General World War 2 Discussion Thread

Shortening the front via counter-operations and phased withdrawals is common sense, though?

You say it is common sense, but actually putting the into action is another thing entirely. Putting common sense to practice is what is significant. The Soviets and Allies never demonstrated a similar ability to withdraw while keeping their combat effectiveness intact during the early years by comparison. The British and French position at Dunkirk bordered on hilarity and the Soviet Union was by most accounts in complete disarray when on the defense for the first time in 1941.


At any rate we can now make some excellent tactical and strategic decisions about a war that was waged 70 years ago, now that we had all or most of the facts from both sides. The parties at that time suffice it to say did not have the luxury and it can be reasoned that many of the decisions made at the time were justified by what either side knew/believed at the time. If you won, you were the brilliant gambler, if you lost you were hopelessly doomed all along, or so the histories go.

^
But conducting orderly withdrawals is more organizational/tactical in nature, than strategic. Divisions hold together, keep cohesion, and then retreat in order. Rear services make ready. I don't see this as genius.

Also, the Germans did not retain their combat power when they retreated; they usually abandoned a small to overwhelming portion of their equipment, particular motor vehicles, support weapons, and armor.

At the Army Group/Army level, the commanders are more theoretical thinkers, and less on-hands.

The Red Army that fought in 41-42 was very different from the one in 44-45- same thing for the French/British/CW forces.

You say it is common sense, but actually putting the into action is another thing entirely. Putting common sense to practice is what is significant. The Soviets and Allies never demonstrated a similar ability to withdraw while keeping their combat effectiveness intact during the early years by comparison. The British and French position at Dunkirk bordered on hilarity and the Soviet Union was by most accounts in complete disarray when on the defense for the first time in 1941.

That is not the correct adjective; bordered on the disastrous would be more apposite (IMO).

At any rate we can make some excellent tactical and strategic decision about a war that was waged 70 years ago, now that we had all or most of the facts. The parties at that time did not have the luxury. If you won, you were the brilliant gambler, if you lost you were hopelessly doomed all along, or so the histories go.

I would disagree: 70 years is still too close to be completely objective, I think, particularly given the strength of propaganda on both sides. We're getting out of the woods, gradually, but still have some way to go. e.g. Are all UK secret records now released into the public domain? I am unsure, but I somehow doubt it.

It was only thirty years ago, that Triumph des Willens (sp) could only be shown on UK TV once every 10 years, given the force of its message. And even now, I think, there may be restrictions in central Europe on the use of certain Nazi emblems in the arts etc

Regarding Manstein...you have to at least credit him with the notion of pushing a concentrated armoured force through the Ardennes in 1940 - which was considered impassable by his contemporaries and counterparts. This kind of creativity is the essence of military genius.

At the end of the day Manstein was given a difficult job and performed it admirably, which is why he has been fawned over in the post-war period by his fellow German officers AND his former adversaries.

I would disagree: 70 years is still too close to be completely objective, I think, particularly given the strength of propaganda on both sides. We're getting out of the woods, gradually, but still have some way to go. e.g. Are all UK secret records now released into the public domain? I am unsure, but I somehow doubt it.

It was only thirty years ago, that Triumph des Willens (sp) could only be shown on UK TV once every 10 years, given the force of its message. And even now, I think, there may be restrictions in central Europe on the use of certain Nazi emblems in the arts etc

This conflict, the Crusades, the War of 1812...it doesn't matter, my point was that hindsight is 20/20, and good historians do not expect and judge personalities based on what they themselves know now in the 21st century.

Manstein performed very well (most of the time) when planning an offensive operation with tactically superior forces against an large opponent. His Crimea campaign is very interesting. The 43' back-hand blow was also very well executed but the final phase could have been executed more cheaply.

His biggest failures were Operation Winter Storm, Kursk and everything after Kursk until his firing in early 1944. He was outmaneuvered by General Vatutin in particular.

In 1943, I believe he did not really comprehend the capabilities of the new Tank Armies and Artillery Corps/Divisions.

Manstein performed very well (most of the time) when planning an offensive operation with tactically superior forces against an large opponent. His Crimea campaign is very interesting. The 43' back-hand blow was also very well executed but the final phase could have been executed more cheaply.

His biggest failures were Operation Winter Storm, Kursk and everything after Kursk until his firing in early 1944. He was outmaneuvered by General Vatutin in particular.

I thoroughly agree.

With hindsight & in Hitler's shoes, I believe that Manstein, the attack Field Marshal, should have been fired around Sept. 1943 and replaced with General Model.

Who would you have to command Operation Typhoon in place of von Bock? Out of curiosity.

I don't know as I would cancel Typhoon and revert to active defense & rebuilding of forces.

Just my ATL:


STAVKA at around Winter 1941-1942 was under the impression that they were close to winning the war already, and were in the position to collapse the Front, which did not happen. In Spring of 42', they thought that they could inflict a military disaster and eliminate AGC.

The idea behind my ATL is to allow the Soviet strategic and operational offensives take place, and beat them much better than they did historically via much stronger defenses and encirclement. Manstein would be given the go to complete the clearing of the Crimea as historically but eliminating Sevastapol was not needed.

By June 1942, the Wehrmacht should be much stronger than it was historically with the equivalent of around 1.5 plus, maybe even 2 Army Groups ready for offensive operations (instead of just 1).

The summer offensive should revolve around destroying the frontier armies again with encirclement, and then encircling the Moscow concentration and putting it under siege like Leningrad. Beyond there, there would be more options if there are available forces left.

As historically, the successes will be smaller here than in Barbarossa I but not 'that' smaller.

Option A: The Caucasus should be ignored, but if possible Vozeneth and the Great Bend of the Don should be cleared with the Volga traffic cut off. THE Bridgehead, Stalingrad, should be sieged, but not entered. Then preparations for long term defense should be made.

Option B: Continue seeking encirclement opportunities in the Moscow Axis/The Center, ignore the South. Prepare for long term defense before it's too late.

Axis Allies may continue supporting the 1942 offensive with their 400,000 troops.

Basically, the tumble of events afterwards would lead to a lengthened World War, and the Atom bomb dropped on Berlin...

At any rate we can now make some excellent tactical and strategic decisions about a war that was waged 70 years ago, now that we had all or most of the facts from both sides. The parties at that time suffice it to say did not have the luxury and it can be reasoned that many of the decisions made at the time were justified by what either side knew/believed at the time. If you won, you were the brilliant gambler, if you lost you were hopelessly doomed all along, or so the histories go.

This conflict, the Crusades, the War of 1812...it doesn't matter, my point was that hindsight is 20/20, and good historians do not expect and judge personalities based on what they themselves know now in the 21st century.

You have made some very good points here Death´s Head!

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Regarding playing Field Marshall on paper:

We can simulate various situations, decisions and/or military operations, even with the knowledge of todays information of both sides, but who can definetly ensure that the opposite side would still act the same way as it did 70 years ago and would not counter our "improved" orders with a new operational strategy and military performance?

According to a popular saying: "No battleplan survives first contact."

The missing link here is doctrine and organizational/institutional knowledge. The units act in predictable ways, due to limitations in their training and specifications in design. eg. It took until Nov-Dec 1942 for the Soviets to introduce formations that were capable of deep operations, after many failed experiments in the field. eg. An infantry division cannot do the same things an armored division obviously can.

That is why professionals war-game before setting a plan and professional literature is much more in-depth than the history books for the masses.

We can simulate various situations, decisions and/or military operations, even with the knowledge of todays information of both sides, but who can definetly ensure that the opposite side would still act the same way as it did 70 years ago and would not counter our "improved" orders with a new operational strategy and military performance?

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I saw you edited your post

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The missing link here is doctrine and organizational/institutional knowledge. The units act in predictable ways, due to limitations in their training and specifications in design. (...) An Infantry division cannot accomplish what a mobile division can, etc.

Well that´s pretty clear.

But this is not what I wanted to point out with my previous post. What I wanted to meantion is that every professional General/Staff has to face an unkown factor X. And this factor X is the possible creativity of the opposites commanders in chief facing and countering challenges by new/unexpected military strategies/operations, regardlessly the units limitations.

That's why they develop decision trees, and plan for alternatives.

Overall, once sufficient experience was developed, they pretty much knew what the enemy units were capable of and how they generally behaved in various situations.

You are right about 'creativity' but a serious upset was generally a rarity. One example I can think of is Chikov/Shuimov's command of 62nd/64th Army in Stalingrad while being outclassed. Another is Mantueffuel's command of the elite 7.Pz and elite PzG 'GD'. Katukov's Tank Brigade in the battle of Moscow. Most commanders don't have the unit quality or the talent to move the formation that creatively and achieve unusual results.

Yes, you 're absolutely right.

Fascinating discussion here.

I know very little compared to the folks in here about Eastern Front activities beyond the famous battles (Stalingrad, Kursk). If you were to recommend a specific Eastern Front action(s) that received little attention but would be an interesting read...what would it/they be?

Lots of Tanks:

Case Blue 1942
Caucasus 1942
Rzhev 1942
Winter Storm, Chir River 1942
Soviet Winter-counteroffensive 1942-1943, Backhand Blow
Belgorod-Kharkov summer 1943
Orel 1943
Mius 1943
Krivoy Rog 1943
Campaign for the Ukraine 1943
Korsun 1944
Rumania, Targos-Frumos I/II, 1944
Bagration 1944
L'vov 1944
Warsaw 1944

Personally, I hope that more will a lot more work will be done for the Campaign for the Ukraine 1943 and L'vov 1944.

Of these, Case Blue 1942, Caucasus 1942, and Rumania 1944 are very fascinating. Books: (Red Storm over the Balkans + relevant unit histories, and To the Gates of Stalingrad).

Bagration is probably the largest operation that receives little to no attention in the west simply because it happened at the same time as Normandy.

Siege of Leningrad is the other biggy

I think people are too clueless on the Soviet '30s in order to get a good understanding of the USSR during the war.
Like the rise to power of the Tsarytsin group, and their consolidation of power in '34 would help explain the disastrous year of 1941. The development of industry and the civil structure as well as the fluctuation of repression, both in severity and targets is kinda a big deal if you want to get a hold of how that country worked. And more importantly how people thought and acted.

Most people kinda know about the NSDAPs rise to power in the 30s and what led up to the war. But in regards to the USSR knowledge is sub-par.

I did a start of some kind in this thread a couple of pages back, I will get back to that work when I have time. This time probably in some knew thread. Maybe in the style of TToH, but focusing on institutions and the macro rather than the micro.