General World War 2 Discussion Thread

Isn´t that what every souvereign country would do? Preparing to defense itself?

Yes the Weimarer Republic had such co-operations with the SU. But don´t refer from such facts to the conclusion that the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic could reveal the treaty of Versailles or could operate or stand against military operations against countries like Poland or France. This is in fact untrue.

I never held this position? I was pointing out that the Weimar government was planning for the future in ways that might be seen, rather correctly, as subversion of the soul of the law by dancing around the technicalities.

Don´t forget foreign policy target of the Weimar Republic was the acceptance of the treaty of Versailles not it´s Revision as it was under the Fashists in 1933.

They nonetheless did everything in their power to work around it, and were successful. Signing a document doesn't mean that you agree with it. No one would accept such terms unless under extreme duress and/or a lack of realistic alternative.

Eh, Castroy, Quark, nix für Ungut. In fact the primary foreign policy goal of the Weimar Republic, maintained by all its governments, was the revision of the treaty. This desideratum was shared by every single major political actor, from the far right (DNVP, NSDAP) over the Weimar coalition (Zentrum/SPD/DDP) to the far left (KPD)...

I never held this position? I was pointing out that the Weimar government was planning for the future in ways that might be seen, rather correctly, as subversion of the soul of the law by dancing around the technicalities.

Yeah I saw the thread moved on after posting. Thanks for clarifying in your last posts. No offense intended by me.

No worries, glad we're all on the same page.

Eh, Castroy, Quark, nix für Ungut. In fact the primary foreign policy goal of the Weimar Republic, maintained by all its governments, was the revision of the treaty. This desideratum was shared by every single major political actor, from the far right (DNVP, NSDAP) over the Weimar coalition (Zentrum/SPD/DDP) to the far left (KPD)...

I know what you mean. Let me clarify it. What I meant is that, despite the interior claims of a Revision of the Versailles Treaty, the Governments of Weimar did not operate against it terms in such a agressive and obvious way as the NSDAP did.

I know what you mean. Let me clarify it. What I meant is that, despite the interior claims of a Revision of the Versailles Treaty, the Governments of Weimar did not operate against it terms in such a agressive and obvious way as the NSDAP did.

That much is obvious. The Nazis did little to go around the law, they simply opted to break it anywhere possible and either conceal the evidence/details or disguise it as something else.

In which they were helped considerably by the widespread belief outside Germany that the Versailles settlement was unduly harsh and that no one was prepared to enforce it.


Hitler's foreign policy initiatives up until 1938-9 were popular and nothing that any German Government would not have sought to have done had they been prepared to take the risks.

Re-armament

Luftwaffe

Anglo-German Naval Agreement

Reoccupation of the Rhineland

The Anschluss would probably be the last of these

That is entirely true. However, "popular" is a problematic qualification. They were popular when they succeeded, true. Still, both within the population at large and ie. the General Staff Hitler was perceived as playing va banque pre-war on more than one occasion; we know that there was widespread and pervasive fear of another war in all strata of German society, not in the least because no one believed it could possibly be won - fears that of course seem eminently reasonable, and not only in retrospect. When Hitlers successes materialised without any bloodshed (ie. Rhineland, Anschluß, etc.), it propelled him to the zenith of his popularity, and this was only strenghtened by the recovery of the German economy, even though this recovery was brought about by Schachts unsustainable, aggressively Keynesian strawfire, MEFO bills etc, that in fact almost inevitably set Germany on a course of rapacious war.
Interestingly enough, as we know from Gestapo/SD material, when the war finally started, Hitlers popularity took a serious dive, only to temporarily recover after the German victory in the Westfeldzug.

Why did the Weimar Republic cooperate with the SU? Because it was the only possibility to gain experience in f. e. tank-warfare (with real Tanks, not bicycles with paper around like in Germany of those days) or testing new prototypes of airplanes (not glieders as back home) or chemnical weapons.

This reminds me of a story about British Army training in the 30's - Tanks and heavy weapons were simulated with flags held by soldiers. One corporal was castigated during an exercise for putting his anti-tank gun up a tree. His response was that he had never seen an anti-tank gun so was not aware that this was inappropriate.

This reminds me of a story about British Army training in the 30's - Tanks and heavy weapons were simulated with flags held by soldiers. One corporal was castigated during an exercise for putting his anti-tank gun up a tree. His response was that he had never seen an anti-tank gun so was not aware that this was inappropriate.

Nice story!

The majority of those 100,000 men were overtrained professional officers and non-commission officers- there were only marginal portion of privates. So this was an army that was composed of leaders.

Highlighting the focus with maneuver warfare, it is notable that a holly disproportionate number of German soldiers were cavalrymen. 3 out of 10 Reichwehr divisions were Calvary. These become the nucleus of the panzer and light divisions.

There was also a 'innovative' ardor set in place thanks to the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff-Hans von seeckt- so persons like Guderian,Hoth,Schweppenburg, Cruwell, etc. were able to thrive.

The majority of those 100,000 men were overtrained professional officers and non-commission officers- there were only marginal portion of privates. So this was an army that was composed of leaders.

But this is normal for a peacetime army; keep the officer cadre intact and recruit/conscript as need arises, rather than keep a whole army sitting around doing nothing. The Red Army certainly did this in the 80's at least, and the US is similarly top-heavy now, despite its degree of activity.

Always easier to recruit privates and have them do basic training in under 6 months than to train and maintain an officer corps.

But as van Voort pointed out the victorious Entente did little to actually enforce their absurd regulations which gave the Germans an open license to basically plan for war when that was the very thing the treaty was supposed to quell.

I also seem to recall that the Germans had something equivalent to the American Civilian Conservation Corps, a large number of men living in barracks, with a regimented lifestyle, and physically fit due to manual labour. That is, not so much an army in being as an army in waiting.

But this is normal for a peacetime army; keep the officer cadre intact and recruit/conscript as need arises, rather than keep a whole army sitting around doing nothing. The Red Army certainly did this in the 80's at least, and the US is similarly top-heavy now, despite its degree of activity.

It doesn't have to be that way:

You could recruit only the officers and NCOs you need and hire the rank and file cheaply from people unable to find any other work - and in Germany in the 20s and 30s there are lots of those guys.

If you are really savvy you select your Officers on the basis of their loyalty to the Government rather than their competence, perhaps unfortunately that wasn't an option open to the Weimar Republic.

I also seem to recall that the Germans had something equivalent to the American Civilian Conservation Corps, a large number of men living in barracks, with a regimented lifestyle, and physically fit due to manual labour. That is, not so much an army in being as an army in waiting.

That would be:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reichsarbeitsdienst


But even before that the Hitlerjugend is preparing people for the Army

It doesn't have to be that way:

It may not have to be that way; my point is rather that it often is that way, and it's not out of incompetence. An army that expects to expand dramatically in war time still has an interest in preserving an officer cadre, even if they have no troops to command. In this respect, senior, experienced NCO's are arguably even more important than the officer class themselves, as in practice green officers are often better off letting veteran NCO's be the de facto unit leader until they have some experience of their own under their belts. On top of this, the Junker officer class had a military tradition dating back to Prussian times which they proudly maintained and defended, and it may well have been politically impossible to dispose of them even if you wanted to.

This reminds me, incidentally, that it was argued above that the Ardenne assault was a demonstration of German military competence; however, I suggest this may be the wrong way to look at it. Because not only had the Germans invaded France through the Ardenne at the beginning of the war, but they had also done so in the First World War. So in fact the Battle of the Bulge was the third time that Germany had used the Ardenne route, and it can be argued that the surprise they achieved was really a failure of imagination on the part of the Allies to assume it couldn't be done, although admittedly neither of the previous operations had been carried out in winter.

If you are really savvy you select your Officers on the basis of their loyalty to the Government rather than their competence, perhaps unfortunately that wasn't an option open to the Weimar Republic.

Hmm, not sure many would agree with that. I think the issue of how the Nazis came to take over Germany is a rather separate one; I think we kind of forget just how weird Nazi Germany really was. The other day I was looking at pic of a grenadiers helmet bearing the German flag on one side and the party symbol on the other; can anyone today really imagine how strange things would have to get for say the US military to be sporting the party symbol of the Democrats or the Republicans?

What was not normal up to 39':

1. German General Staff/prussian military traditions & almost myopic focus on tactics, troop training and operations
2. focus on mobile warfare, the creation of the panzer and light divisions. This is along with the tendency to concentrate development in the top 20% (mobile units).
3. No strategic air force or surface navy of note; a larger share resources instead shifted to developing ground force and tactical airpower in service of ground forces.
4. German military was a 'one shot'/ "shop window" force that was structured around short wars of movement rather than long attrition battles (like the Red Army). They invested a time and resources in divisional training which meant that most of their capability was in intangibles/capabilities rather than durable systems and production. They had to win fast or not at all.

But this is normal for a peacetime army; keep the officer cadre intact and recruit/conscript as need arises, rather than keep a whole army sitting around doing nothing. The Red Army certainly did this in the 80's at least, and the US is similarly top-heavy now, despite its degree of activity.

I find the German Army to be the best in 39-41- as it fought in wars that it was designed for. The greatest operational weapon they fielded was Fliegerkorps 8 and Panzergruppe 1 to 4. FK-8 may have set the standard for aerial-ground support in WW2. Their infantry divisions were also pretty solid. By 42', their capabilities were much deteriorated but they had some left for the summer offensive and surgical set-piece operations. By 43' they were in irreversible decline and basically fell apart in the summer of 43' with the infantry arm collapsing before and during the battle for the Dnepr.

44-45 there is not much of note left in the German military except the 'GD' division, which was an elite that was kept up to older standards. Without high capability units, they can't do much.

Despite the Germans finding themselves in exactly the kind of attrition war that they knew they had to avoid, they adapted reasonably well enough to prolong the war past where it should have ended.

That said the Soviet Union was indeed a special case as no other nation could afford to lose so much territory, men, equipment and other resources in the first 6 months and then continue on to provide stiff resistance into launching resurgent counter-offensives. Barbarossa was and could only have been foiled by the Soviet Union.

The Germans had no realistic prospect of contesting British control of the sea. Probably nobody did barring the US, which which Britain had treaties regulating the proportional sizes of their naval strength that had come about after WW1. So even if Germany had had the resources for a major naval re-armament, which it probably did not, and even if they had disregarded Versailles, and been allowed to do so with a nod and a wink, doing it would certainly have attracted serious British and American attention.

Strategically, all they needed was enough naval power to block the Kattegat, and after the capture of Denmark and Norway even this ceased to be an issue. The highly engineered 'pocket' battleships they built were perfectly adequate for this task; the only other strategic concern was interdiction of British supplies, which fell to the U-boat arm, as it had done in WW1, and disguised commerce raiders.

I don't believe they had any intention of trying to re-fight the battle of Jutland, and so a large surface navy simply was not required.