WW2 Documents, Myths and Facts

Combat statics can also be misleading as they often list hard numbers and fail to take into account the complex realities of large operations (i.e. terrain, offensive, defensive, reasons behind a certain action)

Life and war are complicated, its hard to list stats and causality numbers and get a real idea for how something actually happened. Both sides fought bravely with what they had, often the outcome of a battle was out of the average soldiers hands long before the first shot is even fired.

To every soldier the most important part of the war is that which is in his field of hearing and vision. To the guy in an M4 whose shell just bounced off of the Panther, his vehicle is a piece of crap built by the lowest bidder. But being under fire MAKES the memory that much more important. If you ask the guy in the Panther if it was worth it to have that design then the answer will depend.... Did it bounce the shell and then die to the M18 that hid in ambust and hit it in the side? Then no. Did it destroy the M4 and then break down while trying to get away from the other 3 M4s in the platoon? Did the other Panthers and PIVs in his regiment run out of gas or break down before this engagement? Both soldiers, being in a position where people were shooting at them, are going to be prone to cursing their kit. But one of them is going to win the battle. Guess which side the soldier would rather be on.

built by the lowest bidder.

The sad truth; I would love to research more about how these respective militaries decided on the tanks they ended up using and I would love to see the other options that could of been.

German steel Quality according this book wasn't as bad as some believe

I am not sure that that is what this caption is saying.

Steel, like many materials, has benefits and weaknesses. The softer it is, the less brittle and vice versa. The higher the grade (and often the harder and more expensive it is to produce) the more likely that the tradeoffs are fewer. In both those cases it is possible that the grades of the Ausf. D were also lower but that they found the more harder, more brittle steel was not as preferable to a softer and in neither case was a harder AND less brittle option available. (I know a little about steel, not a lot.)

What would also be interesting would be any notation about "spalling". A round that creates spalling (and some, HESH rounds, were designed later on when they became aware of spalling) can kill the crew and/or disable the tank without ever penetrating.

Also here is a picture of a Panther turret not penetrated by 75mm rounds (note the three dents) yet the combined impacts cracked the Turret:

"The side of a Panther tank turret, cracked by three glancing blows of 75 mm HE, June 1944.

Photograph by Major W H J Sale, 3rd/4th County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters), World War Two, North West Europe, 1944.

The three hits from 3rd/4th County Shermans killed the turret crew, but apart from cracking the thick armour plating did no other damage to the tank.

From an album containing 210 photographs compiled by Major W H J Sale, MC, 3rd/4th County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters), 1944."

http://www.nam.ac.uk/online-collection/detail.php?acc=1975-03-63-18-162

By the time of the Normandy campaign, the logistical, material, and most importantly numerical superiority of the Allies had grown so massive as to make these musings largely academic anyways. In retrospect, it is fairly surprising and difficult for the historian to plausibly explain as to why the Germans managed to contain the Allies as long as they did, especially seeing as the German strategical dispositions were mediocre at best, but they had no chance of winning the campaign whatsoever.

The sad truth; I would love to research more about how these respective militaries decided on the tanks they ended up using and I would love to see the other options that could of been.

There is actually quite a bit on US and British tanks on the web, and even in the wikipedia pages on the various tanks they used. Often there were design and manufacturing considerations with prototypes. Sometimes the new wonder-weapon like prototypes didn't perform up to standard. The difference between the US and the Germans is they didn't go into production unless they knew what would come off the line was producible and serviceable (see the development of the Pershing or the Comet as a case-in-point).

By the time of the Normandy campaign, the logistical, material, and most importantly numerical superiority of the Allies had grown so massive as to make these musings largely academic anyways. In retrospect, it is fairly surprising and difficult for the historian to plausibly explain as to why the Germans managed to contain the Allies as long as they did, especially seeing as the German strategical dispositions were mediocre at best, but they had no chance of winning the campaign whatsoever.

I think it is simple matter of geography and logistics.

In the East The Russians weren't on par with the Germans until sometime in '43. Then they had to cover 1200-1500 km against a competent resisting opponent (not like '41 Soviets or '40 France) when no one covered more than 400-700 in an offensive on a given front, which often took weeks, and then have to stop for months to replenish and reorganize. And offensives in the winter would cover less ground and were longer to replenish.

In the west the allies had to have enough logistics stockpiled in England and then they had to cross the Channel. Prior to WWII no resisted beach landing had ever been successful, and this beach landing knew that after landing they would have to confront a panzer counter attack. The Bocage cost them a few extra weeks and their logistics were better than the German logistics in '40/41 so they were able to cover all of France and the low countries in their first "offensive", but then they too had to stop to replenish and reorganize.

I just don't think faster was possible. Not against a resistant and experienced defense no matter how overmatched.

I would love to have seen a doctrinal 'fair fight' (US, UK/CW vs. 44' Wehr/SS) in 1944 but I never found any. Hence, I moved "East", lol.

I think it is simple matter of geography and logistics.

In the East The Russians weren't on par with the Germans until sometime in '43. Then they had to cover 1200-1500 km against a competent resisting opponent (not like '41 Soviets or '40 France) when no one covered more than 400-700 in an offensive on a given front, which often took weeks, and then have to stop for months to replenish and reorganize. And offensives in the winter would cover less ground and were longer to replenish.

In the west the allies had to have enough logistics stockpiled in England and then they had to cross the Channel. Prior to WWII no resisted beach landing had ever been successful, and this beach landing knew that after landing they would have to confront a panzer counter attack. The Bocage cost them a few extra weeks and their logistics were better than the German logistics in '40/41 so they were able to cover all of France and the low countries in their first "offensive", but then they too had to stop to replenish and reorganize.

I just don't think faster was possible. Not against a resistant and experienced defense no matter how overmatched.

Nah, I certainly disagree.
Obviously any monocausal explanation will lack sufficient explanatory plausibility, but if you ie. consider the volume of logistical support, speed of advance, etc. of the Allied push through France and into Germany after the German defeat in Normandy, the conclusion is hard to avoid that other factors were at least as significant as "mere" logistical shortcomings, and the same applies to some degree to the Eastern theatre. I think its hard to avoid the conclusion that there was grosso modo a certain lack of initiative and overall operational timidity in the Western Allies' generalship that prevented them from actually bagging and destroying the German army (instead of "only" routing it) in a similar fashion as ie. the Germans exercised during Fall Gelb, or later in the East. This is all the more glaring as the quantitative factors were disproportionately heavily stacked in the Allied favour, not to mention that their entire armies were mechanised and therefore at least theoretically capable of much faster movement than the largely foot/horsemobile bulk of the Wehrmacht.
Looking only at the range of any given advance here is IMO quite misleading; speed is every bit as important a factor, and on average, the Western Allies were never quite able to match the speed of the PzAOKs in the East, despite operating on much more favourable infrastructure and facing much weaker opposition.

Nah, I certainly disagree.
Obviously any monocausal explanation will lack sufficient explanatory plausibility, but if you ie. consider the volume of logistical support, speed of advance, etc. of the Allied push through France and into Germany after the German defeat in Normandy, the conclusion is hard to avoid that other factors were at least as significant as "mere" logistical shortcomings, and the same applies to some degree to the Eastern theatre. I think its hard to avoid the conclusion that there was grosso modo a certain lack of initiative and overall operational timidity in the Western Allies' generalship that prevented them from actually bagging and destroying the German army (instead of "only" routing it) in a similar fashion as ie. the Germans exercised during Fall Gelb, or later in the East. This is all the more glaring as the quantitative factors were disproportionately heavily stacked in the Allied favour, not to mention that their entire armies were mechanised and therefore at least theoretically capable of much faster movement than the largely foot/horsemobile bulk of the Wehrmacht.
Looking only at the range of any given advance here is IMO quite misleading; speed is every bit as important a factor, and on average, the Western Allies were never quite able to match the speed of the PzAOKs in the East, despite operating on much more favourable infrastructure and facing much weaker opposition.

they still won. in less than 1 year since the landing. i think that is fast enough. maybe they hit critical mass and anymore really couldnt do much.

im no expert like many here.

anyway, the website is fun to read. not sure about credibility though. but really, any historical debate goes like "your sources is wrong but mine isn't". so who knows.

Nah, I certainly disagree.
Obviously any monocausal explanation will lack sufficient explanatory plausibility, but if you ie. consider the volume of logistical support, speed of advance, etc. of the Allied push through France and into Germany after the German defeat in Normandy, the conclusion is hard to avoid that other factors were at least as significant as "mere" logistical shortcomings, and the same applies to some degree to the Eastern theatre. I think its hard to avoid the conclusion that there was grosso modo a certain lack of initiative and overall operational timidity in the Western Allies' generalship that prevented them from actually bagging and destroying the German army (instead of "only" routing it) in a similar fashion as ie. the Germans exercised during Fall Gelb, or later in the East. This is all the more glaring as the quantitative factors were disproportionately heavily stacked in the Allied favour, not to mention that their entire armies were mechanised and therefore at least theoretically capable of much faster movement than the largely foot/horsemobile bulk of the Wehrmacht.
Looking only at the range of any given advance here is IMO quite misleading; speed is every bit as important a factor, and on average, the Western Allies were never quite able to match the speed of the PzAOKs in the East, despite operating on much more favourable infrastructure and facing much weaker opposition.

And yet all the evidence proves otherwise... There wasn't enough materiele to go around in September to go around. To extend your columns without assured supplies of fuel and ammunition with a still dangerous enemy on your flanks is unwise.

They probably did have enough to push on one flank (3rd Army/Patton or 8th Army/Montgomery) and it was probably the wrong choice (militarily) to go with the Brits, but they certainly didn't have enough for more than that. They didn't have any real ports other than Cherbourg (on the wrong side of Normandy) and the rail networks were a shambles due to allied bombing. THe allies had captured ANtwerp by the end of August, but they didn't hold the Scheldt estuary, which took the Canadians I think almost another two months of brutal fighting to capture.

In September/October US artillery batteries were even ordered to ration their rounds. Sure they had great logistics, but the very nature of the mechanised formations also meant they needed more fuel, and they needed fuel to transport the fuel, all while new formations were continuously landing in Normandy, also needing to be transported AND supplied. There is a reason we have the story of the Red Ball Express.

The part I never got was why after the Bulge they had to push it out instead of cutting it off. That winter campaign was rough on the GIs, rougher than it needed to be since winter warfare precludes a lot of your advantages of air and mobility.

anyway, the website is fun to read. not sure about credibility though. but really, any historical debate goes like "your sources is wrong but mine isn't". so who knows.

Sometimes both are (or aren't).

This site has encouraged me to do more reading and research. That was how I hit on the "any push has limits to how far it goes" theory. It just seemed to be that way with German advances as much as allied ones (including Soviet). You break out, are chasing unprepared and routing enemies, but you can't exploit that phase beyond the reach of your supply lines and support. The Germans experienced it in France and multiple times in Russia. The Allies in France. The Soviets in their pushes to Berlin. German logisticians even predicted this prior to Barbarossa (they estimated a 700km max advance before resupply would cause a halt).

^^

The key "disappointment" with the W.Allied victory 44-45 is the lack of rapid, 1939-1942 Wehrmacht type encirclements which would have shorted the campaign by months. I think this is also evident at the operational and tactical level with the lack of rapid prisoner bags at the 100-30,000 and 10,000 scale.

There is the repeated argument that the Western Allies were logistically bottlenecked after the Normandy breakout and the relative scarcity of harbour capacity was an obvious obstacle, but to put things into perspective, I think there was no point in the campaign where the Allied soldier on average did not have many times the weight in logistics of his counterpart backing him up. Of course, on the other hand, the Allied formations, being fully mechanised, had higher requirements, but then again, they also enjoyed far greater mobility and organic firepower. Again, its not so much distance as it is speed that gains operational results. Considering the force ratio and topography the lack of decisive Allied results in France and the low countries is hard to explain on "mere" logistical concerns when put to comparison with the "offensive" years of the Wehrmacht.

American military command is logistics and combat system design centered rather than operational art in the Napoleonic/Prussian sense. American society and political culture is extremely sensitive to casualties and taking massive military risks at the scale of Hitler-types. Fall Gelb/Fall Rot, Plan Barbarossa would be an instant 'no-go' given how razor edge these plans were.

The idea of housing permanent General Staff with its own entrenched interests (backed up by a military class) is completely in opposition to American political culture. The benefits of such an entity with its operational arts and risk taking were forgone as with its tyrannical aspects.

There is the repeated argument that the Western Allies were logistically bottlenecked after the Normandy breakout and the relative scarcity of harbour capacity was an obvious obstacle, but to put things into perspective, I think there was no point in the campaign where the Allied soldier on average did not have many times the weight in logistics of his counterpart backing him up. Of course, on the other hand, the Allied formations, being fully mechanised, had higher requirements, but then again, they also enjoyed far greater mobility and organic firepower. Again, its not so much distance as it is speed that gains operational results. Considering the force ratio and topography the lack of decisive Allied results in France and the low countries is hard to explain on "mere" logistical concerns when put to comparison with the "offensive" years of the Wehrmacht.

Shortages were definitely a problem durin the Sept - Dec. period. Here is one caption I found in which artillery shells were rationed and also the total rounds fired during one 4 week period:

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/usarmy/artillery.aspx

"Although US artillery was second to none in the war, problems with ammunition supply did hamper efficiency at various periods. This problem reached its nadir during the fall of 1944, when the US artillery in Europe was reduced to strict rationing of ammunition. At one point, the artillery was limited to fewer than twenty 105mm rounds-per-day-per-gun. From 11 October to 7 November 1944, Third Army fired a total of 76,325 rounds of all types (an average of 2,726 per-day), which was less than the number fired on a single day during the Battle of the Bulge. Indeed, at the end of the Battle of the Bulge, ammunition reserves in the ETO were 31 percent of the War Department's planning levels (which were already conceded to be too low). Like the personnel replacement problem, the ammunition shortage was only truly solved by the ending of the war."

Some more on the Allied supply issue in fall of 1944:
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http://www.historynet.com/red-ball-express

"On both fronts an acute shortage of supplies–that dull subject again!–governed all our operations," General Bradley wrote in his autobiography, A General's Life. "Some twenty-eight divisions were advancing across France and Belgium. Each division ordinarily required 700-750 tons a day–a total daily consumption of about 20,000 tons."
.....
...the Red Ball Express was conceived during a 36-hour brainstorming session among American commanders. Its name came from a railroad phrase–to "red ball" something was to ship it express–and from an earlier Red Ball Express in Britain that rushed supplies to the English ports during the early days of the invasion. The second Red Ball operation lasted barely three months, from August 25 through November 16, 1944, but by the end of those critical months the express line had established itself firmly in the mythology of World War II. More than 6,000 trucks and their trailers transported 412,193 tons of supplies to the advancing American armies from Normandy to the German border.

So the Red Ball Express was transporting some 5,000 tons/day (probably less in the beginning and more towards the end) to divisions needing 20,000 tons when they are on the move.

On some days in late August the US Army recorded fuel usage of 800,000 gallons (that alone is 2,500 tons) and the system for transporting didn't even start until everyone was running out.

They had to scrounge up 6,000 trucks and keep them running. And they were going through tires like crazy. A combination of overloaded trucks, war-ravaged roads, and a 30-35 mph constant speed.

I read in one article (can't find it right now) that at this point and through much of September 3rd Army had its fuel allocations reduced from 400,000 gallons/day to 31,000 with the allocation instead being assigned to US 1st and British 8th Armies for the Northern push over the Rhine. It was later again increased, but that doesn't mean you can move forward. You have to refill the tanks and then stockpile more at/near the front. You have to get them ammunition (remember the artillery is short on ammo) and replace/repair the damaged material.

The US Army had supply issues until they could take Antwerp which then gave them the ability to land supplies closer to the front. Also was one of a few reasons it was a target for the Ardennes Assault. With Antwerp in hand the Allies were able to shorten Red Ball Express route thus increasing the volume of transport in a shorter distance and time.

The US Army had supply issues until they could take Antwerp which then gave them the ability to land supplies closer to the front. Also was one of a few reasons it was a target for the Ardennes Assault. With Antwerp in hand the Allies were able to shorten Red Ball Express route thus increasing the volume of transport in a shorter distance and time.

Well, yes, that is part of the contention I have had all along, that offensives can only last so long as they can keep the forward elements supplied enough to keep moving and with enough "support" (infantry, artillery, supply, etc) keeping up so they don't feel their flanks are ever TOO exposed to constitute a danger.

Once they have to stop for even a few days, particularly with defensive lines before them, it will probably cause a halt in the progress from that breakthrough. They no longer know if the enemey is on the run or has stopped and used the time to re-entrench. Whether the enemy has been reinforced and resupplied, since they are now closer to their home. The advancing units are at the same time themselves weaker. Their supplies are running low, their vehicles are in poorer condition and there are probably far fewer of them then when they started, their ranks are thinner, and they are probably more fatigued. Even in that state they might be in better shape than the enemy. But once they stopped for a few days they no longer know that for sure. And the Allies starting running low and progressing only in fits and starts about the same time they had got to the Seigfried Line/West Wall/German Border, the most natural place for the Wehrmacht to stop its retreat and start again digging in to form a new (and somewhat prepared) defense line.

It is completely natural, and often wise, to pause, refit, reinforce and resupply for a new offensive, particularly if you are the allies and will be stronger when refit than the Wehrmacht will be when it has done its best to resupply.

Operational art is accomplishing what you can with the resources at hand. IIRC the Allies in Normandy did not have a supply flow that was less than the Wehr in Barbarossa.

Barbarossa and Case Blue was also made in phases and with great logistical problems. However, the advances were more impressive, as well as the operational victories. The Germany army in the West was very much a third-rate force- the Wehr had no operational capability of real substance in WW2 since July. 1943.

This extends past the issue to supply and into the asset utilization of the combat forces along with the nature of the command cadre.

The politically incorrect complaint (like popular history Hastings or Ellis (brute force) has in his books) is that the W.Allies expended ammo & fuel too lavishly and attacked in too crude & conservative of a manner, generally by thrusting with heavy firepower expenditure without enough tactical envelopment.

The counterargument often invoked..(the soviets have their own as well) is the theory of 'tactical densities'. This claims that the Germans were too densely packed to allow sophisticated maneuver. I personally think this argument does not hold much ground at all.

The article is " excuse my language " shit. It says it debunks myths but gives no proof. According to the numbers the axis/allied ratio for tanks was around 1:3 .

So the Germans did something right. And before you say something is debunked you first need to explain the reason why the allies suffer a 1:3 ratio.