General World War 2 Discussion Thread

'Tis the age of the internet. I will say that much: I have read each and every book I have "attacked" or even otherwise mentioned. Otherwise I shall say "lol". You remind me of the guy that suckerpunches a random dude in a bar, breaks his hand on his jaw and then bitterly complains and whines about all the unwarranted aggression.

If you want explicitly Russian recommendations, ie. Isaev/Drabkin et al ain't bad whenever they manage to tame their "patriotic" urges. You know why? They actually visit TsAMO.

More personal attacks.

Why do you spend dozens of hours reading such terrible, historically worthless books in the first place? See how I'm suspicious of your claims?

Can you identify the titles?

Wat? Seriously, I can't make any sense of what you are trying to communicate. Hey, English is not my first language by a long shot, but I understand the vast majority of people. Semantics and such, they fail me here.

If these General staff books and the book I just mentioned were so bad, why did you spend an immense amount of time reading them in the first place?

Identify the titles of the books of the two russian authors.

Argh! I beg of you, stop, before my brain gets irreversibly damaged. Why would I read "bad" books? Because of inclination, interest, both personally and professionally, of course. Do I have to explain this? Just because any given book or publication might not be useful/insightful as a work of academic history, does not mean it can not be entertaining, gripping, or even plain hilarious. There are obviously many dimensions to "quality". It is also trivial but apparently needs mentioning that in order to find out whether any given book has merit, and of what sort, you have to read it in the first place. It goes without saying that one should ie. not base ones understanding ie. of the Wehrmacht on reading the semi-fiction of Sven Hassel or the borderline propaganda/apologetics of Paul Carrell, but that does not mean they are uninteresting, if only because of the degree to which they have shaped perceptions, or in the case of the former, because of all the modern-day swashbuckling.

As for Isaev & Co, I am not gonna do your googling for you. Get off your lazy behind and do it yourself. This concludes our glorious conversation, I am going to bed now. Enjoy yourself.

I don't think actually you read them- you just hand waved them because you didn't fancy them or their conclusions. They treat German soldiers like targets. There's a lot of bluffing that's been coming from you here. Your claims are bogus to me. There is absolutely no indication from your posts that you are some sort of high level, objective eastern front scholar. You are merely one that is opposed to Russian eastern front history and source your beliefs predominantly from German POVs

I've been involved in historical discussion with some of the highly knowledgable for five years and never have I encountered such an exchange, utilizing such excuses.. as today.

The fronts were everything bit not balanced in 1944... None of them! The German industry was suffering from the bombing raids and the supplies were attacked constantly by the RAF and the American Air Force because the had the air superiority! Panzerdivisions could not operate because of the Bombers. Same on the eastern front were the russians outnumbered the germans and used their tacrics against them!

Well, but the total collapse of the eastern front Summer 1944 was bec of Hitler was more feared of the invasion than of the rushing Red Army.

At Normandy the German Army (strong potential) was bleeding out slowly due to constant Air attacks and extreme Artillery fire (the so called "doctrines" of the US-Army of fire superiority, they didn't focus much on infantry, tanks). But still held the front 2 months. Now think about these forces on the eastern front at "Bagration"....... instead an infantry division had to cover a huge frontline

In a Russian-German only war no side would be able to make a major breaktrough the next years.
Gen Guderians opinion ....

Well, but the total collapse of the eastern front Summer 1944 was bec of Hitler was more feared of the invasion than of the rushing Red Army.

At Normandy the German Army (strong potential) was bleeding out slowly due to constant Air attacks and extreme Artillery fire (the so called "doctrines" of the US-Army of fire superiority, they didn't focus much on infantry, tanks). But still held the front 2 months. Now think about these forces on the eastern front at "Bagration"....... instead an infantry division had to cover a huge frontline

In a Russian-German only war no side would be able to make a major breaktrough the next years.
Gen Guderians opinion ....

Well the thing was, that Hitler knew that the Allies would attack (they fooled him with this but that is another story) so he thought he could first fight off the Allies in the West and then get back to the Eastern Front where he believed his troops would do everything they can to stop a Red Army (that was supplied better and outnumbered the German Troops) to hold them off till the Western Allies are defeated. What happened then is history

I don't think actually you read them- you just hand waved them because you didn't fancy them or their conclusions. They treat German soldiers like targets. There's a lot of bluffing that's been coming from you here. Your claims are bogus to me. There is absolutely no indication from your posts that you are some sort of high level, objective eastern front scholar. You are merely one that is opposed to Russian eastern front history and source your beliefs predominantly from German POVs

I've been involved in historical discussion with some of the highly knowledgable for five years and never have I encountered such an exchange, utilizing such excuses.. as today.

Frankly, you should seek a shrink. If you find no fault with a narrative that treats people of whatever persuasion as "nothing but targets", then you might be in need of help. The rest of your nonsense I will not dignify with a response. Sapienti sat.

Well, but the total collapse of the eastern front Summer 1944 was bec of Hitler was more feared of the invasion than of the rushing Red Army.

At Normandy the German Army (strong potential) was bleeding out slowly due to constant Air attacks and extreme Artillery fire (the so called "doctrines" of the US-Army of fire superiority, they didn't focus much on infantry, tanks). But still held the front 2 months. Now think about these forces on the eastern front at "Bagration"....... instead an infantry division had to cover a huge frontline

In a Russian-German only war no side would be able to make a major breaktrough the next years.
Gen Guderians opinion ....

The German army in Normandy did at no point number more then 380 000 deployed personnel, and included among its formations a great number of reconstituted static infantry divisions who were of little use outside of garrison duties/economy of force in the first place. By mid-1944, the force ratio had already swung too decisively in the Soviet favour for these forces to make much of a difference. Even if Bagration had been less decisive then it was, even if AG Centre could have been more or less conserved, the Germans could not escape the attritional reality. There was no longterm perspective for a stabilisation of the front at this stage, much less an eventual reversal, thats just arithmetics.

Similar to how German sources treat Soviets as targets.

Your credibility here as an enthusiast, let alone a scholar = absolutely zero. You are presenting a fraudulent fascade of specialized professionalism and you are claiming to have studied books that you have not. Awful social skills, too. A lot of puffery, a lot of insecurity, and a lot of nonsense personal attacks with little substance and absolutely no indication of specialized depth of knowledge. Constant misreading of posts and points as to be easily confused as trolling.

On our forums, I have seen dozens of people come and go that have done the same. Real experts and scholars do not do as you done.

go back and read your own spazzy posts, man! Are you proud of them? I would be ashamed if I were you. Or are you going to emote again, claim the victim, and then respond again just satisfy your desire to have the 'last word'? Leave now and don't let the door kick you on the way out!

BS, agitation

The fronts were everything bit not balanced in 1944... None of them! The German industry was suffering from the bombing raids and the supplies were attacked constantly by the RAF and the American Air Force because the had the air superiority! Panzerdivisions could not operate because of the Bombers. Same on the eastern front were the russians outnumbered the germans and used their tacrics against them!

Yet war production peaked in 1944.

Something Speer took credit for


Though really a reflection of disorganisation and not going for Total War until 1944

War production peaked in 1944 due to measures taken by German industrial sectors earlier in the war, especially after the failure of Barbarossa. This is explained in the book 'Wages of Destruction'.

You're right, Speer took credit of this in 'Inside of the third Reich' and in public (Nazi production miracle), and even convinced American interrogators of this. It's a myth.

But this added production came coupled with shortages of strategic raw materials and could not translate into increased combat power. The troops and formations of 1944 were of a much lower caliber than those of 1941 and 1942 even if the technology of their equipment was better. Mobility and fuel in their formations decreased and were cut across the board.

On the allied sides, the Soviet, US and British army were trained, equipped, and organized in a much more potent manner than they were earlier in the war. Armaments also similarly reached a high level for them. In the case of the soviets, they experienced a massive increase in combat power between the fall of 1942 to the beginning of 1944. Their artillery firepower alone quadrupled in expenditure rates.

Infantile unqualified grandstanding

You are not merely a highly opinionated amateur - which is obvious to anybody with but a whiff of actual historical understanding - but also a thoroughly unpleaseant fellow and a bit of a simpleton, at least judging by your inability to grasp even the most basic concepts of historiography. For you to complain about personal attacks is to take the cake though. I you follow the course of our "conversation" - and I am hesitant to call it that - then your very failure to abstain from such is what made it devolve from something at least potentially enriching into what it is now. You can repeat your spurious claims about me not reading books until you are red in the face but that won't lend them anymore substance or make you look any less ridiculous. Next time, just take a learning opportunity if it presents itself - if your inflated ego allows you to. Have a nice day!

Yeah, my issue is more with the assertions of the effectiveness of Western Air Power in supressiong German production pre-1944

Strategic Bombing has not yet directly decreased production because it is still going up - for a variety of reasons not including Speer.


However it has forced a lot of production into counter air work (Flak and Fighters) that would otherwise be on the Eastern front killing T34s and Il-2s.

Whilst Western tactical air is dominant over France, that doesn't have impact on what happens in White Russia

Yea, I agree generally although the air battles of the west had a significant impact on ground battles in the east. The LW was a rip-off, and controlled by the power politics of Goering, who took a much larger share of resources than his arm's impact on the war.

The Luftwaffe as an operational weapon was largely out of the skies after their LF-4's offensive at Stalingrad and Operation Citadel. The LW was also the German military's most expensive organization, as it consumed immense reserves of raw materials and industrial capacity that completely exceeded all of Germany's armored forces.

Then the greater half of the LW became embroiled in the air battles in the west, and then the FLAK arm became a massive organization that bleed resources and manpower in order to provide a degree of air deterrence.

Then we have the LW field divisions and a lot of lavish waste on them.

As for heavy FLAK, I don't think they were used as much as anti-tank weapons as typically thought. They were considered second line AT defense, used to plug gaps in the front when the panzerjaeger (anti-tank) battalions of German divisions were inadequate.

"Reichsverteidigung" AAA was manned disproportionately by personnel otherwise unsuitable for military duty - the elderly, infirm, convalescents and among the enlisted predominantly the very young, what in postwar Germany came to be known as the Flakhelfergeneration, meaning the generation of Flak auxiliaries. While it is true that addressing the Allied air offensive imposed a massive strain on German resources, at least in the manpower department the strain was much less pronounced than the sheer numbers themselves might suggest.

As for heavy FLAK, I don't think they were used as much as anti-tank weapons as typically thought. They were considered second line AT defense, used to plug gaps in the front when the panzerjaeger (anti-tank) battalions of German divisions were inadequate.

No but manufacturing capacity for FLAK and PAK overlap a lot: They are both high velocity artillery weapons and that's something you need a fairly well tooled factory to build.

Not counting also the use of explosives.

The only thing they don't overlap in is in materials for KEPs

Maybe. More on this issue: Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914-1945, Westermann. Good material, which was published. This is the PDF of the transcript:

http://www.theblackvault.com/documents/ADA380153.pdf

Well seeing this thread is back on track I have a question for those who have extensive knowledge of WW2 history. You guys are talking about manufacturing capacities and the like thus I ask the following.

Why did Nazi Germany prefer to focus on expensive and over engineered tanks such as the Panzer IV, Panther, Tiger, Tiger II instead of a single solid tank design meant for mass production?

They Germans never managed to mass produce any tank in the war, the Soviets manufactured roughly 60 000+ T-34s (All variants). The USA took a similar approach by producing nearly 50 000 M4 Sherman (All variants). The Panzer IV production is around 5000, the most produced armoured vehicle was an assault gun, the Stug III whose's production output was around 13 000 (all variants).

Why not try to mass produce the Panzer IV ausf J earlier, instead of the lavish Panzer IV ausf H, Panther and Tiger ?

I would say that by manufacturing several different tanks they put a huge strain on their manufacturing industry seeing the different tank models did not overlap in manufacturing, it was wasteful. But I'm quite uninformed on the manufacturing details So I could be wrong.

I've read online that Hitler himself was obsessed with tanks. He supervised even the tiniest details such as the armour thickness, the guns calibre, and specially names for them during their conception. Which is odd for a Statesman, especially seeing he did not know much about engineering, even less about strategy, let alone grand strategy.

I remember reading something about his disputes with Guderian on Wikipedia. If I recall correctly Hitler was convinced that tanks gave political advantage and diluted them across several panzer divisions instead of concentrating them on fewer divisions as Guderian wanted.

As Iosef Stalin said, "Quantity has a quality all its own", and this is even truer on total wars to the death where no price is too high; as opposed to limited wars where qualitative advantages can prove decisive.

Another issue with the quality over quantity approach is that the German wunderweapons could not be everywhere and I get the feeling that they where rarely present when truly needed (independent Tiger/Panther battalion had to be sent where most needed, thus it might arrive too late, also they seemed to have serious reliability issues and limited operational range). Sure qualitative weaponry is more efficient, but in a total war, quantitative weaponry is much more effective overall.

Was the German high command so incompetent not the see such a gaping flaw in their grand strategy?

Ultimately their self proclaimed "superior" tanks were barely effective at the strategic level compared to Soviet or American ones. I could go as far as claiming that the Panther & Co cost the Germans the war on the eastern front. Due to the many technical and reliability issues with the Panthers, Elefants and Tigers the Germans were was forced to delay the Kursk offensive for 2 months (Not sure of the exact length of the delay). This allowed the Soviets to dig in and prepare huge minefields and AT gun kill zones. They believed these new weapons were the key to victory but ironically lost the initiative forever because of a god damn expensive tank (That could be easily immobilized by an extremely cheap mine).

Can anyone shed some light on Nazi Germany's tank rationale?