How Could the Axis Won the War ?

I keep seeing logistics being brought up. It is definitely key to why Germany would NEVER have won the war. Operations management which goes in tandem with logistics but includes the cultural/industrial capacities of the combatants can help color the bleak picture that was Germany's fate.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6xLMUifbxQ


I agree with what AvNY is trying to tell some of these wehraboos (I went through as similar phase with the American Civil War). The numbers for victory simply do not add up for Germany no matter how you fudge it.

Ill have a go - Britain surrenders after Dunkirk or is brought to heel (early) by a more successful Battle of the Atlantic. Entire Luftwaffe available for Russian campaign, far fewer garrisoned soldiers in France, Norway, Greece etc. plus more pliant populations. No bombing of industry, no pouring millions of man hours into the atlantic wall and less undercover shenanigans stirring up problems, no enigma cracking, no lend lease via Murmansk and if you play the deal right the British supply Germany with petroleum from Persia and raw materials from their empire. Does the US also prop up Russian supplies in this situation with no Western option? Perhaps Turkey joins in on the German side too with the promise of rebuilding a bit the old empire

I think they still might not have conquered the whole of the Soviet union but might have taken a big chunk and held it as they did after WW1

Well, the U-boat campaign certainly could have brought the UK to it's knees, in theory. But they didn't have enough U-boats at the start of the war either. As for planes, well, I dunno about specifically Nazi incompetence; aircraft production climbed through-out the war too.

Increasing production to "several times" that of the UK? Seems unlikely to me.

At this point Germany controlled the bulk of the industrial assets of Europe. and Germany alone already had a higher industrial base then great Britain. Not to mention germany had a much shorter supply chain i that was not nearly as vulnerable.

have ever played command and conquer? the British vs Germany situation would be like this: they both have their bases next to one another but Germany has 8 barracks continually pumping out troops while the brits have only 2. the brits do have 10 other barracks spread out across the map. who is going to win?

Germans of course because of concentration of power.

Its the same reaspn why the Japanese gave British such an ass kicking

I keep seeing logistics being brought up. It is definitely key to why Germany would NEVER have won the war. Operations management which goes in tandem with logistics but includes the cultural/industrial capacities of the combatants can help color the bleak picture that was Germany's fate.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6xLMUifbxQ


I agree with what AvNY is trying to tell some of these wehraboos (I went through as similar phase with the American Civil War).

The American civil war is an extremely faulty comparison. You do not take into account of strength of concentration. if Philadelphia and new york where placed on the west coast and not the east coast i would bet hundred bucks the south would have won.

Nice vid btw. But if Britain had fallen the Americans would not be able to enter the ww2 at all leaving only the soviets. And the soviets would have lost the industrial battle sooner rather then later.

At this point Germany controlled the bulk of the industrial assets of Europe. and Germany alone already had a higher industrial base then great Britain. Not to mention germany had a much shorter supply chain i that was not nearly as vulnerable.

I'm afraid you're not grasping the salient point. Germany can have as much industry as it likes, but without the raw materials to put through those industries, it's pretty much helpless.

And Germany does not have those resources within its borders. It has a few in its colonies, but it came late to the colony game. As we know, Germany HAD to seize Scandinavia to protect its steel supply; it HAD to go to the Balkans to secure oil. So at every turn Germany has to take on more opponents, broaden its fronts, extend its reach, just to stay in the war. And it has access to neither its own colonies nor international trade because British sea power is so overwhelming.

Britain has all of those resources in its colonies. As long as Britain can keep the sea lanes open, it can fight. And as we also know, Britain can use those same lanes to supply the Russians and open new fronts. Closing the lanes by U-boat action, or better, fighting a war in which Britain is not involved, were the only realistic options. They had a good go at naval interdiction, but they never had enough U-boats, and couldn't get enough because of the same resource shortages.

The prospect of trying to fight a war with Britain excluded doesn't seem plausible to me either; British foreign policy for hundreds of years had centred on one over-riding concern: that no single power should be able to unite Europe. I am confidant that even if Germany had somehow managed to arrange a war which Britain was not obligated to join by treaty (not that I can think of one), the British would have joined in anyway just to make sure that it never happened.

So I really don't see how there is any way out of the trap. Germany can't fight a war that doesn't involve Britain, it can't win while Britain is in the war, and it can't knock Britain out. The only smart thing to do was to not start the war.

RE: Fighting without Britain in the war.

Britain came extremely close to surrendering in 1940 when completely unexpectedly their main ally with the land army without which they had no hope of fighting on the continent collapsed. At this point the Soviets were on the wrong side. Plenty of powerful Germanophiles in the UK too including the Royal family (who famously damaged Britain's negotiating position in the run up by assuring in person to top Nazi's what Britain would and wouldn't go-to war over).

Your assertions about British policy are correct but this relied on the British having another friendly European power to back - this time there were no Prussians or French or Austro-Hungarians to side with and the situation with the Soviet union was one of mutual suspicion and animosity - Britain was set to intervene against it in the Finnish winter war just before this. The only hope was the US, 3000 miles away and broadly isolationist. If it hadn't have been for Churchill and his relationship with Roosevelt Britain may well have struck a deal with Germany - Britain keeps its global empire - Germany gets Europe and deals with all that troublesome communist stuff that can get out of hand and lead to Aristocrats and the powerful hanging from lampposts.

Even when Hitler turned on the Soviet Union the British expected them to collapse within weeks and the British supplied them with what it could as a delaying tactic only

I take your point array, and I don't really disagree in general terms. I acknowledge that Britain wobbled.

Where I disagree is that I don't think it was a practical possibility. Once Britain is involved, it becomes necessary to knock Britain out; and the only means to do that is unrestricted submarine war. And unrestricted submarine war was what brought the US into WW1. So the only potential German strategy to knock Britain out is the same one that is most likely to give Britain a new ally that can keep it in.

I'm afraid you're not grasping the salient point. Germany can have as much industry as it likes, but without the raw materials to put through those industries, it's pretty much helpless.
.

Correct but at the same time you are over blowing the situation by a rather huge margin. Germany still managed to wage war against the soviet union for 4 whole years. So raw resources where not the immediate problem and they could definitely could have sustained a war against Britain for a few years. Also keep in mind that in the absence of war against the soviet union the german/soviet trade pact would have in all likelihood continued.

Remember that Hitler invaded the soviet union because he wanted Germany to be resource autonomous.
He would be better of however if he just neutralised the British and opening the trade routes again

Yes I think we're in general agreement and thus the answer to the question of the axis approach to achieving final victory is to not fight Britain - though its not guaranteed they could still beat the Soviets...

They could have also/alternatively not fought the Soviet Union and been happy with France, Scandinavia, half of Poland and the Balkans and seized France's foreign colonies for itself but they had to go an be all ideological about it!

I take your point array, and I don't really disagree in general terms. I acknowledge that Britain wobbled.

Where I disagree is that I don't think it was a practical possibility. Once Britain is involved, it becomes necessary to knock Britain out; and the only means to do that is unrestricted submarine war. And unrestricted submarine war was what brought the US into WW1. So the only potential German strategy to knock Britain out is the same one that is most likely to give Britain a new ally that can keep it in.

This is false. While the reputation of Germany took a hit their where plenty of people that realised that sending arms and equipment to the brits is going to provoke an attack.

This is

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimmermann_Telegram

The real reason why the Americans joined the war in WW1.

Also the whole unrestricted submarine warfare is also false. at that point the uboats had sunk several thousand tonnage of American ships. its when hitler foolishly declared war against the usa after pearl harbour. And he didnt need to because Germany and Japan where in a defensive pact not

Correct but at the same time you are over blowing the situation by a rather huge margin. Germany still managed to wage war against the soviet union for 4 whole years. So raw resources where not the immediate problem and they could definitely could have sustained a war against Britain for a few years.

But a war against Britain was not likely to be resolved in a few years. Even if Germany had been able to maintain the U-boat force, which is more or less impossible, it would have turned into a mutual blockade, which each side trying to strangle the other. That's not the sort of thing that's going to decide itself in a hurry. The emphasis on an "immediate" problem is misplaced, because we are talking about the war as a whole.

I don't think I'm over-blowing the situation at all. Germany has to win quickly, and if Britain can be defeated at all, it can't be defeated quickly. So that's game over right there, in my opinion.

Also keep in mind that in the absence of war against the soviet union the german/soviet trade pact would have in all likelihood continued.

Maybe. But if the German leadership had been sensible enough to see the foolishness of attacking Russia, it would have been sensible enough to see the foolishness of invading Poland too. This also presupposes that German/Soviet relations remain stable for the duration, which also seems unlikely.


Re submarines:

This is false. While the reputation of Germany took a hit their where plenty of people that realised that sending arms and equipment to the brits is going to provoke an attack.

I don't disagree that the arming of UK was recognised as a de facto involvement in the war. But that isn't what I'm talking about; what I'm talking about is planning that should have happened long before the war started. The problem that Germany faced was cutting Britain off from its global network of supplies, which would necessarily require unrestricted warfare. This means deciding to sink American and other ships quite regardless of whether they are sympathetic to Britain. Submarine war did not start after Lend-Lease etc.; they were deployed by the BDU with sealed orders before the war began.

You're asking me to accept that Germany would have been able to kill US non-combatant citizens, and destroy US shipping, which is a strategic capacity, and reasonably expect that the US would do nothing about it. That's absurd.

The real reason why the Americans joined the war in WW1.

I don't think you've read you own resource sufficiently closely. As it says:

"On 1 February 1917, Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare against all ships in the Atlantic bearing the American flag, both passenger and merchant ships. Two ships were sunk in February, and most American shipping companies held their ships in port. Besides the highly provocative war proposal to Mexico, the telegram also mentioned "ruthless employment of our submarines." Public opinion demanded action. Wilson had previously refused to assign US Navy crews and guns to the merchant ships. However, once the Zimmermann note was public, Wilson called for arming the merchant ships, but antiwar elements in the United States Senate blocked his proposal."

It wasn't just the expression of the theoretical possibility of supporting Mexico against the US; it also proved that Germany was deliberately, and with malice aforethought, killing private US citizens. That these were not accidents or mis-identifications, but a deliberate policy of sinking American ships.

I don't disagree that the arming of UK was recognised as a de facto involvement in the war. But that isn't what I'm talking about; what I'm talking about is planning that should have happened long before the war started. The problem that Germany faced was cutting Britain off from its global network of supplies, which would necessarily require unrestricted warfare. This means deciding to sink American and other ships quite regardless of whether they are sympathetic to Britain. Submarine war did not start after Lend-Lease etc.; they were deployed by the BDU with sealed orders before the war began.

You're asking me to accept that Germany would have been able to kill US non-combatant citizens, and destroy US shipping, which is a strategic capacity, and reasonably expect that the US would do nothing about it. That's absurd.

The answer is yes, The Americans are a zealous people when it comes to defending their country but even they would recognize that sending ships filled with ammunition ,that you know is going to be used against the Germans, is going to provoke the Germans in attacking your ships. The war between Germany and the USA started only because of pearl harbour. At that point several thousand usa sailors met their death in the cold waters of the north sea.

But even so unrestricted submarine warfare wasn't the only option. They could have easily go for aerial supremacy and bomb the ports and industry or mine the ports. And if my focus was the British i would send the whermacht to north Africa. if they could capture the Egypt and Morocco the British empire would be cut in half while while having access to the oil of saudi araby.

And do not forget that British empire in 1941-2 was facing a 2 front war with the Japanese attacking their colonies.

"On 1 February 1917, Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare against all ships in the Atlantic bearing the American flag, both passenger and merchant ships. Two ships were sunk in February, and most American shipping companies held their ships in port. Besides the highly provocative war proposal to Mexico, the telegram also mentioned "ruthless employment of our submarines." Public opinion demanded action. Wilson had previously refused to assign US Navy crews and guns to the merchant ships. However, once the Zimmermann note was public, Wilson called for arming the merchant ships, but antiwar elements in the United States Senate blocked his proposal."

I would also suggest you read that part. their was a very strong antiwar movement in the america's during both world wars.

Once Britain is involved, it becomes necessary to knock Britain out; and the only means to do that is unrestricted submarine war.

I don't think that's the only way. If Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain go just a little differently, Germany has air superiority over the Isles. If the OKL and OKM weren't always feuding, perhaps they notice that a small percentage of the Luftwaffe in a small percentage of the time was accounting for a huge percentage of British shipping losses. Does unrestricted air warfare rather than unrestricted submarine warfare make any difference to the Americans? No, probably not. But it wouldn't have the same diminishing returns from attrition that Uboats did.

Then there's the matter of where British shipping comes from. Hitler fatally started ignoring Britain once he felt they were beaten. If he takes them seriously and approves Operation Felix (seizing Gibraltar with or without Franco's help), the war in north Africa and the usefulness of the Italians drastically changes. Even as late as 1942, if he'd sent Rommel a couple more divisions he likely takes the Suez and beyond. And if Japan is further "encouraged" to go after British holdings rather than American ones, you've essentially cut off British shipping at its sources rather than at its destination.

A lot of what iffing, but each one was a plausible event on its own.

Nice to see you, Kolaris!

The video earlier on in this thread by Andrew Roberts is reasonably clear: Germany could have won WWII prior to US involvement, but Hitler intervened fortunately/unfortunately, depending on your perspective.

Heisenberg boycotting (from inside) the nuclear bomb.

The answer is yes, The Americans are a zealous people when it comes to defending their country but even they would recognize that sending ships filled with ammunition ,that you know is going to be used against the Germans, is going to provoke the Germans in attacking your ships.

Which is irrelevant. Germany resorted to unrestricted submarine war precisely because it could not practice restricted war, which would oblige it to inspect ships and determine that they carrying war materials before they could be sunk. It would also make them responsible for sparing the lives of the crew and bringing them to shore somewhere. This was a practical impossibility for the Kriegsmarine and was never attempted.

There wasn't even any guarantee that the US would accept it, even if they tried it.

Either way, to attempt to present this as a German response to US support is to completely reverse the sequence of events. Unrestricted sub war committed them to sinking neutral shipping regardless of what cargo they were carrying. And they did this before any kind of aid was offered by the US.

But even so unrestricted submarine warfare wasn't the only option. They could have easily go for aerial supremacy and bomb the ports and industry or mine the ports. And if my focus was the British i would send the whermacht to north Africa. if they could capture the Egypt and Morocco the British empire would be cut in half while while having access to the oil of saudi araby.

They DID go for aerial supremacy, in the Battle of Britain, and lost. And as I pointed out above, modern thinking is they had no chance of winning. They did bomb ports and industry, or tried to, and they certainly dropped mines. But the British were quite capable of dealing with these things.

Losing Egypt, and I presume you allude to the Suez canal, would have made life more difficult, but far from impossible. Plenty of shipping even today goes the long route around the South African Cape, for precisely which reason U-boats operated in those waters too. It would not have cute the Empire in half; it would have simply lengthened supply lines.

And those armies you want to transport to Africa, and the oil you want to ship back? They have to go by sea, across the Mediterranean. The only reason that British did not deploy in the Med in any great strength is because they were instead blockading the German surface fleet in the Baltic. If Germany had genuinely managed to cause significant trouble in North Africa, the British could easily have shut it down and blockaded the Italian coast. This would have let the Tirpitz etc. out, which would have been bad, but not as bad the alternative. On top of this, whatever forces had shipped to North Africa would now be trapped.

It's a mad plan and there are good reasons it didn't happen.

And do not forget that British empire in 1941-2 was facing a 2 front war with the Japanese attacking their colonies.

Britain had plenty of experience being a naval empire. It has a historically small army precisely because it could afford to fight small, localised engagements in areas that can only be reached by sea. This also entails knowing you can't necessarily win every fight, but that you can dominate in the long run.

I would also suggest you read that part. their was a very strong antiwar movement in the america's during both world wars.

I'm well aware of it. I've mentioned myself that declaring war on the US was an act of hubris because every day that Germany could avoid bringing the US into the war was to their benefit. But every anti-war movement struggles when civilians are being killed, and that is precisely what unrestricted sub war was specifically going to do.

And more generally, look where you are now? In order to defeat the British, you're now trying to neutralise America. Every attempt to solve the problem creates an even bigger problem; Germany keeps snowballing the war into a bigger and bigger catastrophe, precisely the opposite of what was required for the only kind of war it could reasonably expect to win.

I don't think that's the only way. If Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain go just a little differently, Germany has air superiority over the Isles.

Dunkirk is irrelevant; Britain only deployed a token air force to the continent, so even if it had been entirely wiped out it would have made little difference. I've already discussed the Battle of Britain above; all I'll say here is that German fighters didn't have the range to even fly over the whole of the isles, let alone establish air superiority. I consider the suggestion laughable.

If the OKL and OKM weren't always feuding, perhaps they notice that a small percentage of the Luftwaffe in a small percentage of the time was accounting for a huge percentage of British shipping losses.

This is a surprise to me; I've hear of no such thing. The effectiveness of aircraft against naval targets was only really recognised after the Battle of Taranto, which was after the BoB was decided. Moreover, aircraft are in general vastly inferior to submarines for interdiction purposes; submarines can hunt undetected for months, far from any identifiable base.

Just for comparison, the US submarine force, comprising only 2% of US navy personnel, accounted for over 60% of Japanese sunk tonnage. There is no way aircraft could have remotely approached this.

Then there's the matter of where British shipping comes from. Hitler fatally started ignoring Britain once he felt they were beaten. If he takes them seriously and approves Operation Felix (seizing Gibraltar with or without Franco's help), the war in north Africa and the usefulness of the Italians drastically changes.

Well, I guess that's true, but I think only getting full Spanish entry into the war would have helped. The British demonstrably carried out several landings against fortified points in Europe and the Med; there is every reason to believe that the importance of Gibraltar would have forced them to do it there.

Even as late as 1942, if he'd sent Rommel a couple more divisions he likely takes the Suez and beyond.

Which was a course of action Rommel himself had advised against, until and unless Malta could be taken. Which it was not.

And if Japan is further "encouraged" to go after British holdings rather than American ones, you've essentially cut off British shipping at its sources rather than at its destination.

This would have been directly contrary to the Japanese war plan, which knew full well that their only hope was to smash the Americans so badly and so quickly that they could force a settlement; detaching forces to pick fights that did not contribute to this goal would never have been considered.

A lot of what iffing, but each one was a plausible event on its own.

Opinions clearly differ.

How does this keep coming up?

Here is a list of always-brought-up "what if"s that couldn't have happened even "if":

- Winning Battle of Britain: Germany greatly underestimated the RAF fighting capacity going into this. Also the British were were on an emergency war footing, and building more fighters than they lost (and building planes at a rate twice that of the Germans at the same time).

- Operation Sea Lion: To say this could work takes a fundamental misunderstanding of the complexity (even by modern military standards) of amphibious landings. The British and the Americans had been studying this for generations and even the under funded US militaries had been putting serious effort in both funding and excersizes in working out this specialty of warfare. They were to amphibious landing what the German operational artists were to land warfare in 1939.
The Germans would have to land on contested beaches without special equipment or training, without air superiority (let alone supremacy) and with a Surface navy that was both in numbers and training the inferior of the defensive naval forces. (and that is just the very simple explanation.)

- Taking Gibraltar without Franco's support (see Operation Sea Lion above, or the attempts on Malta, which was closer to Italy and farther from the deep blue water of the Atlantic that favored the Royal Navy).

- Capturing Moscow by attacking earlier, by focusing only on Moscow, etc. It wasn't the winter that stopped the Germans. Full stop. It was Russian resistance and ability to rebuild its forces while the Germans lacked resupply and reinforcements. It wasn't like they got to Moscow and then spent their effort. It was that the forces that made it TO Moscows defenses was a spent force. They didn't break through the outskirts of Moscow let alone through the suburbs let alone into or around Moscow. Moscow was ten times the size of Stalingrad.

- UK surrendering. The moment Churchill became the leader this became as likely of happening as Stalin surrendering (in other words it wouldn't happen).

- Keeping the US out of the War. This also wasn't going to happen. While there might have been a strong neutrality sentiment in the US before the war that was rpidly eroding in the favor of going to war. The reason it didn't take any time to declare war on Germany by the end of '41 is because sentiment was already moving that way.

The list is much longer (Me-262, Panzers, etc. etc.)