Profile of DasDoomTurtle

Jump back to quoted post5 May 2015, 12:52 PM__deleted__

As to Jochen Peiper, there is a fairly recent biographical dissertation (2014) on him from Jens Westemeier which I would urge reading. A few things:
Peiper was in deep with the Nazi hierarchy, he had been Himmlers adjutant and had explicit knowledge of Aktion T4 and later the Shoah. Heck, his own brother was very likely murdered in T4 but that seems not to have overly disturbed him, and I could go on here. While he has gained some notoriety for Malmedy, where, while having command responsibility, he quite likely did not play any direct role btw, he demonstrably had PoWs murdered in cold blood by the hundreds as a matter of policy over several months on the Eastern Front, to the point where that alarmed his own peers and superiors. To cut a very long story short, Peiper was a very disturbing character even by the standards of the SS....

As for his leadership and tactical qualification, he undoubtedly eventually became a skilled SPW bataillon leader, gaining a number of significant successes especially with night attacks on the Eastern Front. However, when he assumed command of the Leibstandarte tank regiment, his limitations became obvious as he had no experience or training in handling tank formations and reputedly proved little tactical adroit. In consequence, lossess soared to completely unacceptable levels, making him quite unpopular with both his men and his fellow commanders.

Jump back to quoted post28 Apr 2015, 18:03 PMcoh2player

I have Spaeter's materials on BR and have other things that touch upon them. There may be discrepencies. The BR's role declined as Germany's offensive stance went to defensive. Opportunities for spec. ops and recon dried up significantly. In 43' the BR units were expanded and a mot. Infantry division was spun off- making most BR men effectively conventional troops.

Then there was the SS coup of the Spec ops arm and the fall of Abwehr, which lead to the 'GD' taking over the BR, and merging them into PanzerKorps 'GD' as a PzG Division in late 44'.

Jump back to quoted post28 Apr 2015, 16:14 PMcoh2player

The Brandenburgers were gradually reverted to traditional roles though, after 42'. Not sure what you are referring to specifically.

How is Model seen in Germany?

Jump back to quoted post28 Apr 2015, 15:01 PM__deleted__

Anyways, Eichewas commanded on the ground by Olt. von Berlepsch of 1./FJR. 7 (aka FJ Lehr) and conceived of by Maj. Mors of the very same outfit, who did not take any orders from Skorzeny, and neither did his men. Skorzeny whacked the Italian radio operator in the face and then proceeded to thrash the wireless set - which was quite unnecessary - but that was it. Of the 88 men who participated in the raid, 70 were FJ, just 18 SS, and virtually all of the latter had very little in the way of combat training/experience and would have been of little help if Mussolinis captors had had more of a fight in them, in fact, Skorzenys' gloryhounding jeopardised the entire operation...

Be that as it may, the almost simultaneous capture of the Italian army HQ was a much more impressive undertaking in evey respect, but has been overshadowed by Eiche to this day.

Jump back to quoted post28 Apr 2015, 13:55 PMcoh2player

Model's command of 3.Pz (1941)was just as good as Rommel with the 7.Pz (1940). As army commander, his method was to tour the front at personal risk to himself and make radical adjustments (making spec ops combat groups) to improve efficiency. He would also break apart formations entirely, and make situation-tailored battlegroups.

Basically all this activity weakened his units offensively but it improved the situation defensively. Manstein, on the other hand, was weaker in the defense but more offense oriented and would not break mobile reserves or strong units up like Model did.