain declared war on a pretext against the will of the Crown, many members of parliament and generally the contemorary sentiment and will of the majority of British people hence
starting WWII.
Churchill persistently and protractedly refused generous peace terms repeatedly offered to the Crown and importantly, ultimate benefit of the British peoples and their Empire at a time when Britain was on her knees, still unrecovered from economic depression with a huge debt still to be repaid from the war of twenty years previous not finally repaid in full until just recently in
2015!!!!! I'll bet the young people of Britain's new millenium were thankful to him for inheriting that <NOT>. He personally intervened to scuttle even the noble sacrifical attempt made by Hess in May 1941 for which he paid with the rest of his life. Yes, thanks to Churchill, Britain was alone, isolated and starving in service of his political and personal objectives fueled by a whisky soaked ego powering a undeniably powerful rhetoric.
The fact was, in the context of that time, America had not entered the war, and until Roosevelt manipulated it,
the American public at large was against her entering any foreign and in the particular, a European war.
Britain was alone,
on her knees, and
starving from the undeniably effective U-boat offensive against merchant shipping.
And after the war, what of Poland's freedom or Czechoslovakia and the Sudatenland then. As if Churchill
ever gave a toss about either of those states and their peoples!