Which WWII Officer/General is your role model?

I think Rommel outclasses most of the names here though. Funny how Patton or Monty tried to reach his fame while having far more resources, tanks, equipment and men. A true general does wonders in the harshest conditions. Everyone is a good general when he has everything he needs, when he needs.

Which is why I would nominate General Bill Slim - "From Defeat into Victory" - kinda epitomizes my own situation too often .....but with the wrong outcome

Which is why I would nominate General Bill Slim - "From Defeat into Victory" - kinda epitomizes my own situation too often .....but with the wrong outcome

Its a refreshingly unsanitized account alright, I very much liked the read.

Its a refreshingly unsanitized account alright, I very much liked the read.

Respect!

I already enjoyed reading your history posts, but this elevates you to an altogether different plane! (Did you also read about the controversy over this book?)

Respect!

I already enjoyed reading your history posts, but this elevates you to an altogether different plane! (Did you also read about the controversy over this book?)

No I did not, however, by the power of google, this shall be rectified...

Moved to The Library

You are a good Mentor

No I did not, however, by the power of google, this shall be rectified...

Essentially, it is a dispute about Wingate's Chindits.

It seems that Slim's book was based on the Official Army history of the campaign - and the Army historians were headed by General Roberts, one of Slim's subordinates, who disliked Wingate and his "flighty" ideas. It is therefore alleged by the Wingate supporters, that "Defeat into Victory" is biased against Wingate and the Chindits and was written to degrade them.

Such is the stuff of politics...

I took this crit off Amazon, but it does not properly reflect what I am trying to say

This is a book about to pass into history; as indicated by its curious use of an accent in the word 'material'. Slim's urbane and contemplative nature compounds the prejudices of his time. "Our losses were light," he writes (I paraphrase) "only around 2,500". Well. That's all right then. He comments how the Japanese "...turned their slanted eyes to Assam" (no reference, obviously, to the ovoid intensity of allied Chinese eyes). Of course, soldiers deal in death and the enemy is inevitably demonised; and it would be banal (as much as offensive) to denigrate the courage and sacrifice - on both sides - of the troops in Burma during WW2. But this is a book that is routinely cited (along with 'The Art of War', 'The Prince" or any half-decent biography of Napoleon) as being a tract for business leaders. And for all Slim's liberal conviviality towards self-aggrandising, would-be mythical generals (mostly, but not all, American) or his gracious admiration for his Japanese counterparts, his is a military mind. His notions of morale are based on activating people who are conscripted; who are removed from all aspects of domesticity and persuaded that their situation offers only victory or defeat. The paradigm here is not a 'business situation' or at least (since some extreme capitalists might think otherwise) not a social situation. Slim operates in a rigid hierarchical context - as indicated by his own willingness (curious to the civilian mind) to accede to orders that he feels are wrong. If he cites his own temper it seems merely to demonstrate his modesty; while his praise for subalterns is without stint. In fact, so exceptional do Slim's colleagues appear that you marvel that the war in the West took only 5 years to complete - the Western front might have had superior technical resources but by Slim's reckoning all the best soldiers ended up in the East! Stubborn positivism has its virtues but it's still an authoritarian mode. Slim has the martial love of aphorisms. "When unable to decide which of two options to take, a general should take the bolder course" he writes in the first half of the book (again, a paraphrase); but when the options present themselves later in the campaign, he actually takes the middle course (and profits by it). He even has the chairman-like propensity for micromanagement - inventing hemp parachutes or putting together ineffectual flotillas of junk ships. Resumes of this book tend to celebrate the way that Slim began his campaign by taking care to marshal superior forces against specific enemy units so that they developed 'the habit of victory' - with the effect that they ultimately learned to defeat enemy units that were greater in number. But it's not that simple. The successful allied campaign to recoup Burma surely owes more to belatedly improved techniques of jungle warfare and to the superior management of logistics - oh, and not a small part to the opportunity for respite afforded by the monsoon season. Slim evidently played a key role in two of these factors. He was a skilled commander and, for his times, a decent man. But he killed people for a living. Let's not pretend there isn't a problem here.

This would be a book to read, I think, if you wish to read a counter-crit:

Wingate and the Chindits: Redressing the balance

Almost two decades later the British Offical History of the Burma campaign of 1944 was published. It contained strong adverse criticism of Wingate. This was hurtful and dismaying for the Chindit veterans. By detracting from the good reputation of their hero and questioning the significance of the campaign in Northern Burma, it attacked their selfworth.
David Rooney's book is the latest counterattack against the Official History and its editor, Woodburn Kirby and his colleague Michael Roberts.
The first four chapters deal with Wingate's upbringing and education, his military apprenticeship in Sudan, his militarily successful but politically embarassing operations in Palestine and his return to Sudan to take a leading part in the liberation of Ethiopia during 1941.
In this part Rooney largely succeeds in his attempt to make "an objective assessment of the achievements of Orde Wingate". It is in the middle part - especially Chapters 7 and 8 - that his historical judgement fails, because his friendship and loyalty towards the Chindit veterans prevent him from dealing objectively with the material.
Rooney complains that, "the Official History disregarded any favourable comment, and launched into a destructive attack on Wingate both as a character and as a soldier. It made a series of unsubstantiated criticisms which are clearly designed to destroy his reputation, and it made no attempt to give a balanced view". These comments could equally apply to Rooney's treatment of Lentaigne, who replaced Wingate as commander of Special Force.

The problem with this is that too many German generals become 'great' even though they lost the battle. Case in point: Manstein. He had big victories and big defeats. Too many Soviet generals get put out of consideration due to the their losses; even though they used lower quality tactical units. Although I agree that W.Allied generals were, for the most part, not stressed enough (compared to the USSR/Germany/Japan) in WW2 to be considered truly tested.

I think Rommel outclasses most of the names here though. Funny how Patton or Monty tried to reach his fame while having far more resources, tanks, equipment and men. A true general does wonders in the harshest conditions. Everyone is a good general when he has everything he needs, when he needs.

the world would have probably been a better place if von Kluge had shot him... Just saying.

You wot mate?

Everyone is a good general when he has everything he needs, when he needs.

Ensuring that you have all that is part of what makes you a Good General...

Wingate also had Churchill's ear, and used it.

This is not the sort of thing that endears you to your fellow officers or commanders



Wingate's career also gets tied in with his status in Israel; so at best you can describe him as "Controversial"

Wingate also had Churchill's ear, and used it.

This is not the sort of thing that endears you to your fellow officers or commanders

'symbiotic relationship' springs to mind.

Wingate's career also gets tied in with his status in Israel; so at best you can describe him as "Controversial"

Agreed. Had he lived, you could see him as another Chaim Herzog.

I'm not a Nazi but I think many SS officers kicked some serious butt in the war. Unfortunatly they're only seen as the bad guys, without noticing their impressive military succes with very limited resources (their cutt-off harassed all the time and still comeback in Coh2) Jochen Peiper made a great job in my opinion.

I have even more respect for many Soviet Commanders, espacially considering that they had to have succes at all costs. Chuikov stands for many many brave and patriotic officers in the Red Army ...

Wehrmacht? Well in the end they hade too many Hitler followers instead of true tacticians like in the first part of the war ... definitly a reason for Germany's tragic downfall.

Its interesting that the Soviet Commanders became stronger and stronger during the war, while Hitler lost the confidence in his ( mostly excellent)officer corps.

The SS was not a serious factor in the war until 1943 meaning they missed out of leading most of the greatest battles. Most of the battles/campaigns they were in (43-45), they lost. So this statement is frankly odd. The regular army had a better combat record than the SS throughout the war.

1.SSLAH saw its peak in WW2 fighting in 43' until it was badly damaged in the ukraine by early 44', operating at a lower level until the end of the war. Peiper was a war criminal and not an outstanding leader.

I'm not a Nazi but I think many SS officers kicked some serious butt in the war. Unfortunatly they're only seen as the bad guys, without noticing their impressive military succes with very limited resources (their cutt-off harassed all the time and still comeback in Coh2) Jochen Peiper made a great job in my opinion.

Wehrmacht? Well in the end they hade too many Hitler followers instead of true tacticians like in the first part of the war ... definitly a reason for Germany's tragic downfall.

No it weren't Hitler's followers he just took over the commander-in-chief position and gave a shit about the opinion of his best Generals although he was as skilled as a general as my favorite pet rock.

Ensuring that you have all that is part of what makes you a Good General...

Ensuring that you have a that is not your job as a general. It's politicians and economists' job.

Ensuring that you have a that is not your job as a general. It's politicians and economists' job.

Wrong

As to Jochen Peiper, there is a fairly recent biographical dissertation (2014) on him from Jens Westemeier which I would urge reading. A few things:
Peiper was in deep with the Nazi hierarchy, he had been Himmlers adjutant and had explicit knowledge of Aktion T4 and later the Shoah. Heck, his own brother was very likely murdered in T4 but that seems not to have overly disturbed him, and I could go on here. While he has gained some notoriety for Malmedy, where, while having command responsibility, he quite likely did not play any direct role btw, he demonstrably had PoWs murdered in cold blood by the hundreds as a matter of policy over several months on the Eastern Front, to the point where that alarmed his own peers and superiors. To cut a very long story short, Peiper was a very disturbing character even by the standards of the SS....

As for his leadership and tactical qualification, he undoubtedly eventually became a skilled SPW bataillon leader, gaining a number of significant successes especially with night attacks on the Eastern Front. However, when he assumed command of the Leibstandarte tank regiment, his limitations became obvious as he had no experience or training in handling tank formations and reputedly proved little tactical adroit. In consequence, lossess soared to completely unacceptable levels, making him quite unpopular with both his men and his fellow commanders.