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WW2 Documents, Myths and Facts

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16 Apr 2015, 20:26 PM
#101
avatar of AvNY

Posts: 862

In this case I think "aggressiveness" means the side that is attacking/on the move.

Studies after the war showed that the side that was able to get the positioning for the first good shot was the one likely to win the engagement. I know you are looking for a kind of Russians-were-oprationally-and-tactically-less-sophisticated-leading-to-greater-loss but soemtimes it really is as simple as the attacker will lose more unless the attack is operationally brilliant (by surprise, from behind, etc.)

Even overwhelming force isn't a guarantee of low losses or a fast breakthrough. The US infantry divisions in the Ardennes were green (102nd) or inexperienced (99th) and spread much too thinly, yet were able to delay, sometimes significantly, the "overwhelming" power of a Panzer army that outnumbered them greatly.

Likewise the British were not operational neophytes at Caen, and had the greater armor size, but they were going up against an organized defense. (Look up Operation Goodwood).

The army on defense generally knows the terrain better. More than that, they can use AT guns effectively, something the attacker can't. And they get to choose when enough is enough and bug out of there with as much intact equipment as possible.




While it is true losses where caused by always attacking, I do not agree that it is because of the "aggressiveness" in it self. But rather the lack of proper recon, proper support, coordination, composition of forces and logistical supply during advances by tank forces that caused the losses.

... I was under the impression that aggressiveness with tank forces are thought to yield less losses than caution of advance?
The so called 'Blitzkrieg' being the classical example of the idea.
....
So I don't disagree with you, I just believe that simply saying aggressiveness is an oversimplification that might give people the impression that aggressive use of armour is a poor choice.
(Well yes it is if you don't have recon, support, composition, logistics etc, :) )
16 Apr 2015, 20:45 PM
#102
avatar of somenbjorn

Posts: 923

Ohh Im not disagreeing with you, not at all, nor am I disagreeing with coh2player. Yes attacking often leads to heavier losses for the attacker, but not necessarily.

I just wished to clarify for people reading that aggressive use of armour in of itself isn't inherent to lead to more losses. :)

I guess (hope Im not putting words in your mouth) coh2player was pointing out the Soviet idea of always attacking by using the word. [Quantity over attacks over quality as he quite well put it.]

But to me it came off as "aggressiveness" will lose you tanks. While in my opinion that is not necessarily true, but rather being aggressive might actually render less losses than being cautious.
And as such explaining soviet armour losses by 'aggressiveness' might give people the wrong image of armour combat.

And yes I agree again with you, simply saying soviets where operationally and tactically less sophisticated is a huge oversimplification and in some instances would be simply false. I do hope I did not come off as trying to build that narrative.

Ps. Yes I do understand that that it is easier to just use one word instead of several posts to explain basically the same thing. But historiography among the general public is bad enough as it is :)

jump backJump back to quoted post16 Apr 2015, 20:26 PMAvNY
In this case I think "aggressiveness" means the side that is attacking/on the move.

Studies after the war showed that the side that was able to get the positioning for the first good shot was the one likely to win the engagement. I know you are looking for a kind of Russians-were-oprationally-and-tactically-less-sophisticated-leading-to-greater-loss but soemtimes it really is as simple as the attacker will lose more unless the attack is operationally brilliant (by surprise, from behind, etc.)

Even overwhelming force isn't a guarantee of low losses or a fast breakthrough. The US infantry divisions in the Ardennes were green (102nd) or inexperienced (99th) and spread much too thinly, yet were able to delay, sometimes significantly, the "overwhelming" power of a Panzer army that outnumbered them greatly.

Likewise the British were not operational neophytes at Caen, and had the greater armor size, but they were going up against an organized defense. (Look up Operation Goodwood).

The army on defense generally knows the terrain better. More than that, they can use AT guns effectively, something the attacker can't. And they get to choose when enough is enough and bug out of there with as much intact equipment as possible.


16 Apr 2015, 21:03 PM
#103
avatar of coh2player

Posts: 1571

Zhukov's principle as stavka representative was this: “In fierce combat, it
is far better to suffer losses and achieve your mission than not to achieve any sort
of aims and suffer losses every day by marking time in place from day to day under
enemy fire.”

The Soviets were very aggressive- their doctrine was essentially attacking as a form of defense. If you actually count their number of attacks even in 41' and 42' they outnumber the Germans. However, their results were inferior as their individual attack 'quality' was less. Basically, lots of weaker, short-ranged attacks that lead to large cumulative losses. This evident if you study a battle from a day to day basis. The Germans prepare more carefully between each attack op. and thus have fewer numbers of stronger attacks. German doctrine was obsessed with maneuver and encirclement and tried to get these from every battle level.


With the Ardennes & Normandy example- the German army's quality, logistics,& training had declined a great deal in both absolute and relative terms so the performance was not good in both battle grounds. This lead to many local defeats. Logistics, besides organization dictates the tactics available as well.
16 Apr 2015, 21:26 PM
#104
avatar of coh2player

Posts: 1571

In the battle of Kursk it would seem that the powerful Soviet defensive rings would have bleed the Germans white very quickly. However, it was in fact the Germans that were inflicting grave losses on them although their own losses began to pile up as they cleared each ring.

The reason in hindsight is obvious: The Germans had trained to take out these defenses for three months and had aerial photographs. They also had local air, armor, and fire supremacy at point of contact.

jump backJump back to quoted post16 Apr 2015, 20:26 PMAvNY

The army on defense generally knows the terrain better. More than that, they can use AT guns effectively, something the attacker can't. And they get to choose when enough is enough and bug out of there with as much intact equipment as possible.


16 Apr 2015, 22:21 PM
#105
avatar of coh2player

Posts: 1571

The Soviets were not strategically/operationally less sophisticated- it was really at the tactical area where they had trouble, which led to the losses. So they weren't perfect. This is based on how they prioritized their scarce national resources and certain policies in their doctrine. Bagration- L'vov was a powerful offensive but with higher formation quality and combat flexibility they could have lowered their own losses & increased the ease in which the operations proceeded.

This is why reading unit histories are important, as it gives a sense of what units are capable of. This knowledge can then be applied to further understand operational history.


And yes I agree again with you, simply saying soviets where operationally and tactically less sophisticated is a huge oversimplification and in some instances would be simply false. I do hope I did not come off as trying to build that narrative.
22 Apr 2015, 11:09 AM
#106
avatar of Esxile

Posts: 3602 | Subs: 1

Probably the best documentary made over the French defeat in 1940.
Unfortunately for many here, it is in French and I can't find a sub version.

The document is from the 70` and goes into details of the reasons why France has been defeated son badly in that short period of time.

1- It interviews politics and generals (dead today) that were there during those events and provide really interesting insights over the politic and military strategy of France in 1939-1940 which lead us into this big failure. It describes quite well how the French military head was completely outdated and that before a failure of the army, it has been a failure of its head.

2- It shows the general feeling of French people in 1939 and the fear and sequels the 1st world war had left to those people. You can have a perception of egoism looking at how they try anything they could (including abandoning allies countries) just to not go in war.

After the war and until now, French are still thinking they lost the war because the German army was better, had better tanks, better planes better anything. And this feeling has been promoted all this time by the French politic and military class in order to mask this other reality, the failure of the French elite. French tanks were better than German ones, French planes were good enough to fight German ones and French soldiers were well prepared to fight. But all of those has been badly lead all this time.

This doc is quite unique and if someone has the capacity to sub it in English, it would probably have a large audience.
24 Apr 2015, 15:27 PM
#107
avatar of DasDoomTurtle

Posts: 438

French tanks were better than German ones


The French tanks were only better in all around armor thickness and sometimes gun caliber. While they did win Tank on Tank ( Battle of Hannut ) they were often ignored by the German Tanks. The French tanks were "INFANTRY SUPPORT". The French did not develop tanks to serve in their own tank divisions like the Germans. Therefore the Germans just "bypassed" the French tanks and took out their support. Without support the French tanks became "slime pickens" for the German AT/Artillery/Air Support.

French planes were good enough to fight German one


Only the French Dewoitine D.520 could compete with the German Fighter planes. The RAF supplied Hurricanes to an extent but the French superior numbers were over matched because of the outdatedness of their air force.

French soldiers were well prepared to fight


The French soldiers were prepared but ill-equipped and those whom were well equipped were on the very limited number of Professional Divisions. Most of the French infantry were made up of reserve soldiers. In alot of cases it was professional soldiers (German) vs. French Reserves whom were commanded by incompetent leaders.

27 Apr 2015, 12:57 PM
#108
avatar of Esxile

Posts: 3602 | Subs: 1


...

So french tanks were better, but wrongly use following an outdated doctrine. It is what I said and what is explained in the video.

The production of Dewoitine was increasing, the main problem here is again an outdated air doctrine.

Germany didn't have much more professional army than France or UK. They had some more experience maybe from their earliest eastern conquest, but nothing big since they didn't meet any modern army around there. The Spanish war probably gave us much more experience than the first month of the WWII.
French soldiers were 90% from conscription, nothing new here and France came from waaay behind in term of military equipment at the declaration of war. What France achieved in the short time between the declaration and its effective start, design and production of tanks and planes, is quite impressive in fact.

The document try to put back this information in place. The defeat still have important psychological effect today here and people tend to believe its because of a lack of will from French soldiers more than an association of failure from French military and political leaders.
27 Apr 2015, 13:18 PM
#109
avatar of DasDoomTurtle

Posts: 438

jump backJump back to quoted post27 Apr 2015, 12:57 PMEsxile

So french tanks were better, but wrongly use following an outdated doctrine. It is what I said and what is explained in the video.

The production of Dewoitine was increasing, the main problem here is again an outdated air doctrine.

Germany didn't have much more professional army than France or UK. They had some more experience maybe from their earliest eastern conquest, but nothing big since they didn't meet any modern army around there. The Spanish war probably gave us much more experience than the first month of the WWII.
French soldiers were 90% from conscription, nothing new here and France came from waaay behind in term of military equipment at the declaration of war. What France achieved in the short time between the declaration and its effective start, design and production of tanks and planes, is quite impressive in fact.

The document try to put back this information in place. The defeat still have important psychological effect today here and people tend to believe its because of a lack of will from French soldiers more than an association of failure from French military and political leaders.


French tanks were only better on paper. They were only able to beat the Germans during the 1% chance of engagement that happened on their terms. Tactics win fights and the French had Tactics 20years old.
The German Army was not conscripted as much as it was full of able body volunteers. You can not win a war with an army that is 90% conscripted. If men don't want to fight they will show that on the battlefield. The failure of the French was just as much upon the Military and Political Leaders as it was the individual. Furthermore the defeat goes beyond French and lands on the British for allowing it to fail because they were unwilling to acknowledge the potential of the new German Army and thus failed to adequately prepare their forces as well.
27 Apr 2015, 15:11 PM
#110
avatar of Esxile

Posts: 3602 | Subs: 1



French tanks were only better on paper. They were only able to beat the Germans during the 1% chance of engagement that happened on their terms. Tactics win fights and the French had Tactics 20years old.
The German Army was not conscripted as much as it was full of able body volunteers. You can not win a war with an army that is 90% conscripted. If men don't want to fight they will show that on the battlefield. The failure of the French was just as much upon the Military and Political Leaders as it was the individual. Furthermore the defeat goes beyond French and lands on the British for allowing it to fail because they were unwilling to acknowledge the potential of the new German Army and thus failed to adequately prepare their forces as well.


Germany lost the war at the end, with their professional soldiers and biggest tanks in the same fashion. So I don't know what you try to point out. Tigers and Panthers were better than ally counter part as individual as French tanks were better than earlier German ones. Doctrines and air superiority build the edge.


27 Apr 2015, 15:43 PM
#111
avatar of somenbjorn

Posts: 923

jump backJump back to quoted post27 Apr 2015, 15:11 PMEsxile


Germany lost the war at the end, with their professional soldiers and biggest tanks in the same fashion. So I don't know what you try to point out. Tigers and Panthers were better than ally counter part as individual as French tanks were better than earlier German ones. Doctrines and air superiority build the edge.




Agreed. Again it is the same thing as was discussed before. Superior tactics is not nearly as important as superior strategy.
The historical Model Esxile is points that both the strategy and tactics where outdated and this is the key point into looking at the French defeat in 1940s.
As opposed to the classical model that claims equipment, fighting will and capabilities of the soldiers as key points.


Regarding tactics 'vs' strategy, It was, as I understand it, one of the Germans greatest flaw. Lack of clear strategic mindset, thinking that if they just won battles they would win the war. However in industrialized warfare the ability to stall, harass and bleed is just as important as it is to be able to mobilize your industry and fully utilize the entirety. The latter two German was never really capable of doing until it was to late. And then more as a result of panic than of anything else.
27 Apr 2015, 17:39 PM
#112
avatar of coh2player

Posts: 1571

The German high command was aware that losing the war was probable in 1942- Minister of Armaments Fritz Todt concluded that the war was lost quite early on in 1941. Barbarossa and Typhoon was where everything was decided. But as members of nazi government, they could not surrender, which lead to everything thereafter. So strategically they were aware that they were in deep trouble at the earliest in 41' and at the latest, in 42' after the encirclement of Stalingrad. Everything after that made little to no strategic, and increasingly, operational sense. They were trying to delay their opponents with no real plan of winning.

Germany, and their axis allies, were obviously too small economically to fight multiple powers in the long run.
15 May 2015, 22:20 PM
#113
avatar of NinjaWJ

Posts: 2070

jump backJump back to quoted post27 Apr 2015, 15:11 PMEsxile


Germany lost the war at the end, with their professional soldiers and biggest tanks in the same fashion. So I don't know what you try to point out. Tigers and Panthers were better than ally counter part as individual as French tanks were better than earlier German ones. Doctrines and air superiority build the edge.


18 May 2015, 04:56 AM
#114
avatar of coh2player

Posts: 1571

According to 'Germany and WW2' series, the Ostheer's officers were ~50% professional in the armored, mountain, and (mot.) infantry. The rest were 35-10% professionals, with the remainder reserve.

This was June 22, 1941- the apogee of (1941-1945). The professionals disappeared as the war went on due to very high leadership losses.
19 May 2015, 08:28 AM
#115
avatar of somenbjorn

Posts: 923

Do you happen to have corresponding figures for NCOs? I ve heard multiple times of talk that the loss of experienced NCOs was considered a serious problem as the war progressed and it would be nice to see some figures.
19 May 2015, 16:44 PM
#118
avatar of coh2player

Posts: 1571

Unfortunately no. The 'professionalism' of the German Army decreased a lot after the battle of France due to having to establish something like ~50+ new divisions for Barbarossa, and with the doubling of the number of panzer divisions.

From experience reading in 1941-1942 the officer/nco cadre was still acceptable with Barbarossa seeing the peak standards, but from 43 onward the proportion of trained leadership/specialists to raw recruits in divisions declined dramatically, often by 50% or more. The majority of officers/ncos were only reservists.
19 May 2015, 17:59 PM
#119
avatar of DasDoomTurtle

Posts: 438

While I can not speak for the German Army as a whole, I can speak for a unit in which I had family serve. They did lack heavily in "good" officers by wars end for the "professionalism" was gone. However, there was never a lack of NCO's until '45 when there was not many men, just boys. He stated that in early years the NCO was just has heavily trained as the officers. Toward the end NCO's were promoted constantly as men with war experience become the NCO replacements.

TLDR: There was never a shortage of NCO's because there was always combat experienced men to move up. There was a shortage of good Officers because there was never enough experienced NCO's to move up.
19 May 2015, 19:28 PM
#120
avatar of CasTroy

Posts: 559

Unfortunately no. The 'professionalism' of the German Army decreased a lot after the battle of France due to having to establish something like ~50+ new divisions for Barbarossa, and with the doubling of the number of panzer divisions.

From experience reading in 1941-1942 the officer/nco cadre was still acceptable with Barbarossa seeing the peak standards, but from 43 onward the proportion of trained leadership/specialists to raw recruits in divisions declined dramatically, often by 50% or more. The majority of officers/ncos were only reservists.


Do you have any evidence or sources that can prove your thesis?

I mean, the reason why there could have been a possible lack of "professionalism" could be the result of changes i. e. in the officers training courses, instructor corpse with only theoretical knowledge in the end of the war, contraction of the education of NCO´s, and so on...
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