Lets talk Pgrens.

I've been getting vet 3 and 20+ kills with with my pgrens lately. They are good.

So now the rifleman terminators are back, are they comparable to the old Falls with 3 offensive vet?

Keep call them "terminators" and they will be turned into a soft shit, like PzGrens. Those were "terminators" for some noob/hypocrite players. And I bet they still are.

Grens with LMG are still nobrainer

I've been getting vet 3 and 20+ kills with with my pgrens lately. They are good.

The key failure in German accounts of the war is their lack of understanding of the Red Army and their operational level of war and massive organizational change experienced in phases during the war. This is because the Red Army operates in a manner that is very much alien to the armies in the West. This lack of understanding extends to the impact of thinking and planning on this level. Germans tend to apply perceptions that are valid at the tactical level to the operational level, which is an error. These tendencies are prevalent throughout most of their interviews and memoirs, and so forth. A few weeks ago I read the 60 page transcript of US armored commanders interviewing Panzer General Balck at Chir and he and Mellenthin displayed these very traits.

A very common thing in German accounts is for a division commander to proclaim their 'superiority' over the Soviets while being outnumbered for a couple of days. Meanwhile, their entire army is getting defeated and will retreat thanks to the events of these days. They cannot grasp the reality of the situation, and learn the wrong lessons from their experience.

To start with, you are of course correct that contemporary German perception of the Soviet approach merits particular caution and has its intrinsic limitations - thats historiography 101. But:
When it comes ie. to the intelligence picture, German insight actually increased exponentially past the beginning of Barbarossa, (before the war it was in most respects abysmal - as evidenced by the fact that it underestimated Soviet strength by almost 50 %) and so did the quality of FHO, their assessments of Soviet strenghts, casualties, and intentions proved by and large fairly reliable whereas the Soviets often operated in the realm of fantasy. The official Soviet history of the Great Patriotic War makes for interesting reading in this regard. As for the alleged German reluctance to discuss their failures or apologetic tendencies in general, this has some truth to it when it comes to particular generals' memoirs (ie. von Manstein etc.), but in general, it is quite simply wrong. If anything, if one constrasts the German tactical treatments, lessons learned etc. with their Soviet counterparts, one is struck by the German willingness not only to discuss their own personal, operational and doctrinal failings but also by their acknowledgments of perceived Soviet superiority in several fields - even though the Germans overall, unsurprisingly, perceived themselves as superior. Soviet analogues on the other hand often, for the lack of a better word, appear borderline bizarre and read more like hagiograhic accolades interspersed with agitprop jargon then serious military literature - for instance, failures (if discussed at all) are virtually never explained in terms of German agency or performance but at most by material shortages, and more commonly by misapplication of political derivatives/"military science" or the shortcomings of certain vilified individuals...

If you read German, look up ie. Middeldorf, Eike: "Taktik im Rußlandfeldzug", and go from there.

A key weakness of the Germans is their excessive focus on combat operations, efficiency, tactics, and troop training at the self-contained division level and below. They maximized logistics support and human & material resources at this level while neglecting the higher levels. (..while not improving their military intelligence arm, military engineering, logistics, artillery, and developing strategic offensive capabilities at Corps, Army, Army Group level)

A German infantry division in the offensive consumed up to 650-550 tons plus a day (this includes 200 tons of artillery ammunition or more), while 1.5 Soviet divisional equivalents consumed only up to 270 plus tons a day in the offensive.

Soviet forces were literally the opposite in focus; You have thinly supplied divisions but very powerful strategic and operational organizations (corps level and above) that were used infrequently. The military philosophy and priorities were completely different between the two, but many German commanders saw things from their own 'frame of reference'.

German military intelligence was poor in the war in the east overall. It was good (only in terms of the border) in the summer of 1941 because they studied Red Army dispositions between 1940-1941.

Let's see: In 1941 they destroyed about 1/3rd of Soviet armies, but failed to detect the presence of half of them. In 1942 they failed to detect soviet armies in STAVKA reserve, soviet mobilization capabilities, and only destroyed or nearly annihilated maybe 7 out of 83 (?ish) armies in 1942. They also failed to understand the significance of periodic and massive changes in Soviet forces structure, including the Tank armies, Sapper Armies, and the Artillery penetration corps.

At Stalingrad and Kursk, they completely failed and simply walked into a trap to suffer massive defeats (Uranus, Orel, Kharkov).

These are just some of the reasons why old fashioned, German historiography from divisional commanders or apologists (which claims that they were winning until Stalingrad, and lost at Kursk) are wrong. It even contradicts a few, lonely voices. Chief of German Staff General Halder, before he left his post in 42', considered the war to be lost in 1941.

Let me briefly address a couple of points, in no particular order.

.... A German infantry division in the offensive consumed up to 650-550 tons plus a day (this includes 200 tons of artillery ammunition or more), while 1.5 Soviet divisional equivalents consumed only up to 270 plus tons a day in the offensive.

Unsurprisingly so. Are you sure it is not you who is comparing apples and oranges here? Your argumentation does not appear to support your case in the first place. Divisional slice is the key concept. A German 1./2. wave Inf. Div. had a nominal strength of 15 000 - 17 000 personnel, compared to an all time high of 6-8 000 in a Soviet Rifle Div. by mid 1943. For most of the war it was rather less then 5000... Also, the Soviets usually had much smaller ammunition allotments per tube, both in their organic and nondivisional artillery, which of course is gonna reduce consumption - at the cost of firepower. Also, the proportion of all kinds of supporting roles was much, and I do mean, much higher in the German divisions, to include signals, medical, etc.. As you emphasize yourself, a German Inf. Div. was conceptually a self contained formation, a Sov. Rifle-Division was not, and correspondingly, much more was operationally demanded of a German division - why would it come as any surprise that it had higher logistical requirements?

...German military intelligence was poor in the war in the east overall. It was good (only in terms of the border) in the summer of 1941 because they studied Red Army dispositions between 1940-1941. ...[...]
German prewar intelligence (both Abwehr&FHO) was miserable, full stop. Part of that was owed to political imperatives, ie. the attempt to avoid any and all overt provocations with the obvious exception of Luftwaffe recon activity in the weeks leading up to the conflict. After all, they not only shut down virtually their entire HUMINT network but also actually refused the advances of both the Romanians and the Japanese - which was to cost them dearly.


...At Stalingrad and Kursk, they completely failed and simply walked into a trap to suffer massive defeats (Uranus, Orel, Kharkov).

What do you base this on if I may ask? Both the risks of Stalingrad and the futility of Citadel were actually fully realised by German intelligence. Orel, too, was at least more or less accurately predicted by FHO, reference Müller-Hillebrand, Heer, vol. 3. If you are looking for German intelligence fuck-ups, looks no further then their crass underestimation of Soviet mobilisation potential or ie. their misappraisal of the direction of Bagration. Looky here: http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/publikationen/ea/publikation/zwei-legenden-aus-dem-dritten-reich/
Then again, of course, the AOKs had their own intelligence, and for example when it comes to Bagration, while FHO erred fundamentally, PzAOK3 was right on the money...

...These are just some of the reasons why old fashioned, German historiography from divisional commanders or apologists (which claims that they were winning until Stalingrad, and lost at Kursk) are wrong. It even contradicts a few, lonely voices. Chief of German Staff General Halder, before he left his post in 42', considered the war to be lost in 1941.

Would you mind naming a few of these "apologists" or representatives of old fashioned German historiography so that we may put this discussion on a more concrete footing? Again, Manstein, Balck, etc. hardly qualify as scholarly historiography and do in fact not claim such a status. We are talking memoir literature here, and their anaologues on the Soviet side would be the likes of Zhukov etc...Mind you, a great many contemporary German voices considered the war to be lost in late '41, and with the benefit of hindsight, it is hard not to concur. However, the fact that the Soviets eventually prevailed had little to do with organisational structure (the Soviets did not abandon the Corps echelon as an organisational framework because it had proved unwieldy, they abandoned it because they lacked qualified personnel!) and everything to do with force ratios, industrial potential, and manpower, none of which favoured the Germans à la longue.

These novels are nice and all but what do they do with pgren?

^Or balance at all for the matter.

So... sturmpioneers cost nearly the same as panzergrenadiers and probably reinforce at a similar amount; they fight the same. Will people also have problems with them, or is it because OKW offers better infantry and the kubelwagen to make its CC role evident? (Its also your starting builder unit, so its no mp40 pioneer squad to complain about) Its also the builder unit, and supplies healthpacks. Its actually meant to build forward defenses and assist in fighting.

So... sturmpioneers cost nearly the same as panzergrenadiers and probably reinforce at a similar amount; they fight the same. Will people also have problems with them, or is it because OKW offers better infantry and the kubelwagen to make its CC role evident? (Its also your starting builder unit, so its no mp40 pioneer squad to complain about) Its also the builder unit, and supplies healthpacks. Its actually meant to build forward defenses and assist in fighting.

We will see what kind of unit synergy will appear in the OKW. But a mobile suppression platform would indeed make the SP better then the PG. The thing is the current PG has little synergy in the ost army as they are rather static long range fighters.

We will see what kind of unit synergy will appear in the OKW. But a mobile suppression platform would indeed make the SP better then the PG. The thing is the current PG has little synergy in the ost army as they are rather static long range fighters.

Its not like USF sturm pios are different except for the ability to build and repair.

You missed the entire point of his post. He just said the unit synergy with OKW was better because they have a mobile suppression platform to support the Sturmpioneers. The only thing OH can do is stick 'em in a Half-Track and wheel up hoping there's no AT Grenades.

PM me if you want to continue. Personally, I don't.

I am familiar with the literature on both sides, and you haven't said anything I didn't expect.

Let me briefly address a couple of points, in no particular order.

And what makes you believe that synergy is better?
Do you know durability of kubel?
Suppression?
Range?

Surely the combo will overpower single squad, but are you certain it will do just as well against a pair of conscripts or rifles for example?

I know that already, so if I were you, I wouldn't theorize too much before you actually see them.

I am familiar with the literature on both sides, and you haven't said anything I didn't expect.

Well dito. I reckon we have different perspectives on the matter. Lets call it a day, and have a good one.

And what makes you believe that synergy is better?
Do you know durability of kubel?
Suppression?
Range?

Surely the combo will overpower single squad, but are you certain it will do just as well against a pair of conscripts or rifles for example?

I know that already, so if I were you, I wouldn't theorize too much before you actually see them.

So in other words, basically the Kubel sucks and by extension so does Sturmpioneers.

Well dito. I reckon we have different perspectives on the matter. Lets call it a day, and have a good one.

Would be nice if all arguments on this forum ended like this...

So in other words, basically the Kubel sucks and by extension so does Sturmpioneers.

I haven't said that, I've said to not expect mountains of gold and rivers of honey when OKW arrives.

I personally find MG42+pgren synergy to be greater in comparison for two reasons I can't name yet.

I'm confused.some people say usa sucks..now okw sucks.Well ,we'll know soon enough.