What extent did the RAF and USAF have on logistics.

with the previous discussion of logistics. it made me ponder what extent the efforts of the RAF and USAF had on logistics and infrastructure during the european theater and if a large impact, to what extent it may've hampered the long term invasion logistics.

Sounds like a really interesting topic, lifted it out. It deserves an own thread. I can't answer it since my knowledge of the Western front is slim to none.

I will happily start the reply and doubtless others will correct me and carry on, hopefully. ( I write from a primarily British perspective)

Background

The RAF were split into

• Fighter Command
  
• Bomber Command
  
• Coastal Command
  
• Transport Operations

http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/F21D57C4_9913_5321_BB9830F0BB762B4E.pdf

The Commonwealth Airforce in Normandy was the 2nd Tactical Air Force - the bombers, fighters and ground attack aircraft, who primarily went after the Axis columns and emplacements. (page 144 onwards of the link).

The USAAF can be found here

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Strategic_Air_Forces_in_Europe

and here

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eighth_Air_Force

For the purposes of your discussion, both need expanding.

The Normandy invasion

It was an important feature of the Normandy invasion that the region be isolated, so that the Axis could not quickly reinforce with Panzers and other materiel . Bomber Command, led by "Bomber" Harris, were therefore prevailed upon to attack railway marshalling yards, and transport infrastructure. This was a two-edged sword: the more successful Bomber Command was in cutting the links, the more it hampered the logistics in any break-out from Normandy.

At this point, it may help if I briefly describe the situation in the RAF, by D-Day. Bomber Command was in the ascendancy - it was led by Air Marshal Arthur "Bomber" Harris, a strong personality, who appears to have had the conviction that Germany could be bombed into submission. You will see his bomber group leaders described as "Bomber Barons". Therefore, Harris had to be strongly persuaded that he should divert his bombers to Normandy, and in practice, he could not wait to re-divert his bombers back onto targets in Germany. For him, Normandy was almost a side-show. He did not reagrd his bombers as 'flying artillery'.

In general terms, RAF Bomber Command tried to do what was asked of them: the links were attacked, albeit some coast defences were not hit - the invading troops suffered for that. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that German re-supply was not badly hit, provided they travelled at night. Harris busied himself with Germany again, as soon as he could.

The 2nd Tactical Air Force, which was outside Harris' ambit, set to work in Normandy on tactical targets.

Occasionally. Bomber Command was called back - the prime examples being first, Caen and then Falaise.

Csen took the hit for France. It was supposed to be captured early after D-Day, but it was not. It became a centre for Axis resistance, (together with the nearby Carpiquet airfield). Bomber Command was therefore called in to flatten the city, which it did. But it had the same results as Monte Cassino - a flattened city does not help invading troops. The ruins provide defence points, which are difficult to spot, so you have to call in valuable engineers to clear a path through the rubble. At the same time, the infrastructure breaks down, which has to be repaired, and the survivors (who need feeding and medical care) are at risk of disease, which can spread to the troops.

You do not read much about French cities being obliterated after Caen - the Allies had learnt their lesson. Caen bled for France.



As for logistics, the aircraft for the paratroopers was the c-47 Dakota, and these were mostly manned by USAAF.

As for the provision of gas/oil, this was provided by pipeline from Southern England - PLUTO .

http://www.combinedops.com/pluto.htm

Haha, oh my. I'm blushing a little. Thank you for facilitating the discussion! MajBloodnok adds some great information, I was aware of the man made Mulberry harbour, but not PLUTO, very cool!

Apologies for the late reply. I feel I should make my "thesis" more specific. I was more wondering that considering the long line of supply built by the allied advance, did the destruction and sabotage of logistical infrastructure caused by the Allied air force and resistance troops prior to the invasion of Europe cause logistical issues later on for the ensuing ground war?

The episode: Pincers in the documentary series The World at War, describes the liberation of France happening at such a pace that German units were overrun so quickly in Normandy that pockets of resistance would threaten the supply lines between the beachhead and Paris, this area from Paris to the depots earned the nickname "Injun Country" by supply convoy drivers.

Would this and other pressures be alleviated by the use of railways and other facilities, rendered inoperable by Allied air power prior to the offensive?

The short answer is yes:

One of the reasons Dragoon is so important is that it captures intact Southern French ports and a functioning rail net leading out from them


However, there are other logistic issues as well:

In addition, many of the French ports on Biscay and the Channel have Germans holed up in them, in some cases until the end of the war

Further after taking Antwerp Monty does not clear the approaches from German troops, instead trying to get across the Rhine - this means that a large port right behind the allied advance is not available into much later than it could have been.


Nevertheless keeping the road and rail net undamaged so you can use it after you win does you no good if you don't win in the first place.

The allies are dependent on a sea LOC that can be shut down by the weather - and at one point it is; and they have to get their supplies and reinforcements in by sea faster than the Germans can do so by land. Anything that slows that up is good (hence the importance of Fortitude in keeping 15th Army around Calais)


In addition the Germans are, apart from a small motorised elite that is getting smaller, an army dependent on marching and rail transport so they need those rail links much more than the allies.

The allies are able to organise the Red Ball Express to supply their troops by truck, the Germans do not have that option.


In addition, once you do start pushing the Germans back they are going to try and destroy all that rail infrastructure anyway so you cannot use it.


So:

Leaving the rail net in Northern France undamaged will help the allies once they are able to advance, but it will help the Germans much more whilst they are defending