General World War 2 Discussion Thread

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Thanks for the VfZ. Will take a look when I have some freetime...

Kiev was also a convincing military matter as AGC already eliminated the Soviet armies in Smolensk and cleared the pockets its north/south jurisdiction while being pounded by Timoshenko and Zhukov's incessant counteroffensives. AGC was already right in front of Vyzama/Bryansk and was 'one blitzkrieg' away from the capital. The Germans had to eliminate Kiev or their southern front would be completely open to counteroffensives and the Axis front would become very long, absorbing a huge number of additional divisions which would dissipate their forces.

Retreating southeastern Front would simply allow the Axis to occupy the territory without much fight and then launch a central Blitzkrieg offensive at the earliest possible moment.

People often stare blindly at military matters and forget political ones. Kiev is my favourite one.
600 000 losses for the RKKA that could have been pulled out sounds like shit decision making.
Or abandon the 3rd city of the country and the historical cradle of your civilization without firing a shot? Good luck maintaining morale and trust in the government by regular people. Especially in that region of the country if you ever manage to get it back. "Hi, we kinda left you to fend for yourself for two years under occupation, hope you don't have any grudges against us, anyway we want you to listen to us again now"
Much better to try to fight and loose horribly in military terms, but using it to get people on your side; than it would be to retreat the army intact and loose the people.

Why doesn't the p4 have a nickname while the elephant tiger etc do?

IMO, the Soviet claims of enemy force strength & destruction in operations are usually worthless and not even close to the actual numbers. The Wehr reporting system in operations usually closer to the mark, but still with discrepancies.

However, in terms of Operational history, the German perspective that has dominated west of the iron curtain has been pretty disappointing overall and has lend to much more serious distortions than statistics- an obvious one is the myth of Moscow 1941 being a close-run affair being prevalent for decades and Manstein's backhand blow in 1943 being a major set-back for the soviets. Lots of battles have been swept under the rug or given only minor coverage.

'Kursk', for instance, gets lots of coverage but is still considered isolated from the related, massive, and ultimately more decisive Izyum/Mius River and Belgorod-Kharkov battles. In older texts like Rolf Hinze, the Soviet units are often not even identified and are depicted in maps as merely arrows.

I think the archives have been open for a long time. It's just that historians that master both russian and german research and want to be productive are quite few. Colonel Glantz is probably the best eastern front historian alive and working in the US. Also apparently the German universities don't take military history seriously and are more interested in researching WW2 social aspects and war crimes- which is too bad.

My intention was to clarify the problem of the wide field of various numbers with an russian scientist, before the western phobia and propaganda punshes.

IMO, the Soviet claims of enemy force strength & destruction in operations are usually worthless and not even close to the actual numbers. The Wehr reporting system in operations usually closer to the mark, but still with discrepancies.

Agreed with most, but this is the wierd part.


Well what claims? The ones made by Krasnaya Zvesda are often very poor, just like all countries propaganda during the war is very inaccurate. (Which is why I cringe whenever someone on the interwebs quotes wartime publications.)

I think all claims of destruction of enemies are way way off. I remember reading about a regiment of IL2s that reported "An entire german armoured division destroyed by massive bombardment". Whilst the German commander reported "Strafed by enemy aircraft, (a few number cant remember like 3-4) needed light repairs, division keept advancing."

The Germans often destroyed well over 100% of Russian tanks knocked out, like 267 reported armour kills with against a formation with a maximum strength of 190. The Germans pull back with some losses and the Russians keep advancing.

We often see that in all wartime reporting, enemies are annihilated, but none tells the enemy that so they just keep moving forward.


I find the only close to reliable numbers to find is looking at own losses. People are often more correct with regards to "I lost x number of men in the following categories" than they are anticipating the losses for the enemy.

But ofc there are problems there aswell. Talking about armour there are many different ways of counting for the different sides.
Like a tank thats knocked and rebuilt at the factory would in Germany be listed as: Sent for repairs.

In the USSR it would be listed as a entire new tank, and be included in the factories numbers of tanks produced.
(Looking at monthly produced tanks for like ChTZ and compare it to how long after a certain battle it was is an interesting project.)

No side is better and to be frank, Wehr did have a very, hrm, interesting way of marking up their own losses.

'Kursk', for instance, gets lots of coverage but is still considered isolated from the related, massive, and ultimately more decisive Izyum/Mius River and Belgorod-Kharkov battles. In older texts like Rolf Hinze, the Soviet units are often not even identified and are depicted in maps as merely arrows.

I have a sneaking suspicion that the Kursk Operation should cover more than just Operation Zitadelle, certainly operation Kutuzov at the very least...
Would this idea be correct or would Kutuzov be its own "battle" (though where campaign ends and battle begins becomes a bit more blurry these days) go elsewhere do you think?

(...)I think the archives have been open for a long time. It's just that historians that master both russian and german research and want to be productive are quite few. Colonel Glantz is probably the best eastern front historian alive and working in the US. Also apparently the German universities don't take military history seriously and are more interested in researching WW2 social aspects and war crimes- which is too bad.

Subscribed.

There are only a few universities in germany that are researching the field of strategic military history. The german army universities in Hamburg and Munich and some military institutes in Potsdam come to my mind.

I don´t know if LeYawn is an educated lecturer of history now and works at a german university. I know he studied history as well and I guess he wrote his master thesis some time ago, but I am sure he knows a bit more about the historical research of military warfare at german universities then I do from my exams.

Edit: But the topic of social aspects and war-crimes at university is still an important aspect to me.

Why doesn't the p4 have a nickname while the elephant tiger etc do?

I´ve read somewhere that in the last years of the war the tank-crews and troops gave it the nickname "Rotbart der Hauchdünne" which means "redbeard the thin-skinned" or "redbeard the wafer-thin" because of its thin armor.

But I cannot confirm that. I guess the source was Spielberger, Walther with his treatise "The Panzer IV and its variants".

Subscribed.

There are only a few universities in germany that are researching the field of strategic military history. The german army universities in Hamburg and Munich and some military institutes in Potsdam come to my mind.

I don´t know if LeYawn is an educated lecturer of history now and works at a german university. I know he studied history as well and I guess he wrote his master thesis some time ago, but I am sure he knows a bit more about the historical research of military warfare at german universities then I do from my exams.

Edit: But the topic of social aspects and war-crimes at university is still an important aspect to me.

I am still in academia, but I changed fields. I still do asymetrical warfare/terrorism stuff on occasion though, albeit from a different angle.

As far as classical, operational military history is concerned, the discipline unsurprisingly took an utter nosedive post war; in fact, to say it was not en vogue would be to understate the matter considerably. Topoi such as these not only received little to no funding, but were also considered politically sensitive - as in: outright tainted - and considered a career dead end - they still are, to a point. Making a heartfelt interest in military matters known would be a very unwise move to say the least if you wanted to ever receive tenure. A very far cry ie. from US (or in fact, anglo in general) university culture, where military history chairs are par from the course even in provincial unis. In consequence, the overwhelming majority of scholarship and expertise concerning "German" 20th century military issues came out of the Anglo world, and this is still where some of the leading authorities reside. (Zuber, Citino, etc etc)
That being said, even throughout the 60s/70s/80s where the tendencies I described were at their zenith, their still always was at least a trickle of quality germanophone scholarship, however, this tended to come from outside the academic "establishment", was published in very limited numbers, was rarely if ever translated, and therefore received very little international - or domestic - exposure. The Zeitgeist, if you will, clearly frowned on the matter. Nowadays the situation has actually greatly improved, to the point where "German" scholarship has pulled considerably ahead in some respects, the PoW question being a case in point, but this still is very insular and has a very limited audience; as evidenced by the fact that you will not find ie. a German Stephen Ambrose/Hastings/Glantz etc. whose reach not only greatly transcends academia, but whose publications are actually more geared towards the broader public.

[...]

I think the archives have been open for a long time. It's just that historians that master both russian and german research and want to be productive are quite few. Colonel Glantz is probably the best eastern front historian alive and working in the US. Also apparently the German universities don't take military history seriously and are more interested in researching WW2 social aspects and war crimes- which is too bad.

In fact, Russian archival access is still highly restricted to Westerners, not only in theory but especially in practice. Even for citizens of the Russian Federation there are still serious hurdles and I am speaking from personal experience here. AFAIK everything above Front level is still restricted, as is most of the doctrinal stuff. Dave Glantz for example exclusively works through middlemen for his Russian archival research. I might add that his grasp of German stuff is pretty shaky. Don't get me wrong here though, he of course has made pioneering contributions.

I have a sneaking suspicion that the Kursk Operation should cover more than just Operation Zitadelle, certainly operation Kutuzov at the very least...
Would this idea be correct or would Kutuzov be its own "battle" (though where campaign ends and battle begins becomes a bit more blurry these days) go elsewhere do you think?

Meh, its just a case of apples and oranges/terminology.
In German parlance/historiography, "Kursk" traditionally refers to Citadel, whereas ie. the official Soviet history includes Rumjantsev/Kutusov. That does not mean that the Soviet riposte was somehow ignored by the Germans.

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As far as classical, operational military history is concerned, the discipline unsurprisingly took an utter nosedive post war; in fact, to say it was not en vogue would be to understate the matter considerably. Topics [Edit] such as these not only received little to no funding, but were also considered politically sensitive - as in: outright tainted - and considered a career dead end - they still are, to a point. Making a heartfelt interest in military matters known would be a very unwise move to say the least if you wanted to ever receive tenure.

Whilst I understand what you say, I doubt if the position was very different in UK until the early 90s (but I do not work in academia). The UK military had their military historians at Sandhurst - I was always of the impression (probably wrongly) that they were slightly frowned upon by the UK academic history establishment.' (One of our university tutors on British Empire history was ex-Sandhurst history staff - he seemed to have bridged the gap). The late John Keegan might be a better example.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Keegan

A very far cry ie. from US (or in fact, anglo in general) university culture, where military history chairs are par from the course even in provincial unis. In consequence, the overwhelming majority of scholarship and expertise concerning "German" 20th century military issues came out of the Anglo world, and this is still where some of the leading authorities reside. (Zuber, Citino, etc etc)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Department_of_War_Studies,_King%27s_College_London

This was, iirc, the lead UK Uni department for War Studies at that time, but (assuming Wiki to be accurate on this occasion), you can see an undergraduate department was not set up there until the early '90s

That being said, even throughout the 60s/70s/80s where the tendencies I described were at their zenith, their still always was at least a trickle of quality germanophone scholarship, however, this tended to come from outside the academic "establishment", was published in very limited numbers, was rarely if ever translated, and therefore received very little international - or domestic - exposure. The Zeitgeist, if you will, clearly frowned on the matter

.

From my limited recollection, Fritz Fischer was an historian who commanded international respect - but that was for WW1. A brief google suggests that both Zuber and Citino are comparatively 'modern'.

Nowadays the situation has actually greatly improved, to the point where "German" scholarship has pulled considerably ahead in some respects, the PoW question being a case in point, but this still is very insular and has a very limited audience; as evidenced by the fact that you will not find ie. a German Stephen Ambrose/Hastings/Glantz etc. whose reach not only greatly transcends academia, but whose publications are actually more geared towards the broader public.

Which pulls me in another direction and off-topic,but how far can Hastings/Ambrose /Beevor be regarded as mainstream academic historians? Or, the late Richard Holmes http://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/may/01/richard-holmes-obituary. Or Prof Caddick-Adams, who made the Ardennes video? He stated that his study was the first fresh review for 20 years

http://www.cranfield.ac.uk/about/people-and-resources/academic-profiles/cds-ac-profile/dr-peter-ap-caddick-adams.html

And yet, there is this publication, apparently highly lauded, only 10 years old.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Battle-Bulge-Ardennes-Offensive-1944-1945/dp/0306813912

Whilst I understand what you say, I doubt if the position was very different in UK until the early 90s (but I do not work in academia). The UK military had their military historians at Sandhurst - I was always of the impression (probably wrongly) that they were slightly frowned upon by the UK academic history establishment.' (One of our university tutors on British Empire history was ex-Sandhurst history staff - he seemed to have bridged the gap).

Well, I'll admit I am not nearly as familiar with the strictly academic situation in the UK as I am with regards to the US. However, judging by my experiences, the relationship between the Armed Forces and the broader public seem to be on a completely different, and for the lack of a better word, more relaxed footing than in Germany. Poppy day, regular public parades etc, the whole UK/Commonwealth remembrance culture for instance would be utterly, utterly unthinkable over here. There were times, and there are places where showing yourself in uniform in Germany would almost guarantee you to get a beating/get abused etc.. Also, going by the merchandise in any given bookstore, interest in military matters/narratives appear to be much more pronounced in the UK but that is of course a superficial impression.

From my limited recollection, Fritz Fischer was an historian who commanded international respect - but that was for WW1. A brief google suggests that both Zuber and Citino are comparatively 'modern'.

Well, technically speaking, Fischer was more than anything a theologian by training, and one with a rather, erh, colourful past at that. Also, his contributions were in the realm of diplomatic history, not in military matters, and much of his reputation stemmed from the fact that he worked in a highly politicised field... That being said there was never a shortage of internationally renowned historians in the Federal Republic, just not in classical military history...in fact, there was an almost ostentatious disregard of operational history, the conduct of actual battle, logistics, equipment and weaponry etc, and the very knowledge of such matters was widely considered at best irrelevant - and I am not exaggerating here. I studied under people who authored genuinely interesting and authoritative works on the sociological makeup of the Wehrmacht and the radicalisation of Eastern Front warfare/the genesis of the Holocaust who almost took pride in the fact that they never fired a rifle, could not tell a regiment from a brigade, and understood literally nothing of the how and why of a military, its organisation and psychology, which was at least in part responsible for why their narratives often fell short under scrutiny.

Zuber and Citino are Americans.

Which pulls me in another direction and off-topic,but how far can Hastings/Ambrose /Beevor be regarded as mainstream academic historians?

Not really of course, their primary research output was/is pretty negligable and often methodologically questionable (the case of the late Stephen Ambrose being an ugly cautionary tale), but their works are accessible, readable, and dont require a great deal of prior knowledge which is why they reach a large audience and make their authors the "face" of military history - and there is of course nothing wrong with that.

Аll this talk of archives, here are two links to ЦАМО (Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence.), just for fun and for relatives but it can be interesting, and a good way to find some source material. List people listed as losses Search for awards and geographic maps.

Hopefully we will see an easing up of things in the years to come. And with stuff that is in regards to certain personal data you need to be that person or a relative or can prove you represent the family, or the person has been deceased for a while. You can also make your/your fathers/grandfather/whatevers records public, should you wish to.


However as always political changes and regarding who you are, why you need the information etc makes a big change. ( US residence like Col. Glantz might have more issues than a Swedish historian for instance.) Being a citizen of Russia opens a tonne of doors. But if you aren't clear that you are doing research for an historian they might not approve it the next time around.

And different documents held might be controlled not by the archive but by like the head of administration of the general staff. So who that person is at the time will affect how lucky you are. (No there is no risk of nepotism )

Given that my intention when I'm older is to become a professional military historian, this is an interesting discussion.

Given that my intention when I'm older is to become a professional military historian, this is an interesting discussion.

If you are serious about going down that route, and especially if WW2 is the focus of your interest, the most important thing to do is to learn the pertinent languages, as not knowing Russian/German/Japanese (insert whatever theater/era you are interested in) will effectively preclude you from surveying the primary sources and producing quality scholarship. And best of luck man.

I've got another question for the historians and WW2 buffs out there.

So March 8th (Women's Day) a friend of mine sent me this link of women's photos throughout history, there's a lot of pictures from WW2. She was surprised of seeing fighting women in the Red Army, Soviet Partisans and French Résistance, also that most of the workforce in USA and UK was female. Yet there are no pictures of German ladies. Personally I can't think of any besides the teenage volkstrum girls pics manning AA emplacements or posing with rifles from 1945 that I googled a while ago. Seeing that the role of women during wartime was pretty well documented for the Allies nations. What was the role of women in the third Reich, they seem to have no role, either in the factories, rear lines nor front lines?!

Can someone explain why the soviets suffered so many wounded? Looking at the statistics, the casaulty ratio for millitary deaths on the eastern front was almost 1:1 with a slight advantage for the axis.

However, the soviets , atleast from the statistics suffered disproportionaly high wounded...

Can someone explain why the soviets suffered so many wounded? Looking at the statistics, the casaulty ratio for millitary deaths on the eastern front was almost 1:1 with a slight advantage for the axis.

However, the soviets , atleast from the statistics suffered disproportionaly high wounded...

Well to start off. casualties are counted very differently between nations. In classical terms the soviets counted only recoverable losses and irrecoverable losses. So if you got shot in the leg or got sick you are in the first category. Killed, missing or maimed you would be in the second category.

Germans, (and other nations) had their own way off keeping track of casualties. And of course other definitions of what constituted a causality.

Often times "irrecoverable" loss is translated as killed and missing whilst "recoverable" as wounded. Now this isn't necessarily true. People who where counted as irrecoverable (missing, presumed dead) would turn up again, maybe one person is counted more than once.

Wounded or more commonly sick persons can be sick more than once and would be casualties more than once. (You can find about 20 million casualties of all standard categories in the USSR depending on the sources, out of 36 million served. many people did seek medical attention or where taken out of action at one point, hence they are listed as recoverable losses.)

My understanding is that Germans didn't count sick people nor people who where lightly injured (please correct me if Im wrong) as wounded. Same as persons being wounded and died at hospital didn't count as 'killed'. (Again correct me if im wrong this is my understanding of germans counting losses during the war, if you want to I'll grant a source I just don't have time to look for it atm. I know alot more about the USSR than I know of the Germans. )



TLr My understanding of very high rates of 'wounded' from the soviets is because of differences of methods of counting and primarily that the ussr didn't specifically count "wounded in battle" differently from "temporarily out of action".