Necromancy in the Library is fine, provided the subject stays on topic.
And with that, I would like to add my own words of caution to those who may think the outcome of non-invasion of UK was a done deal. To that extent, I would argue that the title of this thread is highly relevant: 'the Hitler factor'.
So could the Germans have done it differently? Counter-factually, I would argue that they could have done.I am basing this post on the
"War Diaries 1939- 1945 Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke" .
Alanbrooke was one of the two Corps commanders for the British Expeditionary Force in France/Belgium, which was forced to retreat to UK via Dunkirk in May 1940. Thereafter, he took over Southern Command on 26 June 1940, and was subsequently promoted to Commander in Chief Home Forces on 19 July 1940, before promotion in late 1941 as the Army representative on the Chiefs of Staff. The diaries are contemporaneously written, and are dry to read, unless you enjoy history.
It is worth remembering that Hitler apparently agreed to let his army regroup, as the British headed for Dunkirk. If Hitler had ordered his army to continue to press the attack, it is questionable as to how many of the Allied troops could have escaped. As it was, a large proportion did escape, leaving behind their heavy equipment. As you know, many were evacuated on small boats, including fishing boats and cabin cruisers. That was the Navy's reserve...and it was a beaten army.
The unwounded survivors were placed into trains which headed off into the UK countryside, where they stayed on trains, while the army decided where they could be reformed. The whole UK army had been shaken up by the disorganised retreat and most men were stragglers, out of contact with their units, many without any equipment worth the name.
Immediately after Dunkirk, Alanbrooke was ordered to return to France on 12 June 1940 to Cherbourg/Le Mans, to see if the UK could restart its effort further West where a further 100,000 UK/Canadian troops were still stationed. But he quickly concluded that this would be a waste of effort, so ordered their retreat also. He boarded a trawler on 17 June to leave France again.
These are some of Alanbrooke's notes after that. He wrote almost daily, so I have cut back to keep this post as short as possible :
"
26 June 1940
...I spent the rest of the day...taking over Southern Command.The main impression I had was that the Command had a long way to be put on a war footing and that a peace time atmosphere was still prevailing...
29 June 1940
In the morning visited the Australian contingent...It will take at least a month before any of them are ready for any active operation. In the afternoon, attended a conference on....Local Defence Volunteers...Why do we in this country turn to all the old men when we require a new volunteer force? Old men spell delay and chaos!...
30 June 1940
..,what I wanted for the defence of Southern Command namely another Corps HQ, another Div, some armoured units and a call on bomber squadrons.Some of these things I may get...I rubbed into him the nakedness of this command when taken in relation to the new situation in Western France
[German occupation: my brackets]...
01 July 1940
...The more I see of conditions at home,the more bewildered I am as to what has been going on in this country since the war started.It is now 10 months and yet the shortage of trained men and of equipment is appalling!!
At present I fail to see how we can make this country safe against attack [My italics]
Two parachutists reported. One captured was a British prisoner paid 500 pounds for the job.
02 July 1940
....The more I see the nakedness of our defences the more appalled I am! Untrained men, no arms, no transport, and no equipment. And yet there are masses of men in uniforms in this country but they are mostly untrained, why I cannot think after 10 months of war. The ghastly part of it is that I feel certain that we can only have a few more weeks left before the Boche attacks.
08 July 1940
Visited Oxford to see my South Midland area...A good show but not enough troops.
10 July 1940
...moved to Totnes...and looked at beach defence, much more work and drive required...From what I have seen I am not happy at the state of the defences in these parts, people have not yet realized the danger of attack.
11 July 1940
...Prior, as as Plymouth sub-area commander does not seem what is wanted and his plans of defence are very sketchy. Green I am afraid must go. He has not got the required qualities...
12 July 1940
This was supposed to be the probable day of invasion!...asking for Green to be relieved of the command of the South Western Area.He is too old and lacking in drive ever to make a job of the defence of Devon and Cornwall.
13 July 1940
...No further signs of impending attack. However I feel that I require a great deal more time to complete defensive arrangements within the Command. There is a mass of work to do and many officers to be replaced.
15 July 1940
Spent a long day going around beach defences from Bognor Regis to West Wittering. A lot of work still requires to be done, and we are painfully thin on the ground...
18 July 1940
I spent the day with 50th Div going round beaches from Lulworth Cove, round Swanage, Sandbank, Bournemouth upp tyo the mouth of the Soent. All work going well, but beaches very lightly held....
22 July 1940
....
To my mind our defence should be of a far more mobile and offensive nature. I visualized a light defence along the beaches, to hamper and delay landings to the maximum,and in the rear highly mobile forces trained to immediate aggressive action intended to concentrate and attack any landings before they had time to become too well established. I was also relying on heavy air attacks on the point of landing, and had every intention of using sprayed mustard gas on the beaches...
26 July 1940
...Chiefs of Staff meeting. main subject of discussion was the priority of use of fighters in the event of invasion. I came away feeling less confident as to our powers of meeting an invasion. The attitude of the Naval Command brought out very clearly the fact that the navy now realizes fully that its position has now been undermined by the advent of aircraft. Sea supremacy is no longer what it was, and in the face of strong bomber forces can no longer ensure the safety of this island against invasion.This throws a much heavier task on the army.
27 July 1940
...went to visit the 46th Division....Found it in a lamentably backward state of training, barely fit to do platoon training and deficient of officers...
29 July 1940
....
.There was, however,one point above all others which constituted a grave danger in the defens8ive organisation of this country, there was no form of combined command over the three services.And yet their roles were ultimately locked together. Who was deciding the claims between the employment of destroyers against hostile landing craft, as opposed to anti-submarine protection of the Western Approaches? Whp would decide between conflicting calls of the Army for bombers to attack beaches, as opposed to Navy wanting them for attacks on hostile fleets?...It was a highly dangerous organization: had an invasion developed I fear that Churchill would have attempted as Defence Minister tp coordinate the actions of these various commands. This would have been wrong and highly dangerous, with his impulsive nature and tendency to arrive at decisions though a process of intuition, as opposed to 'logical' approach. Heaven knows where he might have led us! "
Very good! You've really got into this. 
One neg post invised. 
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