WW2 Documents, Myths and Facts

Jump back to quoted post16 Apr 2015, 06:07 AMsomenbjorn

While it is true losses where caused by always attacking, I do not agree that it is because of the "aggressiveness" in it self. But rather the lack of proper recon, proper support, coordination, composition of forces and logistical supply during advances by tank forces that caused the losses.

... I was under the impression that aggressiveness with tank forces are thought to yield less losses than caution of advance?
The so called 'Blitzkrieg' being the classical example of the idea.
....
So I don't disagree with you, I just believe that simply saying aggressiveness is an oversimplification that might give people the impression that aggressive use of armour is a poor choice.
(Well yes it is if you don't have recon, support, composition, logistics etc, )

Jump back to quoted post16 Apr 2015, 20:26 PMAvNY

In this case I think "aggressiveness" means the side that is attacking/on the move.

Studies after the war showed that the side that was able to get the positioning for the first good shot was the one likely to win the engagement. I know you are looking for a kind of Russians-were-oprationally-and-tactically-less-sophisticated-leading-to-greater-loss but soemtimes it really is as simple as the attacker will lose more unless the attack is operationally brilliant (by surprise, from behind, etc.)

Even overwhelming force isn't a guarantee of low losses or a fast breakthrough. The US infantry divisions in the Ardennes were green (102nd) or inexperienced (99th) and spread much too thinly, yet were able to delay, sometimes significantly, the "overwhelming" power of a Panzer army that outnumbered them greatly.

Likewise the British were not operational neophytes at Caen, and had the greater armor size, but they were going up against an organized defense. (Look up Operation Goodwood).

The army on defense generally knows the terrain better. More than that, they can use AT guns effectively, something the attacker can't. And they get to choose when enough is enough and bug out of there with as much intact equipment as possible.

Jump back to quoted post16 Apr 2015, 20:26 PMAvNY

The army on defense generally knows the terrain better. More than that, they can use AT guns effectively, something the attacker can't. And they get to choose when enough is enough and bug out of there with as much intact equipment as possible.

Jump back to quoted post16 Apr 2015, 20:45 PMsomenbjorn

And yes I agree again with you, simply saying soviets where operationally and tactically less sophisticated is a huge oversimplification and in some instances would be simply false. I do hope I did not come off as trying to build that narrative.

French tanks were better than German ones

French planes were good enough to fight German one

French soldiers were well prepared to fight

Jump back to quoted post24 Apr 2015, 15:27 PMDasDoomTurtle

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Jump back to quoted post27 Apr 2015, 12:57 PMEsxile

So french tanks were better, but wrongly use following an outdated doctrine. It is what I said and what is explained in the video.

The production of Dewoitine was increasing, the main problem here is again an outdated air doctrine.

Germany didn't have much more professional army than France or UK. They had some more experience maybe from their earliest eastern conquest, but nothing big since they didn't meet any modern army around there. The Spanish war probably gave us much more experience than the first month of the WWII.
French soldiers were 90% from conscription, nothing new here and France came from waaay behind in term of military equipment at the declaration of war. What France achieved in the short time between the declaration and its effective start, design and production of tanks and planes, is quite impressive in fact.

The document try to put back this information in place. The defeat still have important psychological effect today here and people tend to believe its because of a lack of will from French soldiers more than an association of failure from French military and political leaders.

Jump back to quoted post27 Apr 2015, 13:18 PMDasDoomTurtle

French tanks were only better on paper. They were only able to beat the Germans during the 1% chance of engagement that happened on their terms. Tactics win fights and the French had Tactics 20years old.
The German Army was not conscripted as much as it was full of able body volunteers. You can not win a war with an army that is 90% conscripted. If men don't want to fight they will show that on the battlefield. The failure of the French was just as much upon the Military and Political Leaders as it was the individual. Furthermore the defeat goes beyond French and lands on the British for allowing it to fail because they were unwilling to acknowledge the potential of the new German Army and thus failed to adequately prepare their forces as well.

Jump back to quoted post27 Apr 2015, 15:11 PMEsxile

Germany lost the war at the end, with their professional soldiers and biggest tanks in the same fashion. So I don't know what you try to point out. Tigers and Panthers were better than ally counter part as individual as French tanks were better than earlier German ones. Doctrines and air superiority build the edge.

Jump back to quoted post27 Apr 2015, 15:11 PMEsxile

Germany lost the war at the end, with their professional soldiers and biggest tanks in the same fashion. So I don't know what you try to point out. Tigers and Panthers were better than ally counter part as individual as French tanks were better than earlier German ones. Doctrines and air superiority build the edge.

Jump back to quoted post19 May 2015, 16:44 PMcoh2player

Unfortunately no. The 'professionalism' of the German Army decreased a lot after the battle of France due to having to establish something like ~50+ new divisions for Barbarossa, and with the doubling of the number of panzer divisions.

From experience reading in 1941-1942 the officer/nco cadre was still acceptable with Barbarossa seeing the peak standards, but from 43 onward the proportion of trained leadership/specialists to raw recruits in divisions declined dramatically, often by 50% or more. The majority of officers/ncos were only reservists.