Whether fueled by ignorance or in preservation of face saving ego, I know not which, I make no apology that your misinformative 'smokescreen' just made me see methaphorical red as a field serving ex-Inf Plt Cmdr. A long time ago now prior to successfully pursuing 'loftier heights', but I've never forgotten the all arms training, nor the field experience.
Your original post as OP of the discussion
clearly referred to the use of smoke relevant to first wave assault. Gauging from your most recent post, it has to be said that you are no closer to practical understanding although it appears you are intent upon fooling yourself to think you are. I don't mind that, but I do mind you attempting to carry along with you dupes who appear willing to gulp down your McBullshit as fast as you serve it up.
And I quote this piece of logic challenged ignorance so arrogant as to make me almost cringe in embarrassment for you were it not that you don't appear to have either the nous or life experience to realise it yourself when it is pointed out to you.
So aside from all of the speculation and conjecture in this thread (not to mention the stuff that seems plain fabricated.) I did some searching on the matter, and it turns out that smoke was planned for, but not really required on D-Day.
Clearly, if you
actually read the piece you quoted, and then present it purporting to be why smoke was not deployed
on the invasion beaches during the actual time of the initial first assault wave landings, then you are just as clueless as you were before you began "searching". Kids with no actual infantry field command experience or knowledge of combined arms field tactics. <sigh>
I've already told you why smoke is 'not a good idea' (that's subtle
understatement for the comprehension and/or literacy challenged) under those circumstances, which had you ever planned an assault on any level, moved to an FUP and then experienced the mayhem which occurs from the moment you step off in the confusion of battle that never quite goes going according to plan (that's more understatement which will apparently need highlighting for comprehension as such to some), you might even gain an inkling of understanding.
There's a time to use cover
from horizontal view to cover tactical movement for fire and movement
advantage. Maintaining any chance of tactical coordination, command and control during the landing of an initial assault wave on an invasion beach isn't one of them.
Smoke. Several methods of delivery and types of
obstruction from view smoke from grenade canister (not coloured dye marker for targeting) through artillery fired, through a large extensive smokescreen by smoke projecters which simply wasn't viable on the landing beaches for first wave too large for infantry to carry even
were there any point to it -which there wasn't/isn't. Remember those Higgins boats/vehicular AT barriers/obstacles that had to be removed and obstacles preventing Higgins boats proceeding beyond a certain point and thus critical tide to be able to disembark attacking infantry in shallow water or beach?
Obstacles preventing or hindering tactical movement need to be seen to be destroyed by directed demo
teams to offer supporting wading Shermans and chance of penetrating the defensive shoreline, and those Sherman commanders need to be able to see where those breaches are to drive to and through them. No supporting flamethrowing or HE firing tanks in support = much higher casualties assaulting hardpoints (i.e. bunkers) or removing light obstacles such as wire covered by defensive fire.
The article you specifically quote is a red herring referring to the potential necessity for smokescreening
ordnance, logistical resupply and or elements of the fleet from air attack during the approach to the beaches and subsequently after the initial wave landings. That's
slant or vertical obstruction from view which is completely different. As an ex-'birdie', remember the loftier heights pursued after Inf Plt Cmdr I mentioned in a preceding paragraph? Guess what it is carrier launched A-4s do precisely, where the A in A-4 is the acronym designator for an Attack type vs F for Fighter or B for or F/A for multi-role? So I have that practical 'inkling' of a trained and practical experience as a ex-'driver' of same clue here too. Cover from view from the air requires a much denser thicker heavier screen to higher level that can only be supplied by large specialised vehicular mounted or truck carried for deployment projectors, NOT something infantry can carry on their backs during the actual beach assaults by the initial and immediate subsequent wave/s even were it to serve any purpose.
As I stated in my previous post, why
exactly is it do you think smoke wasn't used in the Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Peleliu or Saipan assault wave landings if it could have been useful in saving lives or advantaged achieving the immediate tactical objectives? America's inability to provide logistical support of smoke from those invasion fleets? Have you got any actual concept of what stood off Tarawa or Iwo prior to those landings and what those immense forces laid on the resolute brave defenders? Have you ever been on Tarawa, Iwo, Peleliu, Majuro, Kwajalein, battlegrounds of New Guinea or Guadalcanal and Ironbottom sound to walk and comprehend the terrain and conditions under which these battles were fought as I have? I haven't been to Iwo or Saipan yet, the former a pligrimage on my bucket list. I might be critical of aspects of US ops during WW II, but logistics isn't an area I would criticise -ever. The USA of WW II era was the unchallenged master of the logistics.
SO back to smoke. Quite apart from the reasons already presented and represented below, smoke will just add to panic and confusion of the men in such assault waves rendering them non-effective. You'd understand that if you had ever led men under such circumstances on the ground, even in training or at night in the confusion of an attempted night assault or defense against same. Note that major assaults generally step off in the just pre-dawn light? There's a reason for that.
So no smoke at Omaha. Oversight, or just more stupid US general staff planning? Or maybe, just maybe, the real reason isn't the one you just read in a book and still clearly yet have no comprehension of?
He's my advice to you. Put away your Wiki mouse and textbooks, qualify scholastically and physically, have the courage to apply to put yourself in harm's way outside the realm of a COH2 mouse, get selected -not exactly a difficult task in the US today with the world's largest 'defence' budget of 500 billion, X10 times larger than its nearest contender, do the training,
graduate -the first hurdle, do some time in the infantry as a field officer in the Army or Marines ON THE GROUND, and you might just develop a clue of what tactical smoke is for, how it works and what it does, and when you should use it or call for it.
Also.
(Pre)
Registered fire (arty and mortar). Find out what they are. (Funnelled)
killing zones. Find out what they are.
Beaten zone of an MMG/HMG. Find out what that is. HMGs
sighted along fixed lines. Find out what that means.
Intersecting HMG arcs of fire providing cross cover. Find out how that works. Find out what that all means in reference
obstacles (to movement). Find out what obstacles are and why they are deliberately placed where they are by defenders (to funnel attackers into killing zones, covered by registered mortar and arty fire and swept by multiple HMGs firing along fixed lines. Think about how smoke will hamper the attackers rather more than the defenders given all of this. Find out what that means in terms of HMG sighting and killing stupid arsed Americans who think smoke is somehow going to protect them magically from bullets, shrapnel or HE blast.
Just like an ambush which is sets up a killing zone planned, prepared, deployed and executed to ensure no-one who enters it will escape (do the training I suggested and you will understand how Hollywood's version of events for idiot consumption is quite different from reality), the optimum chance of achieving the only objective if you walk into an ambush,
successful survival, or attaining the objective in the case of an assault upon an invasion beach which is a similar situation to an ambush, is to
move out of that killing ground as quickly as possible.
That generally means attacking straight at the ambush (SOPs) or assault objective to destroy the defenders, although not literally up the guts nthe second instance. Remaining in the killing ground just means
everybody dies, not
some die, even if that means most. You can't do that if you can't see where you are going, see the enemy positions to return
aimed fire which is the only form of effective fire or direct offshore support arty on it/them. Equally it is important for the attackers to be able to see the obstacles to move around or cut (wire) or open a pathway through to get around them them. OK it's a movie, but remember Tom Hanks calling for Bangalores to do just that as it is illustrative?. Seeing where the
dead ground or trajectory outside the beaten zone is to move into it is also helpful -which might save you from MG and small arms fire, though it's not great cover from arty or mortar fire in the particular, so its not a great loiter point for long.