General World War 2 Discussion Thread

Which all goes to the biggest mistake Hitler made, which was starting the war in the first place:

"What were you thinking?!"

The German way was to rely on the abilities of their mobile forces (20% of their army) to help them win the war. If this 'elite component' possessed a superiority, it could 'offset' their material inferiority and their infantry divisions, which were much more pedestrian.

The German panzer forces did major re-organization and re-equipping work after 1939, 1940, and before Barbarossa. This was basically a learning and correction period. They started the war being very different, being very high armor like the soviets but few infantry and recon assets, and having brigade structures. The whole structure was re-worked. They learned how to coordinate combined arms, air power, and logistics even better in battle.

A big reason why the performance of the panzer divisions was so good in 1941 and consistently good until 43 had to do with this outstanding preparatory effort in which they discovered the correct synergistic mix and the correct training doctrine. This added even more to their pre-war lead in executing mobile war. After 1941, the general organizational form did not change drastically throughout the war, as it was flexible doctrine that worked well.

This was compounded by the high quality of panzer leaders at the division and corps level- Men like Model was originally commander of 3.Pz. Manstein was a Korps (mot.) commander. Hube was commander of 16.Pz. Rommel, Cruwell and Nehrling, of Afrika Korps fame, originally lead the 7.Pz, 11.Pz and 18.Pz also with great success.

This is how, Hoth and Guderian's Panzergruppes in 1941 destroyed and captured 2,000 soviet tanks for the loss of ~150 write-offs in one week. Most of these enemy tanks were overrun, but whenever the panzer divisions fought the mech. corps, they usually slaughtered them and outclassed them completely tactically. The same happened in North Africa, although to a lessor extent.

The W. allies took two-three years to rework their system to a competitive standard and according their own needs. By 44', the Germans didn't have a particular edge anymore in mobile forces against the west.

A big reason why the performance of the panzer divisions was so good in 1941 and consistently good until 43 had to do with this outstanding preparatory effort in which they discovered the correct synergistic mix and the correct training doctrine. This added even more to their pre-war lead in executing mobile war. After 1941, the general organizational form did not change drastically throughout the war, as it was flexible doctrine that worked well.

This is what I talk about when I say that the German military of '40 and '41 is "experienced". They have actual, real life, experience operating a million men at a time in foreign and hostile territory. Theory aside, figures aside, you will see in real life where the stresses and weaknesses are in your organization. You will see which of your men, NCOs and officers are capable, which aren't yet but can be retrained, and which are hopeless. You will find which of your figures were wrong and where are the weakpoints. These are the things you TRY to emulate in maneuvers but never really do adequately. You will be more effective even if you find no changes to make in your doctrines.

But mostly in '41 (and much of '42) they benefited from an unusually unprepared Soviet military. What saved the Soviets was a combination of 3 things; The depth of the country that needed to advance as the Germans, after some 400-500 miles, started to run into limitations in supply and then the progress was in fits and starts until it ground to a halt (similar to the Allies in France, the Soviets during Bagration, etc.). The second was not the size of the Soviet army, but the size of its reserves. There were already some 15-18 million men who had had military training and were still of fighting age. This was why they were able to put more units together so quickly. Germany did not have this depth of reserves, and as an industrial society, the older the male population the more likely a potential soldier was also a necessary worker. And finally, as time went on the Soviets were no longer inexperienced and incompetent. By the Stalingrad counter attacks they had been at war for a year and a half.

The W. allies took two-three years to rework their system to a competitive standard and according their own needs. By 44', the Germans didn't have a particular edge anymore in mobile forces against the west.

The irony is that the three reasons the Germans gave for their defeat aren't really good explanations:

The weather - this is a neutral factor. The weather affects both sides and at times that helps either one. Remember that at first the Germans welcomed the first frosts as it meant the mud hardened and they could finally move and supply again.

The greater size of the enemy - This was always the case and they knew about this going in. 3 million men invaded in Barbarossa, and quickly killed or captured 4.1 million Soviet soldiers, so by definition they were outnumbered from the start. And in the latter offensives the Soviet operations would be on fronts where there were under 2 Soviet troops for every German defending, but the Soviets had learned on attack to have 3-5 to 1 in the area of the attack (often as the result of maskirovka operations).

Hitler's meddling - Until the summer of '44 Hitler often took the advice of his generals, and also at times he was right when they were wrong. Many of the generals we consider brilliant also still thought in terms of quick and decisive engagements to defeat the enemy. They were the ones who felt it was important to capture Moscow and Leningrad where it was Hitler who focused on the south and the resources. In that case Hitler was probably in the right in that this was going to be a long and drawn out conflict and its resolution would be political and not military (the same way that the capture of Poland, Czechoslovakia and France was defeating them politically and not militarily capturing them).


The more I learn about the nitty gritty of the war the less impressive the Germans are as compared to the myths. They had some sharp uniforms and started off with some great doctrines, but by '43 they were believing their own hype a bit too much. The reason we often think what we do about the Germans vs. the Russians is that prior to the fall of the USSR most of our history comes from the German side, and most of that is from the German generals who fought the wars of '39-'43... they were the ones who survived.

On the day Operation Barbarossa began 3 million men crossed their demarcation line with fully loaded supply trains with direct rail and road links to their supply location and to face an outnumbered, UNlead, and poorly trained opposition. The ONLY thing they had to concern themselves with was the speed and distance of their advance.

Tha main thing was the miscalculation on the part of the Soviet Union for not anticipating or preparing for the Germans to break the non-aggression pact, otherwise much of the Germans' success in the surprise invasion could have been mitigated.

If you truly believe that this is all there is to it you would make a very poor logistician. Having a full 100,000 sq. meter warehouse can supply very little at a time if it only has one loading bay.

Don't put words in my mouth. I never said "that was all there was to it". YOU were the one painting the D-Day landings as something the Allies had to do in haste and miraculously pulled off, when in reality it was the most carefully planned and executed military operation in human history and they had the complete luxury and ability to stockpile the weapons, munitions, and men to carry it out while being behind the English channel.

England was full of supplies. But the allies knew they had to focus on getting those onto French soil and to operating units. And they did it well. The Germans thought the allied reliance on motorized transport would be a liability since horses could forage but trucks need fuel. They did not conceive of Pluto, the fuel supply system the allies set up to pump fuel over the beaches.

If anything the English channel was a godsend to the British and western Allies as they would not have lasted into 1941 without it. By the time the landings were carried out the Kriegsmarine or Luftwaffe were no where to be seen, and the Allies had complete superiority in this regard. When you have complete air and naval superiority, a beach landing is simple a matter of execution.

The Allies were not concerned with the defenses or the actual landings...they only feared the appeared of the 15th Army which was still expect another landing in Pas de Calais. Of course that never happened but the Germans continued believe Normandy was a diversion. Tactical victory which allowed the logistical support to remain intact. Hardly amateur.

There is a US military adage that amateurs talk tactics and professionals talk logistics. The corollary is a rephrasing of the old "tactics win battles but strategy wins wars" to "tactics win battles, logistics win wars."

Well ultimately you need to win battles too, that is what affords the logisticians the opportunity to apply their craft.

Lots of thought goes into logistics in the US military and has ever since the creation of West Point as an academy of not just military training but of engineering and scientific training as well.

No one's denying common sense...

Don't put words in my mouth. I never said "that was all there was to it". YOU were the one painting the D-Day landings as something the Allies had to do in haste and miraculously pulled off, when in reality it was the most carefully planned and executed military operation in human history and they had the complete luxury and ability to stockpile the weapons, munitions, and men to carry it out while being behind the English channel.

If anything the English channel was a godsend to the British and western Allies as they would not have lasted into 1941 without it. By the time the landings were carried out the Kriegsmarine or Luftwaffe were no where to be seen, and the Allies had complete superiority in this regard. When you have complete air and naval superiority, a beach landing is simple a matter of execution.

I don't know where you can get that I said the landings were amateurish or hastily planned. One can say the planning went on for two years, and there was so much focus on the landing that they neglected to prepare for fighting in the Bocage.

But it is hard to talk of the benefits of the English Channel since it just IS. Without it the whole history of Europe, not just Britain, would be different from the times the Romans invaded the British isles and onwards. Such is the case behind most "what if" scenarios, that the "what if" really wasn't even possible and that was why the choice was never made.

The Allies were not concerned with the defenses or the actual landings...they only feared the appeared of the 15th Army which was still expect another landing in Pas de Calais. Of course that never happened but the Germans continued believe Normandy was a diversion. Tactical victory which allowed the logistical support to remain intact. Hardly amateur.

One always wants to be within the enemies OODA Loop because it gives you more initiative than he has. That said, I wouldn't say that they "feared" the appearance f the 15th. That was by definition the thing for which they had to prepare since it was much more likely than Kriegsmarine or Luftwaffe counter attacks. But it was still possible that the Kriegsmarine would try and it was still a very very real fear, especially after the losses to E-Boats during the Operation Tiger exercise just 6 weeks prior.

Well ultimately you need to win battles too, that is what affords the logisticians the opportunity to apply their craft.

That's an interesting thought experiment. There are still a few instances where factions won all (or most) of the battles yet still lost the war. Invariably the reasons were political or economic and not strategic. Three that come to mind are the US Revolutionary War, the US War of 1812, and Vietnam. Certainly all the losses didn't mean that side lost.

I don't know where you can get that I said the landings were amateurish or hastily planned. One can say the planning went on for two years, and there was so much focus on the landing that they neglected to prepare for fighting in the Bocage.

But it is hard to talk of the benefits of the English Channel since it just IS. Without it the whole history of Europe, not just Britain, would be different from the times the Romans invaded the British isles and onwards. Such is the case behind most "what if" scenarios, that the "what if" really wasn't even possible and that was why the choice was never made.

All I am saying is that the English channel was more of an obstacle to the Germans in 1940/41 than the western Allies in 44.

One always wants to be within the enemies OODA Loop because it gives you more initiative than he has. That said, I wouldn't say that they "feared" the appearance f the 15th. That was by definition the thing for which they had to prepare since it was much more likely than Kriegsmarine or Luftwaffe counter attacks. But it was still possible that the Kriegsmarine would try and it was still a very very real fear, especially after the losses to E-Boats during the Operation Tiger exercise just 6 weeks prior.

"feared", "concerned" use whatever word you like but the excellent intelligence disruption on the part of the Allies and their spy network practically took the strongest German formation out of the equation until it was too late. The Kriegsmarine was reduced to U-boats and the Baltic fleets which were more concerned with supplies reaching the Eastern Front via the Arctic. They couldn't do much with the air coverage the Allies enjoyed at the time anyway.

That's an interesting thought experiment. There are still a few instances where factions won all (or most) of the battles yet still lost the war. Invariably the reasons were political or economic and not strategic. Three that come to mind are the US Revolutionary War, the US War of 1812, and Vietnam. Certainly all the losses didn't mean that side lost.

Politics can be considered strategic but on an even higher level. But yes, there are even some hypothetical projections that see the German victorious in 1919, but of course the political situation in Germany at the time was on the verge of collapse even if the Kaiser didn't abdicate. The Russians also withdrew from WWI for political reasons due to the instability caused by the war, although their armies were not very successful anyway.

von Schweppenburg's post-Normandy appraisal as Chief of Panzer Group West was that the Normandy Panzer divisions in June 1944 were at 30-40% operating efficiency compared to the high quality Panzer Divisions that were used in France 1940 (he was commander of 14 PzK at that time).

This was based on the established standards of individual training, level of unit training/cohesion, quality of personnel/leadership, capabilities, and other developmental factors.

This and digs into unit histories goes further into explaining why the panzer forces in 44-45 didn't perform as well over the usual stuff (we wuz outnumbered, air power, etc.)

My thanks to coh2player and other participants in the discussion. It was really interesting to read what they think about the Eastern Front in the West.

My thanks to coh2player and other participants in the discussion. It was really interesting to read what they think about the Eastern Front in the West.

In fairness, as little as I know about that front (have been learning much more about it only recently) I know much much more than the average westerner.

So to turn the question on you.... how are we perceiving it differently than someone in the East?

In fairness, as little as I know about that front (have been learning much more about it only recently) I know much much more than the average westerner.

It's OK. I know more than the average esterner. But I also know that my knowledge of small

... how are we perceiving it differently than someone in the East?

You may be surprised but not so much. We also have funs of bad guys in suits from Hugo Boss with skull and crossbones, who say that World war2 was loss Nazi because Hitler is idiot, General Frost is beast, and russian roads are terrible. SS was elite, germany was overwhelming ally numbers and all that.

On the other hand "pure patriots" who think that Stalin was too soft, weak and indecisive. USSR had to attack first! It would have saved from huge losses and all was well. For the USSR ... heheh ... We color the whole world red ... ha-ha-ha!
A little aside all this watching people coming out of school age and had time to read a couple of books about the war from normal historians. And those who write these books. Some are facepalming, the others groaning with laughter, the delusions that are "commies" and "Nazi".

Few people know anything, most do not know anything.

P.S. My english is lame. I know

A little aside all this watching people coming out of school age and had time to read a couple of books about the war from normal historians. And those who write these books. Some are facepalming, the others groaning with laughter, the delusions that are "commies" and "Nazi".

Few people know anything, most do not know anything.
(

It is basically the same in the west. With historians having to groan over the stupidity of the general public.

Im happy about this thread, for the internet its quality is surprisingly good.

This list of military strenght is nothing more than a propaganda paper created by german nationilist/right winged parties during the elections of the Reichstag with the intention to threaten the voters because of a possible german defenselessness ensuring voters will elect those parties and support their demands of a rearmed german military in the Republic of Weimar and a "possible" revision of the treaty of Versailles.

And Freikorps, in terms of armed paramilitary forces, did not exist anymore after the year 1920 in the Republic of Weimar. To hide a secret rearmement, in terms of training troops, which was against the treaties of Versailles/Trianon and St. Germain there were various strategies for the first german Democracy.

Three examples:
1. Conscription time was reduced so more soldiers could be trained but the troops limitation of 100.000 of the Reichswehr was not exeeded, because trained soldiers joined civil-life again.

2. German factories still produced submarines, but now for foreign clients until 1935. (Knowledge and Know-how was still there and was even improved.)

3. Military education and training of pilots was forbidden. So across the country gliding schools and clubs were established where new pilots were schooled and educated. Many pilots of the first days of the Luftwaffe gained experience with flying airplanes for civil airlines such as the german "Lufthansa" or airlines from other countries.

Well:

1) Versailles did leave Germany with a very small army relative to her population, so the fact that this was in retrospect considered unjust in part explains the unwillingness to prevent Germany rearmament

2) Germany inherited from the Prussian tradition the concept of the Army and pride in Service as a core part of the National identity. Hence disarmament was a particularly punitive thing to do to her. The second time around the Allies did a much, much better job of demilitarising German culture.

3) Czechoslovakia, being new had no real territorial claims. On the other hand Germany was bordered by France - which had the greatest military reputation in the world at the time; and Poland, possessed of probably the second best military reputation in Europe. Neither of these powers is especially friendly to Germany and in addition the Poles remembered not only being oppressed by the Germans but also the great extent that the Poland once had.

As such Polish attempts to expand her borders could not be ruled out, and it should be remembered that the French had invaded Germany as recently as 1923

4) For all the above reasons, over-turning Versailles and expanding the armed forces was hardly a fringe belief in Weimar Germany - it may well be one of the most popular things Hitler did. Though he was building on the groundwork laid in the 20s

Well even under the treaty the Reichswehr was legally making the most out of the stipulations. Out of the 100,000 men serving, over 80,000 were NCOs and junior officers trained to a very high standard. This was done so that it was deemed necessary to outright break the treaty and recruit a larger army, presumably due to an imminent crisis, their officer corps would be experienced and highly trained and would expedite the seasoning process for the newly enlisted.

While that is of course true, and greatly facilitated the eventual expansion of the armed forces post '35, the Reichswehr itself was for all intents and purposes a glorified police force and unable to perform territorial defense - and the higher echelons of the Reichswehr were under no illusions as to this fact - the contemporary publications makes for very instructive reading in this regard. Even assuming a most optimistic mobilisation scenario (ie. a rapid expansion to 400 000 men wartime strength - the bulk of which of course would however have been purely static divisions without even a field artillery complement), the Reichswehr, by its own estimate, would have been unable to actually defeat a Czechoslovak or Polish aggression, and in case of a French attack, they assumed they could at the very most last for 4 weeks fighting various delaying actions - and that is, if the political leadership was willing to literally sacrifice the entire army down to the last man - and no shortage of civilians, which were to operate en masse as franctireurs.
Actual war planning in the Reichswehr was largely centered around finding a suitable terrain feature to hinge a last stand on and "die honorably"; in the latter scenario this was usually the Harz mountain range, assuming a French push through central Germany on Berlin.

LeYawn, the historical record shows this view of the Reichswehr to be somewhat untrue or at the very least misleading. Take their cooperation with the Soviet Union for instance. There were bases set up on Soviet soil to co-operatively research, develop, and apply the very weapon systems prohibited under the Versailles treaty which among others included tanks, aircraft, and chemical weapons.

Training schools were established that were to teach both the practical and theoretical. It is estimated that the Germans spent roughly 10 million Reichsmark per year on their operations in the Soviet Union, nearly 100 million by 1932. This is a large sum for a starving, fledgling government, which the Weimar Republic was in the 1920s, to invest in the research and practical training of such weapons that could not even be legally produced within Germany's borders, much less adopted by it's military. Rest assured that when Hitler and his national socialists took over they found that much of the work had already been done for them. In effect the interwar government had unconsciously provided the neat starting point from which Hitler raised his awesome Wehrmacht.

But whether the Nazis were to come to power or not it is clear that the Germans were very concerned with remaining militarily up-to-date and providing themselves with the knowledge and the means by which to outright break the treaty, if necessary, in the defense of the country.

What precisely would you disagree with here, when talking about the realm of actual capability? While it is true that the Reichswehr did its very best to subvert and circumvent Versailles (not just the cooperation with the Soviets, also the establishment of the Truppenamt etc) and in the process not become utterly out of touch with the realities of modern warfare, it was fundamentally unfit to actually defend Germany against any potential opponent, let alone a coalition. Again, if you consider the various memoranda, read the proceedings of the staff rides, wargames etc, there was no doubt whatsoever that even when stretched greatly beyond the limits of plausibility, the military potential of the Reichwehr was just to limited to allow for territorial defence; the only positive, political outcome that ever surfaces is a successfull appeal to the international community. A military victory in the conventional understanding was ruled out of the question, even against Czechoslovakia.

No one is arguing that it was ever fit to stand against the armies of Germany's neighbors, or that it somehow would. The fact remains that the Wehrmacht was raised to incredible fighting capability in half a decade, and much of that success can be attributed to the foundations laid by the Reichswehr and the work done in the interwar period.

And I certainly don't disagree at all, but whatever the military merits of the Reichswehr, it was at best masquerading as an army.

It was dangerously weak, yes, and this is even from the perspective of the French who were torn between the abject curtailing of their troublemaking neighbors and the fact that they desired Germany to be a somewhat capable buffer to the threat of Bolshevik expansion.

LeYawn, the historical record shows this view of the Reichswehr to be somewhat untrue or at the very least misleading. Take their cooperation with the Soviet Union for instance. There were bases set up on Soviet soil to co-operatively research, develop, and apply the very weapon systems prohibited under the Versailles treaty which among others included tanks, aircraft, and chemical weapons.
(...)
In effect the interwar government had unconsciously provided the neat starting point from which Hitler raised his awesome Wehrmacht.
(...)
But whether the Nazis were to come to power or not it is clear that the Germans were very concerned with remaining militarily up-to-date and providing themselves with the knowledge and the means by which to outright break the treaty, if necessary, in the defense of the country.

Isn´t that what every souvereign country would do? Preparing to defense itself?

Yes the Weimarer Republic had such co-operations with the SU. But don´t refer from such facts to the conclusion that the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic could reveal the treaty of Versailles or could operate or stand against military operations of countries like Poland or France. This is in fact untrue.

Why did the Weimar Republic cooperate with the SU? Because it was the only possibility to gain experience in f. e. tank-warfare (with real Tanks, not bicycles with paper around like in Germany of those days) or testing new prototypes of airplanes (not glieders as back home) or chemnical weapons.

Don´t forget foreign policy target of the Weimar Republic was the acceptance of the treaty of Versailles not its Revision as it was under the Fashists in 1933.