with the previous discussion of logistics. it made me ponder what extent the efforts of the RAF and USAF had on logistics and infrastructure during the european theater and if a large impact, to what extent it may've hampered the long term invasion logistics.
A complicated question with a lot of moving parts. At the time they overestimated the success of the bombing campaigns so it is quite likely that resources could have gone to better uses, but you don't really know those things except with 20/20 hindsight.
Certainly they did a lot of damage to industry and infrastructure. Moving production from large scale factories to (essentially) a cottage industry will certainly impede efficiency as well as quality, inventory control, etc. Damaging the road and rail networks, impeding daytime travel, all have the effect of degrading your enemy.
Then there is the question of where else you would be using those materials and resources. I am not sure where all the aluminum would be used, and certainly the use of car factories for the production of planes didn't limit the US making a ton of cars, trucks, ships or anything else. In fact the Avenger torpedo bomber got picked up by GM because they needed things to do in their now shut car factories.
There also doesn't seem to be a shortage of fuel. While the Allies in France stalled do to fuel shortages at the front this was mostly because of transportation and supply limitations within France. There were stockpiles of stuff in Cherbourg and off the the beaches. (Though had supply been even better they might have found out they were using those stockpiles quicker than they could be replenished, and possibly found that fuel in England was in short supply because of use for aviation gas. It is all about the bottlenecks.)
Then there are the men. Certainly bomber and fighter crews were better than average, but I don't know that the numbers of those qualify as huge. A 1,000 US bomber raid means only 10,000 men, less than a US division, and many of them are "just" gunners. There were already 30 divisions in France in the beginning of fall, '44. Not just that, but as I stated above, though not as effective as first thought, the air forces didn't have NO effect.
Then there are outliers like the Mosquito fighter/bomber. It was designed from the outset to use skills and resources for which there was a surplus in England (wood and skilled woodworkers & cabinet makers). They designed it to be made in an already existing cottage industry and ended up with a superlative plane that on its maiden flight was 20 mph faster than a Spitfire and with the range of a bomber. Almost 8,000 were made during the war. I don't think there was a role for planes that it wasn't used for (including fighter).
While using all those resources for the invasion might have made it materially possible to invade sooner, I don't think it would have been a year sooner, and it just wasn't likely that anyone would attempt an invasion across the English channel except in more clement weather (so May, June, July, or August). And they probably would not have been ready in August of '43 as the US had only been at war 1 1/2 years at that point.